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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Ryan M. Harding 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Political Science 
June 2021 
Title: Empirical Hobbes: Science and Political Theory in the Works of Thomas 
Hobbes 
This dissertation adjudicates the role of empiricism in the science and 
political theory of Thomas Hobbes. It accords “empiricism” status as a separate, 
coherent motivation, apart from others (like geometricization), which helped 
to orientate Hobbes, shaping his political theory and filtering into his scientific 
ideas and practices. The dissertation demonstrates that experience played a 
more dynamic, if misunderstood role in early Hobbesian science than is 
accounted by interpreters, and disaggregates the different meanings Hobbes 
gave “experience,” particularly in The Elements of Law (1640) and in the first 
(1642) and second (1647) editions of De cive. This demonstration culminates in 
a treatment of Leviathan (1651) that challenges methodological interpretations, 
and offers, instead, that the text’s exposition was, in part, crafted to address a 
pair of substantive concerns about the effects of un-empirical speech and causal 
myopia in human decision-making. The dissertation also considers the 
relationship between serial composition, the method Hobbes used to construct 
many of his texts, and his empiricism. The study of this relationship yields two 
principal findings. First, serial composition encouraged changes in Hobbes’s 
empiricism, prompting the development of new empirical concepts, analytical-
v 
empirical strategies, and changes in his political methodology. Second, the 
practice resulted in layered, bricolage texts, all responding to different features 
of Hobbes’s world, and in which are embedded different understandings of 
what the empirical study of that world entails. The empirical “drift” of Hobbes’s 
works potentially makes assembling some set of them into a whole and the 
search for systematicity in Hobbes’s political theory a futile task. Thus, the 
dissertation questions the interpretive utility of the methodological statements 
elaborated in De corpore (1655). A close analysis of the statements also offers an 
entry-point into a discussion of Hobbes’s practice of retrojecting new, emergent 
understandings of science and scientific method back onto previous texts. This 
practice of retrojection, the analysis shows, went hand-in-hand with and, to an 
extent, stemmed from Hobbes’s use of serial composition, combined with his 
empiricism. The dissertation also features a revised chronology of the Elementa 
Philosophiae, Hobbes’s plan for a trilogy of texts that would elaborate the 
elements of his philosophy. 
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The idea for this dissertation originated in a simple puzzle. Thomas 
Hobbes’s first major work of political theory, The Elements of Law (1640), 
appears to minimize the role of experience in the construction of scientific 
knowledge, and specifically, in the production of universal, certain truths. In 
fact, in The Elements Hobbes seems to forcefully prise the two, experience and 
science, apart. He offers the curt assessment that “Experience concludeth 
nothing universally,”1 and develops a typology of knowledge that explicitly 
disaggregates2 science from simple prudential reasoning, “conjecture from 
experience,”3 mere “knowledge of fact.”4 Yet, it would be a mistake to draw 
conclusions about the place of experience in science on the basis of these 
 
1 Hobbes, Thomas, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1928), 12 [4.10]. Hereafter, all references to The Elements of Law 
include three elements: (i) a page number and (ii) the chapter and (iii) paragraph (as numbered 
in the text) in which the relevant material is found (in brackets). Moving forward, a chapter and 
paragraph or article number is given in brackets in references to Hobbesian works which 
originally featured numbered paragraphs (as in De cive and De corpore) or articles (as in 
Thomas Hobbes’s commentary on Thomas White’s De mundo). 
 
2 Hobbes specifies, “there be two sorts of knowledge, whereof the one is nothing else but sense, 
knowledge original…and remembrance of the same; the other is called science or knowledge of 
the truth of propositions, and how things are called, and is derived from understanding.” 
However, he adds, “Both of these sorts are but experience; the former being experience of the 
effects of things that work upon us from without; the latter the experience men have of the 
proper use of names in language. And all experience being (As I have said) but remembrance, 
all knowledge is remembrance: and of the former, the register we keep in books, is called 
history; but the registers of the latter are called the science,” ibid, 18-19 [6.1]. In 6.4, he adds, 
“And of these two kinds of knowledge, whereof the former is experience of fact, and the latter 
evidence of truth: as the former, if it be great, is called prudence, so the latter, if it be much, 
hath usually been called, both by ancient and modern writers, SAPIENCE or wisdom: and of this 
latter, man is only capable; of the former, brute beasts also participate,” ibid, 20 [6.4]. 
 
3 Ibid, 12 [4.10]. 
 




ostensibly unequivocal remarks. Hobbes also notes that “right reason,” the 
organon of science, begins with “principles that are found indubitable by 
experience.”5 So too, he lampooned dogmatici for substituting ersatz, bogus 
maxims for the tried-and-true conclusions that flow from “evident 
demonstrations…from experience.”6 
Many Hobbes interpreters have simply overlooked or swept away the 
puzzle. After all, to admit the puzzle would be to invite murkiness into an 
otherwise clean, solid distinction between (deductive) science and (inductive) 
experience, two distinct forms of knowledge and knowledge creation Hobbes is 
supposed to have held separate. To admit the puzzle would also complicate the 
projects of some of Hobbes’s intellectual biographers, who have deployed the 
distinction between science and experience as a historiographical device, as a 
means by which to mark and track changes in the trajectory of Hobbes’s 
intellectual life. In such contexts, the distinction between knowledge begot by 
experience and knowledge derived by ratiocination (i.e., scientific, syllogistic 
reasoning) is made into fulcrum, a pivot point, around which Hobbes’s 
intellectual development revolves.  
 
5 Hobbes writes, “Now when a man reasoneth from principles that are found indubitable by 
experience, all deceptions of sense and equivocation of words avoided, the conclusion he 
maketh is said to be according to right reason; but when from his conclusion a man may, by 
good ratiocination, derived that which is contradictory to any evident truth whatsoever, then is 
he said to have concluded against reason: and such a conclusion is called absurdity,” ibid, 17 
[5.12]. 
 
6 The quotation, which appears in chapter 13, “How by language men work upon each other’s 
minds,” contains an “either” omitted in the ellipsis: “without any evident demonstration either 
from experience, or,” Hobbes adds, “from places of Scripture of uncontroverted interpretation,” 
ibid, 51 [13.4]. 
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A clarifying illustration is found in Mariam Reik’s The Golden Lands of 
Thomas Hobbes. Reik locates a shift in Hobbes’s epistemological posture, 
between the views about knowledge and truth operative in Hobbes’s 
introduction to his translation of Thucydides (1628)7 and the positions 
adumbrated in The Elements (1640). There is a noticeable friction between the 
former introduction, which locates “truth”8 in Thucydides’ history, having been 
rendered “evident”9 through artful deployments of rhetoric and historical 
 
7 The text bears 1629 as the year of publication. However, as Noel Malcolm points out, the text 
was registered in March 1648, and adds, “In his letter to the widowed Countess of Devonshire, 
sent from London on 6 [/16] November, Hobbes said that the printers would ‘shortly be ready’ 
for the Epistle Dedicatory, which was printed last of all. The title page of the book gives the 
date of publications as 1629; but it was common practice to put the next year’s date on a book 
published in November or December. The exemplum in Dr Williams’s Library London...bears 
the inscription: ‘Ex Authoris dono Januarij primo [1628 altered to 1629] Ex libris Samuel. 
Harrisonj,’” Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years’ War: An Unknown Translation by 
Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 11 n. 44. 
 
8 As Reik notes, Hobbes “finds no conflict between such reconstructed speeches [i.e., 
Thucydides’ “fictive orations”] and his requirements for ‘truth’ in the historian,” The Golden 
Lands of Thomas Hobbes (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977), 48. 
 
9 Ibid, 48. In the passage, Reik explains, “By skillful description, the historian provokes the 
emotions of a spectator in the reader, and the events thereby become ‘evident’ – a word that 
appears several times in the Hobbes essay and one that he uses more in the order meaning of 
the immediately manifest or ‘seen.’” However, Reik offers a highly qualified interpretation of 
Hobbes’s remarks. She notes, “nor was Hobbes really satisfied to substitute belief engendered 
in the reader for demonstration of historical causes and consequences. The nature of history, 
he said, is ‘merely narrative,’ and no style, no matter how vivid, could of itself make historical 
narrative instructive.” The conclusions Reik draws are somewhat misleading. First, the meaning 
and scope of Hobbes’s remark about histories that are “merely narrative” is ambiguous; a 
plausible interpretation of the line is that the evaluation was intended to apply to a subset of 
histories, specifically ones that are inferior to Thucydides’, see: Thomas Hobbes’s “Of the Life 
and History of Thucydides,” in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury vol. VIII, 
ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: Richards, 1843), vii-viii. Second, Hobbes makes clear that 
the instructiveness of history turns on and is highly related to the historian’s capacity to render 
evident narration: “But Thucydides is one, who, though he never digress to read a lecture, 
moral or political, upon his own text, nor enter into men’s hearts further than the acts 
themselves evidently guide him: is yet accounted the most politic historiographer that ever 
writ. The reason whereof I take to be this. He filleth his narrations with that choice of matter, 
and ordereth them with that judgment, and with such perspicuity and efficacy expresseth 
himself, that, as Plutarch saith, he maketh his auditor a spectator. For he setteth his reader in 
the assemblies of the people and in the senate, at their debating ; in the streets, at their 
seditions; and in the field, at their battles. So that look how much a man of understanding 
might have added to his experience, if he had then lived a beholder of their proceedings, and 
familiar with the men and business of the time : so much almost may he profit now, by 
attentive reading of the same here written. H e may from the narrations draw out lessons to 
4 
reconstruction, and the view Hobbes marks out later in The Elements, a text 
that embraces an idea of truth, fashioned on the model of deductive geometry, 
from which history, “experience of fact,” had apparently been jettisoned. Reik 
writes, 
These are crucial terms10 to consider in view of Hobbes’s later 
formulations about method. Inasmuch as his model for scientific 
knowledge would be drawn from geometry because its conclusions were 
demonstrable and necessary, history (both civil and natural) would be 
classified as indemonstrable knowledge of fact. Both kinds of history 
made a man prudent by adding to his experience; both were kinds of 
memory. 11 
Closing out the point, Reik adds, “profoundly skeptical of the evidence 
of the senses, he would hold that no certain knowledge of fact could ever be 
attained in any case.” What she offers is that Hobbes’s turn to geometric 
science can be understood within a larger arch of discovery, a search for certain 
himself, and of himself be able to trace the drifts and counsels of the actors to their seat,” ibid, 
viii. 
10 The “crucial terms” are, in fact, a distinction between probable and certain knowledge. Reik 
fills in the content of Hobbes’s epistemological outlook at the time of writing the introduction 
with especial attention to rules of rhetoric and, especially, context, pointing out that, “Hobbes 
was not, of course, alone in his time in permitting fictive orations to live alongside 
requirements for truth; such speeches were often considered allowable if they were ‘probable.’” 
However, she goes on to add, more speculatively, that, for Hobbes, “Thucydides’ method is 
perspicuous in its presentation of causal factors because it renders ‘probable’ reconstructions of 
what would have been said under the circumstances and it concretizes true abstractions,” The 
Golden Lands of Thomas Hobbes, 49. While not sharply divergent from Hobbes’s remarks on 
conjecture and (some) history in the introduction, Reik both pushes beyond the text of these 
remarks and, in the assessment, quietly relies on distinctions delineated in later Hobbesian 
works and correspondence (as between science and experience, and science and non-
demonstrable physics), combined with context, to make the point. The simple, but historically 
and interpretively unsatisfying fact is that Hobbes supplies insufficient detail in the 
introduction to draw strong, clear conclusions about the epistemic status of history, and more 
broadly, his epistemological outlook at the time. However, it may be offered that the 
retrojection of the distinction between science and experience, or physics and non-
demonstrable science, back on to Hobbes as he wrote the introduction to his translation of 
Thucydides may plausibly introduce distortion into Reik’s analysis of Hobbes’s introduction as 
well as misrepresent the epistemic status of experience in both contexts (i.e., within the context 
of the introduction and then, in particular, within the context of Hobbes’s later work). 
11 Reik, The Golden Lands of Thomas Hobbes, 49. 
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knowledge. An important milepost in the search is the introduction to the 
translation of Thucydides, the idea that there can be “truth” in history (and 
thereby, experience). After, “[h]e would become intrigued by the possibilities of 
geometrical methods,” she writes, “precisely because they seemed to combine 
the evident with necessary truth…”12 Thus, Reik positions Hobbes’s embrace of 
“geometrical methods” against an earlier flirtation with “truth” in history, 
which was a necessary stop on the road to discovering a method capable of 
generating the kind of certain conclusions for which Hobbes was earnestly 
searching. 
Elements of the view are reproduced and amplified in Timothy Raylor’s 
new book, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes. Raylor’s book addresses 
the relationship between rhetoric and science in Hobbes’s work13 for the 
 
12 The full quotation proposes, “He would become intrigued by the possibilities of geometrical 
methods precisely because they seemed to combine the evident with necessary truth, and they 
could be applied to moral philosophy,” ibid, 49-50. The analysis harmonizes with dimensions of 
Timothy Raylor’s. Raylor argues that Hobbes’s innovation within the context of the study of 
civil science was to make an area of inquiry which, previously, produced merely plausible 
conclusions into one that could claim the mantle of geometric certainty. Raylor writes that, for 
Hobbes, “civil philosophy is not (as moral philosophers since Aristotle and up through Lipsius 
and Bacon had believed) part of the realm of things open to argument and deliberation; it is, by 
contrast, apodeictically demonstrable; its truths can be known with absolute certainty. Civil 
science is no longer, as Aristotle insisted in the Nicomachean Ethics and Hobbes had assumed 
in the prefatory matter to his Thucydides, a matter of prudence—limited, contingent, and 
practical; it is, rather, a species of wisdom: a certain, demonstrable, and universal science. 
There is no place in it for dialectical reasoning, and none therefore for rhetoric,” Philosophy, 
Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 212. 
 
13 Of the scope and critical aims of his project, Raylor explains, “that, from the earliest point at 
which we have evidence, Hobbes, although a humanist by profession, did not conceive of 
rhetoric in civic humanist terms, as a noble enterprise, which required—or, according to some 
theorists, guaranteed—impeccable moral credentials in the speaker—as in Quintilian’s famous 
definition of the orator as ‘a good man skilled in speaking’ (‘vir bonus dicendi peritus’). 
Hobbes’s tutoring, by contrast, appears strongly pragmatic, aimed at training a young aristocrat 
in the management of his affairs, and the handling of his public responsibilities. Even in this 
early, ‘humanist’ period Hobbes is preoccupied with the dangers of persuasion and views 
rhetoric less as the foundation of civic life than as an instrument of its potential subversion. 
Such concerns are of a piece with those he would express on many occasions, in works ranging 
from De cive and Leviathan through to Behemoth. Hobbes’s humanism is in general terms not, I 
argue, Ciceronian or civic; it is, rather, as Richard Tuck and Noel Malcolm have argued, ‘late’ or 
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purpose of dismantling a scheme of periodization popularized by Quentin 
Skinner that proposes a shift in Hobbes’s comfort with the use of rhetoric in 
philosophy. In the process of making his anti-Skinnerian case, Raylor accepts 
the view that Hobbes “abandon[ed]” the practice of “collecti[ng]”14 experiences 
when he embraced the ideal of demonstrative science, à la geometry.  Thus, 
while dismantling one scheme of periodization (Skinner’s), Raylor substitutes 
another scheme in its place.  
The view endorsed by Raylor, like Reik, asserts that Hobbes operated 
under two different epistemological paradigms at different times in his life. He 
held distinct, incommensurate15 views on the relationship between experience 
and truth (Reik) and experience and science (Raylor) before and then following 
a turn to geometric science. Luc Borot presents a strong version of the point: 
“Hobbes seems to have undergone an epistemological crisis on one of his 
 
Tacitean in its emphasis on uncovering deceit, dissimulation, and the hidden springs of power,” 
ibid, 13. 
 
14 Raylor assesses that “Hobbes abandons the collection and registration of experiences,” having 
embraced an “austere, narrowly restricted version of Aristotelian syllogistic as the only route to 
knowledge,” ibid, 191. 
 
15 I use the language of “paradigm” in the full Kuhnian sense. Of revolutionary change in 
science, Thomas Kuhn explains, “Revolutionary changes are somehow holistic. They cannot, 
that is, be made piecemeal, one step at a time, and they contrast with normal or cumulative 
changes like, for example, the discovery of Boyle’s law. In normal change, one simply revises or 
adds a single generalization, all others remaining the same. In revolutionary change one must 
either live with incoherence or else revise a number of interrelated generalizations together […] 
roughly speaking, the distinctive character of revolutionary change in language is that it alters 
not only the criteria by which terms attach to nature but also, massively, the set of objects or 
situations to which those terms attach. What had been paradigmatic examples of motion for 
Aristotle – acorn to oak or sickness to health – were not motion at all for Newton…Or again, 
what had been the unit cell of Volta’s battery was no longer the referent of any term forty years 
after his invention was made. Though Volta’s successors still dealt with metals, liquids, and the 
flow of charge, the units of their analyses were different and differently interrelated,” “What are 
Scientific Revolutions?,” in The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an 
Autobiographical Interview, eds. James Conant and John Haugeland (Chicago: The University of 




journeys to the Continent…about 1630,”16 Borot writes. The outcome, Borot 
contends, was a thoroughgoing reconsideration of, and a turn away from 
history, “knowledge of the past,” mere “time and memory,” or simple 
experience, to a “science of politics…based on strong deductive grounds, on 
undebatable premises.”17 
There was a change during the relevant period with respect to Hobbes’s 
epistemological posture, how he conceptualized science and truth. However, 
there is less distance and more continuity between the two postures than any of 
the views suppose. What Raylor and Reik miss – something overlooked even by 
scholars who eschew the idea of such a break18 in Hobbes’s intellectual 
 
16 Borot, Luc, “History in Hobbes’s Thought,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom 
Sorell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 306. 
 
17 Ibid, 307. 
 
18 David Johnston, while focused on the distinction between science and history, uses the 
science-experience distinction as ballast for his account, writing “This distinction [i.e., between 
the “particulars of experience” and “universal knowledge”] is commonly regarded as the most 
important sign of the gulf that divides the scientific and philosophical outlook of Hobbes’s later 
years from the humanistic viewpoint of his earlier period. The reason Hobbes turned away from 
history is neither that he considered it incapable of causal explanation nor that he began to 
distrust its reliability. Instead, Hobbes turned away from history because he had discovered a 
different source of political knowledge, science, which is more powerful than history because it 
makes universal statements possible,” The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the 
Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 11. Likewise, 
Luke Borot explores a continuity in Hobbes’s work with respect to his views on history, but as 
pointed out, uses the distinction as an analytical device wherewith to parse Hobbes’s 
biography, “History in Hobbes’s Thought,” 305-328. So too, Ioannis Evrigenis, not unlike Reik, 
attempts a reconciliation of Hobbes’s biography with respect, specifically, to his use of rhetoric. 
He writes, “Focusing on 1629 as the point at which Hobbes allegedly broke with humanism and 
turned to science thus causes us to lose sight of the fact that Hobbes had been and continued 
to be primarily concerned with persuasion,” but nevertheless leaves the distinction intact, 
without pausing to consider the relationship between the two in depth, Images of Anarchy: The 
Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes’s State of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 46, and also see 8-9. Further, Evrigenis uses the distinction a prism through which to 
interpret and taxonomize Hobbes’s political theory, writing, “Far from constructing a 
philosophical account that will yield universal conclusions in conformity with the demanding 
standards of De Corpore, in appealing to experience in the Elements and De Cive, Hobbes is 
merely extending the principles that he had expounded in his analysis of history where he had 
identified prudence toward the present and providence toward the future as the benefits of 
good history,” ibid, 96. The puzzle on which Evrigenis gets hung up – Hobbes’s invocations of 
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development but who nevertheless reproduce and traffic in the hard 
experience-science distinction – is how Hobbes brought experience into the 
new conception of science and truth. Embedded in Raylor’s contention that, 
following the turn, “Hobbes” was “interested…not in the facts of experience or 
the pursuit of particular cases by way of induction” is a misrepresentation, as 
Raylor’s point elides the enduring role of experience, and even particular cases 
(dressed up to appear more credible), in the science of The Elements of Law and 
the works that followed.  
Even David Johnston, who is a stated ally19 of the broad view elaborated 
here, misses the mark. Johnston, like the rest, leaves in place the wedge that 
divides science and experience, and reproduces the elements of a periodized 
history at which he, himself, directs critical ire.  Johnston holds that “the 
‘precepts’ [Hobbes] had associated with philosophy in 1628 were no more than 
loose generalizations, rules of thumb drawn from experience. Now,” Johnston 
emphasizes, “[Hobbes] was confronted with a form of reasoning that seemed to 
offer the prospect of genuinely universal conclusions, based less on experience 
than upon rigorous definitions.”20 Hence, Johnston is thrown by Hobbes’s 
requirement that science be rooted in experience. He finds the meaning of the 
 
experience within the context of elaborating his political theory – is a subject that receives 
extended scrutiny in the next two chapters. 
 
19 While not a proponent of precisely the same view, Johnston does reject the idea of a break, if 
of a different nature. He writes, “It is therefore impossible to concur with the view that the 
break between Hobbes’s early conception of history and his later idea of philosophy or science 
occurred over the issue of causation, if it occurred at all,” The Rhetoric of Leviathan. It bears 
noting that Reik makes a similar argument in The Golden Lands of Thomas Hobbes. For an 
assessment of one element of the argument, see footnote 7. 
 
20 Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan, 22-23. 
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passage in which Hobbes relates the requirement “obscure,” and assesses, with 
obvious (and understandable) confusion, that Hobbes “was unable to define 
clearly” just how science is “grounded…in experience.”21 
What a long history of Hobbes’s intellectual development reveals is that 
Hobbes was deeply wedded to the project of engineering forms of explanation 
capable of mapping the shifting topographies of human experience. As the 
second chapter shows, he maintained an earnest empirical curiosity, engaging 
in different forms of experiential probing throughout all relevant “periods.” 
Even as a young student at Oxford, Hobbes eschewed the abstruse, 
overwrought precepts of “Aristotelity”22 promoted by the school curriculum. 
Instead, he was keen to know how things that he witnessed in the world 
worked, and was inclined to a straightforward, concrete style of thinking. 
Though drawn into different philosophical movements and programs at 
different points in his life, the aim always was to anatomize and understand the 
world he saw. He brought his experience and his world into his work. Likewise, 
Hobbes did not push experience out of his science. He conceived of a science 
and engaged in patterns of scientific praxis deeply reliant on sense experience 
and observation, as evidenced by The Elements of Law. Reik’s assessment that 
Hobbes was “profoundly skeptical of the evidence of the senses,” so much so 
that “he would hold that no certain knowledge of fact could ever be attained in 
21 Ibid, 49. 
22 See footnote 39 in the chapter that follows on empiricism in Hobbes’s early science and The 
Elements of Law. 
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any case”23 may have, in some period,24 applied to Hobbes’s friend, the French 
philosopher Pierre Gassendi. As a characterization of Hobbes, it is simply 
wrong. 
Hobbes’s intellectual biography may not conform to a straight line. 
However, as the second chapter shows, his empiricism, his close attention to 
experience and quest for empirical truth, form the basis for a motivation that 
can be seen at work, churning throughout his life. Where others posit a break 
23 Reik, The Golden Lands of Thomas Hobbes, 49. 
24 Reik’s assessment, by necessity, is not a summary of Gassendi’s view, especially with respect 
to how he subtly navigated questions related to certainty and the epistemic reliability of sense 
experience versus, e.g., reason; Susan James addresses the subject in “Certain and Less Certain 
Knowledge,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1986-1987): 227-242. However, early on, 
Gassendi famously eschewed the idea of certain knowledge. As Paolo Mancosu records, 
“Gassendi went as far as to claim in the second part of his Exercitationes Paradoxicae adversum 
Aristoteleos, written in 1624 but published posthumously in 1658, that no science exists, and in 
particular Aristotelian science,” Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the 
Seventeenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 13; on Gassendi’s views in 
Exercitationes Paradoxicae adversum Aristoteleos also see Richard H. Popkin’s The History of 
Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 92-93. However, 
Gassendi’s skepticism softened over time, as he accorded information derived from sense 
experience provisional status as knowledge. Of the shift, Henry G. van Leeuwen writes, “In his 
early writings, Gassendi had argued for complete skepticism, using the views of Montaigne and 
Sextus to reach the negative conclusion that no science is possible, least of all that of Aristotle. 
The only conclusion is that nothing can be known. Later on, Gassendi tempered his 
epistemological skepticism by joining it to the constructive conclusion of his friend, Mersenne. 
In the analysis of knowledge in the Syntagma philosophicum Gassendi tried to establish a via 
media between dogmatism and skepticism. The type of absolute knowledge sought by the 
dogmatic philosophers cannot be found, but at the same time we can find a type of knowledge 
which we have no reason to doubt, and which suffices to enable us to understand the world. 
This limited knowledge consists of what is obvious to us, our sense experience, plus certain 
conclusions drawn from this. We can judge from a cautious and careful examination of sense 
experience that certain other facts should be true, or might be true. These judgements are 
either verified by later experience, or by the conformity of experience with the system of 
judgements. Hence, Gassendi’s physical theory, atomism, is ‘justified’ as a system of judgments 
about experience, and is ‘verified’ by the fact that experience is what one would expect, if 
atomism were true. This yields what he called a shadow of truth, rather than true knowledge 
itself. Gasendi made no effort to defend his atomic theory as a true picture of reality, and 
hence, as a metaphysical system. It was defended as the best predictive hypothesis considering 
what we ‘know’ from sense experience,” The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630-1690 
(The Hague: Springer, 1963), viii. Nevertheless, Gassendi’s skepticism would put he and René 
Descartes on a collision course and at loggerheads; indeed, Gassendi demolished some of the 
undergirding epistemological structure supporting Descartes’s Meditations on First Principles. 
11 
in Hobbes’s intellectual biography, this dissertation sees a continuity, an 
overarching trajectory and an orientation whose core features changed little 
across time and space. 
The fact of Hobbes’s empiricism has not gone unnoticed in the 
secondary literature.25 Yet, no one has, to date, produced a monograph 
centered on the theme, which, specifically, aims to delineate his empiricism as 
it operated in its different modes. The word “empiricism” and its cognates 
abound across this dissertation. “Empiricism,” as it is variously used, broadly 
refers to either a disposition – that is, an inclination to probing explanations of 
experiences of nature (including human nature); a pattern or style of analysis 
that fundamentally relies on sense experience, or inferences from sense 
experience, for data to fill out and fill in explanations of the world; or an 
explanation that describes some fact or feature of the world as disclosed 
directly through or inferred from bare sense experience. Hobbes was empirical 
in all three senses. Empiricism was a way of being in the world and represented 
25 Notable examples include David Boonin-Vail, who expounds, “The definitions in science, that 
is, the elementary propositions about natural bodies, must remain open to revision in light of 
new evidence, but the scientist can nevertheless ‘reason aright’ from those definitions that best 
fit the evidence to find conclusions that follow inexorably from them. In this way, Hobbes can 
reasonably claim to maintain a view of science that benefits from the example of geometry 
without becoming detached from empirical reality,” Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral 
Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 33; Johnston, who, while observing that 
“Scientific propositions are abstract, but they are abstracted from experience,” remarks 
somewhat tentatively that “there is a sense in which the validity of any science as a whole is 
dependent upon its connection with reality,” The Rhetoric of Leviathan, 52; and especially John 
Danford, who, in the process of explicating the relationship between Hobbes’s ideas and 
Euclidean geometry, points out (seemingly) of geometry, that “science is not constructed out of 
thin air, or on the basis of merely arbitrary principles. The conceptions which lie at its base are 
the result of careful analysis of the sensible observable world. It is emphatically empirical,” “The 
Problem of Language in Hobbes’s Political Science,” The Journal of Politics 42, no. 1 (1980), 118. 
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an approach to studying that world. It was an approach that, in turn, furnished 
explanations capable of making sense of the world he experienced. 
The dissertation also explores the theme of serial composition in tandem 
with Hobbes’s empiricism. A carryover from scribal publication, serial 
composition was the practice of “producing multiple, progressively expanded 
versions of a text” as to facilitate the “adaption of works for different audiences 
and the rapid production of new(ish) volumes.”26 With adaptation came 
changes in the presentation and purpose of the four27 main versions of 
Hobbes’s political theory (The Elements of Law (1640), the first (1642) and 
second (1647) editions of De cive, and Leviathan (1651)). And, as the third 
chapter demonstrates, some forms of adaptation engendered changes in 
Hobbes’s empiricism, having pushed him to fill out new empirical concepts and 
develop new empirical-analytical strategies sufficient to address alterations in 
the set up and design of his work that would have otherwise compromised its 
empirical integrity. In addition, the practice enabled the use of the works that 
resulted to address new, emergent features of Hobbes’s world that had become 
a source of concern, the subject of chapter 4 on Leviathan.  
While allowing for the refinement and reworking of different aspects of 
his political theory across different texts (and contexts), serial composition 
 
26 Baumgold, Deborah and Ryan Harding, “Excavating De cive,” in On the Citizen: A Critical 
Guide, eds. Robin Douglass and Johan Olsthoorn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2020), 12. 
 
27 Hobbes’s major political works are, most typically, construed as comprising a trio of texts: 
The Elements of Law (1640), De cive (1642), and Leviathan (1651). However, two principal 
editions of De cive were published in the 1640s, a first edition (published in Paris) in 1642, and a 
second edition (published in Amsterdam) in 1647. As discussed in the following chapters, the 
second edition is, plausibly, sufficiently distinct as to be counted as a distinct presentation of 
Hobbes’s political theory. 
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created opportunities for Hobbes to expand the empirical footprint of his 
political theory – to bring more and more of the world into his work. What 
resulted are complex, bricolage compositions that are a tangle of old and new 
material. The compositions are shot through with an array of motivations, 
substantive concerns, shifting forms and styles of political argumentation, 
conceptions of science and scientific method, and different patterns of 
scientific practice. In all instances, texts were stretched, trimmed, and 
otherwise reworked to account for new empirical concerns and conditions, new 
empirical problems, and new perspectives on what the empirical study of the 
world entails.  
All of Hobbes’s major works of political theory are time capsules which, 
when opened, provide a portrait of Hobbes at that moment, rich with 
information about whose company he kept, his concerns, his world, and his 
epistemological outlook. That is, the practice of serial composition, resulted in 
the production of increasingly layered compositions, featuring patterns of 
exposition, all dating to different periods of Hobbes’s life. As chapter 5 
addresses, it is unlikely that the compositions comport to the rigid 
methodological strictures elaborated in De corpore, published fifteen years after 
Hobbes completed his first work on politics, The Elements of Law. 
In summary, this dissertation addresses the evolving relationship 
between Hobbes’s empiricism, science, and political theory. The next three 
chapters of the dissertation (chapters 2-4), if lined up one next to the other, 
form a single chronology, which starts with Hobbes’s education at Oxford (c. 
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160328) and ends with Leviathan. The first chapter in the three-chapter set, 
chapter 2, draws different threads of Hobbes’s biography together to produce a 
long history of his scientific interests, attending throughout to the role of 
empiricism in guiding his scientific engagements and eventually informing his 
assessment of different forms of geometricized explanation. The long history 
establishes Hobbes’s commitment to empiricism and empirical truth as a 
motivation that emerged apart from, and which helped to govern and control a 
later commitment to geometricized science. The final part of the second 
chapter traces out the ways in which these early empirical commitments 
filtered into the science and political theory of The Elements of Law. The final 
part of the second chapter also solves the puzzle that opens this introduction, 
in part, by developing a conceptual map of Hobbes different uses and 
invocations of “experience.” The disaggregation of semantically and 
conceptually distinct forms of experience is aided by a study of how experience, 
in all its modes, was deployed in forms of contemporaneous scientific discourse 
The Elements reproduces. 
Chapter 3 picks up where the first chapter leaves off, in the period 
following the completion of The Elements of Law. It supplies a revisionist 
chronology of the development and crystallization of Hobbes’s Elementa 
Philosophiae (“The Elements of Philosophy”), a plan for a sprawling 
 
28 Noel Malcolm explains that “The exact date of Hobbes’s matriculation is not known; his 
autobiography states that is was during his fourteenth year, i.e. between April 1601 and April 
1602. He adds, however, that he stayed at Oxford for five years, and we know that he was 
admitted BA in Feb. 1608. Aubrey says he entered Oxford ‘at fourteen years of age,’ and dates 
his arrival there, plausibly, to the beginning of 1603,” Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 4 n. 9. 
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philosophical trilogy on first philosophy, physics, human nature, and politics. 
The chapter argues that, feeling some measure of social pressure to make his 
name in Parisian philosophical circles, Hobbes made the decision to conscript 
the prefabricated material of The Elements of Law into the new philosophical 
trilogy. However, shoehorning the material into the new mould entailed that 
Hobbes trim it down, tear away its empirical underpinnings, and alter it in 
ways that potentially compromised the argument and the empirical integrity of 
his political theory. The quandary pushed Hobbes, in the first edition of De cive 
(1642), to develop his empiricism in new directions, toward a greater reliance 
on (universal) experience and the concept of “right reason.” And though he 
would later abandon “right reason,” the second edition of De cive (1647) made 
(universal) experience into a core element of his political methodology. 
Chapter 4, on Leviathan, bookends the chronology that begins in 
chapter 2. It shows that the interpretive practice of using method as a device 
wherewith to decode or make sense of Leviathan is mistaken. Instead, the 
chapter offers that interpreters should look beyond method, to the substantive 
or empirical concerns that helped to inform the process of adaptation that 
produced Leviathan. It is these concerns – about, specifically, the perils that 
flow from the use of unempirical speech and the social and political wreckage 
that results when individuals fail to reckon correctly about the effects of their 
actions – that make Leviathan distinctive. Understanding how the concerns are 
operative in the text also pays the ancillary benefit of elucidating, in part, how 
Hobbes did use method in the work. The chapter focuses on four different areas 
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of exposition in which the concerns manifest, and concludes with observations 
on the impact of Hobbes’s empiricism on the political theory of Leviathan.  
The theme of empiricism and method continues into chapter 5. This 
chapter questions the reliability and value of the statements on the subject of 
method and civil science found in De corpore (1655). Specifically, it argues that 
there are a variety of reasons to question whether the methodological 
pronouncements found in De corpore are interpretively useful and therefore 
should be the basis for interpreting Hobbes’s (earlier) political works. The 
argument has two prongs. First, the chapter argues that the statements, and 
accompanying illustrations, are sufficiently vague and, in some instances, 
clumsy in design as to encourage questions about their actual utility. Second, 
the chapter traces the history of how the key methodological concepts that 
organize De corpore’s discussion of method were (or were not) plausibly used 
or featured in Hobbes’s works, beginning with The Elements of Law. The history 
militates against the view that Hobbes developed his works with the method 
delineated in De corpore in mind. Instead, the history shows that his 
understanding of science and method drifted over time, making any attempt to 
discover a single, unifying method across the Hobbesian corpus potentially 
futile. 
Such a project is also possibly futile, the chapter’s conclusion points out, 
because of the role of empiricism and serial composition in the production of 
Hobbes’s political works. The conclusion to chapter 5 argues that serial 
composition inclined Hobbes to a liquid, or fluid understanding of texts. The 
texts on which he worked were never complete or finished; they were an 
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always-changing assemblage, or mass of prefabricated material that could be 
remade, recombined, and redirected to new ends and new designs, to meet the 
demands of new emergent contexts. It is unsurprising that, in the process of 
remaking these materials, Hobbes’s own understanding of these materials, and 
his political theory specifically, changed with time. He embedded these new 
understandings into later texts, and in so doing, retrojected the epistemological 
positions and corresponding methodological views associated with later texts 
back onto earlier texts. These later statements pose perils for the interpreters 
who rely on them to shape and inform interpretations of his political works. 
Relatedly, I offer that the discovery of unity in Hobbes’s political theory is also 
fraught because of the “drift” of his political works, i.e., because of Hobbes’s 
empiricism, how his works reacted and responded to his changing world. It is 
this drift, I impress, that makes reading Hobbes’s works worthwhile and 
interesting. Like different layers of sediment, each encoded with information 
about what was happening in the world at the moment of its formation, so too, 
the different layers of Hobbes’s political theory, The Elements of Law, the first 
and second edition of De cive, and Leviathan, tell us about the world in which 




EMPIRICISM IN HOBBES’S EARLY SCIENCE AND THE ELEMENTS 
OF LAW 
In Thomas Hobbes's first study of politics, The Elements of Law (1640), 
readers are presented with a bifurcated conception of knowledge. Knowledge, 
he explains, comes in two forms: science and "experience of fact."29 What the 
distinction conveys is that scientific knowledge is not something that can be 
excavated directly out of the soil of experience. Hobbes is well-known for the 
admonition that "Experience concludeth nothing universally."30 And what 
Hobbes was after were necessary, universal conclusions, not “experience[s] of” 
particularistic “fact.”  
Instead, Hobbes pointed to geometry as a suitable model for science. 
The title of The Elements hints at the work's methodological lineage. It is a 
signal to readers of an intention to deliver a study modeled on Euclid's 
Elements.31 His work makes good on the intention. Hobbes’s Elements, like the 
Euclidean original, is organized around a structure of defined terms.32 These 
 
29 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 20 [6.4].  
 
30 Ibid, 12 [4.10]. 
 
31 The title of The Elements contains a clear geometrical reference, signalling an intent to deliver 
a political analysis modelled on geometry. However, the title is also evocative of Francis Bacon’s 
Elements of the Common Lawes of England as well as Edward Forset’s A Comparative Discourse 
of the Bodies of Natural and Politique (London: John Bill, 1606). For the Baconian connection, 
see Patricia Springborg’s “Quentin Skinner and Hobbes’s Artificial Person of the State Redux,” 
Global Intellectual History (2019), 11-12. 
 
32 Deborah Baumgold, “The Composition of Hobbes’s “Elements of Law,” History of Political 
Thought 25, no. 1 (2004), 11, 25. Baumgold writes, “The bulk of the work – four-fifths of the 
chapters, to be precise – is fleshed out on a skeleton of defined terms, which appear highlighted 




definitions, he intimated, were to provide a base around which the 
superstructure of his work would be built. "[T]here is no way," Hobbes explains, 
"but first to put such principles down for a foundation...and afterward to build 
thereon the truth of cases in the law of nature...till the whole be 
inexpungable."33 Hobbes believed science should be carried out more 
geometrico (in the style of geometry), its conclusions the byproduct of careful 
deductions erected upon certain principles and formed using well-drawn 
definitions.  
The Euclidean features of The Elements – its title, epistle dedicatory, and 
its most obvious stylistic features – are not superficial. The definitions Hobbes 
sets down accumulate as the exposition proceeds, and eventually form the base 
for an original treatment of the "cases in the law of nature." However, within 
the content of these definitions – and layered around them – are patterns of 
scientific practice and theorization that cannot always be neatly or consistently 
assimilated to the Euclidean ideal. These practices and ways of thinking are 
part of a longer history and arc of intellectual development.  
Close examination of these practices and ways of thinking show Hobbes 
was as concerned with the project of empirical truth as achieving “geometric” 
certainty. To be clear, he did not see geometry and empiricism as opposed.34 
 
33 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, xvii [epistle dedicatory]. 
 
34 As Peter Dear notes in Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific 
Revolution (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), “The classical mixed mathematical 
sciences appealed to just such empirical principles. The basic empirical premise of the 
mathematical science of optics, for example, held that light rays (or visual rays) travel in 
straight lines in homogenous media. This counted as evident because everyone knew, from 
common experience, that you can’t see around corners,” 43. Such a classical, principally 
Aristotelian orientation and understanding of evident (or universal) experience carried through 
into the work of Jesuit mathematicians and 17th century natural philosophers, including Galileo, 
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Like other mathematician-scientists of his day he did not believe that 
demonstrative certainty need be purchased at the price of empiricism.  
However, greater attention to Hobbes's “empiricism” elucidates aspects 
of The Elements and his scientific practices that are often misunderstood, 
especially by commentators who misconstrue the nature of and outcomes 
associated with Hobbes’s conversion to geometric (or syllogistic) science. He 
did not, as Gregory Kavka puts it, “generally denigrat[e]…observation and 
experience.”35 Nor were Hobbes’s “appeals to experience” a signal that he was 
engaged in something other than science, as Ioannis Evrigenis maintains.36 
Likewise, Timothy Raylor is misleading in the suggestion that “Hobbes” gave up 
“the collection and registration of experiences,” turning instead to an “austere, 
 
who aimed to render mathematicized treatments anchored in non-particularistic common 
notions and, in turn, the actual substance of the (observed) world, 44-46. Of the relation 
between empiricism and geometry specifically, Kinch Hoekstra notes, “it was not until the 
1820s, when Lobachevsky formulated a non-Euclidean geometry, that mathematicians began to 
understand Euclid’s Elements as an abstract series of internally consistent axioms rather than a 
‘system of propositions deduced from premises which were supposed to describe the space in 
which we live.’ Before Lobachevsky, Euclid’s starting points were seen as reflections of our 
spatial experience, and Hobbes too accepts that sense experience provides the materials from 
which any formal structure of deductions must be built,” “II* - The End of Philosophy (The 
Case of Hobbes),” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106, no. 1 (2007), 33-34. Hoekstra uses 
the observation as a basis to challenge strong conventionalist readings of Hobbes’s theory of 
truth. 
 
35 Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986), 7. In the relevant passages, Kavka relates that despite a “need” for “empirical assumptions 
or evidence about human motives, actions, and interactions to arrive at substantive and 
interesting conclusions about morals and politics,” Hobbes’s “discussions 
of…method…generally denigrates the obvious source of such assumptions and evidence – 
observation and experience.” 
 





narrowly restricted version of Aristotelian syllogistic as the only route to 
knowledge.”37  
I show that both in practice and in conceptualization Hobbes's science 
was more sensitive to experience and observation, empirically driven and a 
posteriori than is accounted by many twentieth and twenty-first century 
interpreters. In other words, the argument positions itself against a common 
vein of interpretation, just recently typified in the work Tom Sorell, who 
categorically rejects the idea that Hobbes “concede[d] cognitive authority to 
sense and memory.”38 A long history of the development of Hobbes’s scientific 
ideas and practices reveals that he did accord sense and memory a certain 
degree of cognitive authority, beyond what a bulk of Hobbes’s interpreters, 
including Kavka, Evrigenis, Raylor, and now Sorell, permit. 
The focus of this chapter is the early history of Hobbes's scientific 
thought. It is divided into two parts. The first part shows that Hobbes's interest 
in scientific subjects emerged separately from an interest in geometry. It is true 
 
37 Timothy Raylor, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes, 191. In the cited passage, Timothy 
Raylor draws a contrast between the early Hobbes, who, under the influence by Baconian dicta, 
engaged in the “collection and registration of experiences,” and the Hobbes of The Elements, 
who equated scientific reason with reasoning by syllogism. The contrast Raylor draws is too 
neat and tidy, and as the analysis that follows does, can be complicated. 
 
38 Sorell reasons, “In short, Hobbes condescends not only to experiment but experience.” 
However, he notes that the purpose of his essay is to “consider an unusual break from that 
condescension – in Hobbes’ civil philosophy. Although he claims for his own formulation of 
civil philosophy a kind of definitiveness and certainty that only geometry has among the 
sciences, and although both geometry and civil philosophy are supposed to be the products of 
reason, the necessity of establishing and submitting to the commonwealth is open to a certain 
sort of confirmation from experience. This is not because Hobbes cedes cognitive authority to 
sense and memory after all, but because civil philosophy has a rhetorical purpose that a certain 
kind of appeal to experience helps to achieve,” “Appeals to Experience in Hobbes’ Science of 
Politics,” in Experiment, Speculation and Religion in Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Alberto 




that these strands of interest would later combine, that geometry became a 
rubric by which he would consider scientific subjects. Yet, he was not an 
unreflexive proselytizer of geometricized explanations: he was critical of the 
unreal abstractness of some forms of geometrical theorizing. In Hobbes's early 
writings is found a concern for fashioning explanations that were not just 
demonstrative (à la geometry), but which were empirically and observably true.  
The second part links this concern to The Elements of Law. It examines 
three aspects of the work: uses and invocations of experience; Hobbes's theory 
of truth; and use of both the language of "cause" and causal explanation. Taken 
together, an examination of these aspects highlights the ways in which 
Hobbes's conception and practice of science was more empirical and 
experiential than some of his own statements would seem to indicate. 
Furthermore, I show that many of Hobbes's scientific practices and ideas 
cannot be traced to a desire to emulate Euclid. Rather, in The Elements, we find 
Hobbes employing and mixing patterns of scientific theorization that comport 
with his own pre-Elements scientific speculations as well as a (nearly) 
contemporaneous literature on mechanics. The most relevant among the latter 
is "A Short Tract on First Principles," a work probably written by Hobbes's close 
associates in the period just before he began composing The Elements of Law. 
Part I: Hobbes's early scientific interests 
a. Before 1630 
 




In his verse autobiography, Hobbes recalls having been force-fed an un-
nourishing diet of Aristotelianisms39 while a young student at Oxford. In 
particular, he remembers thinking the Aristotelian precepts dutifully consumed 
by his classmates were rarified and over his head.40 The concepts being “too 
high” for him to “grasp,”41 he sought solace elsewhere.  
Hobbes found respite in the more pleasing42 concrete subjects of 
geography and astronomy. Geography and astronomy presented him with 
 
39 Of the pedagogical prevalence of Aristotelianisms in England over the relevant period, 
Charles Schmitt explains, “by 1600 Aristotelian logic had a stronger foundation in England than 
it had had any time since Henry’s break with Rome. There was not the gradual withering away 
of the tradition from the end of the Middle Ages, hastened by the twin spurs of humanism and 
Ramism, that most modern interpreters of the period claim to see there, but quite the opposite. 
Aristotelian logic, as did Aristotelian philosophy in general, grew in stature quite significantly 
during the last quarter-century of Elizabeth’s reign,” John Case and Aristotelianism in 
Renaissance England (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983), 37. With respect to the 
pedagogical import of “Aristotelity” at Oxford specifically, and Hobbes’s experiences with the 
curriculum, Noel Malcolm recounts, “The official curriculum laid down in the statutes of 1564-5 
was indeed conservative and dominated by the works of Aristotle (thought it did include some 
standard astronomical and geometrical works, including Euclid, which Hobbes would have had 
to study if he had wanted to proceed MA). Hobbes’s complaint that the philosophy taught at 
the universities was ‘Aristotelity’ had some truth to it. There had been a definite revival of 
Aristotelianism in England in the latter part of the sixteenth century [as Schmitt notes], and 
extra decrees were issued in Oxford in 1586 to exclude the use of authors who disagreed with 
the ‘ancient and true philosophy’ of Aristotle.” However, Malcolm adds that while Aristotelian 
outlooks were hegemonic, counter-hegemonic discourses were also in circulation, viz. the 
prescribed Aristotelian outlook was not universally accepted: “there is a mass of evidence that 
academics in the early seventeenth century had intellectual interests, especially in the sciences, 
which went far beyond the official curriculum, and that these interests were often reflected in 
their teaching.” Similarly, we should not “assume that Hobbes’s hostility to scholastic logic 
would have found no sympathetic echo in the Oxford of his day. The humanist criticism of 
scholasticism lingered on at the university,” Aspects of Hobbes, 4-5. 
 
40 In his verse autobiography, Hobbes recalls, “Then I was promoted to Physics, where the 
Master taught that everything consists of a union of two parts, Matter and Form, and that 
appearances of things, flitting through the air, present now forms to the eye, now sounds to the 
ear. He also attributed many effects to Sympathy and Antipathy, with much more of the same 
sort too high for me to grasp,” “The Autobiography of Thomas Hobbes,” trans. Benjamin 
Farrington, The Rationalist Annual (1958), 24. However, Farrington adds a finish to Hobbes’s 
reminiscence that is not present in the Latin. Hobbes writes, simply, that the ideas were “over 
my head” (supea captum…meum), Thomæ Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera Philosophica vol. I, 
ed. William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1839), lxxxvii. 
 
41 See footnote 40. 
 
42 “Accordingly,” Hobbes wrote in his verse autobiography, “I turned to more inviting themes…” 
“The Autobiography of Thomas Hobbes,” 24. 
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forms of understanding that were easier to follow. He studied geographical 
maps with an adventurer’s interest, and looked on in wonder at a globe whose 
“gaps”43 were, then, being quickly filled in. Using celestial maps, Hobbes eagerly 
studied constellations. He would imagine himself accompanying the sun on its 
orbit, and found particular delight in perceiving, for himself, the “art” by which 
the sun produces equal days (dies justos).44  
Both interests and a corresponding inclination to concrete, cognizable 
subjects followed Hobbes into the life he pursued after Oxford. In 1618, not 
more than a decade after leaving his alma mater he looked up at the sky with 
interest as a comet, the third of that year, streaked across it. He “pondered the 
fact that neither the comet itself nor its mane could at that time have fallen 
within the shadow of the earth unless the comet was indeed near to the earth.” 
Hobbes was stricken by the fact that “the sun,” at the time, “was about 20° in 
Sagittarius but the comet was more to the north than Arcturus was.”45 As 
puzzlement about the comet’s location set in, Hobbes consulted the 
 
43 “I fed my mind too on maps celestial and maps terrestrial, and as I gazed on the painted 
constellations I rejoiced to companion the sun on his travels and to observe the art with which 
he apportions the days justly to all mankind. I observed, too, where Drake and Cavendish had 
cast a girdle round Neptune’s waist and the different regions they had visited. I picked out the 
tiny settlements of mankind and the Monsters depicted on unexplored lands. Geographers have 
their own way of filling up gaps. The best testimony to their learning is no spot left empty on 
the globe,” ibid, 24. John Aubrey, Hobbes’s biographer, adds that Hobbes “tooke great delight 
there to go the booke-binders’ shops, and lye yet gaping on mappes…,” “Brief Lives,” Chiefly of 
Contemporaries, Set Down by John Aubrey, Between the Years 1669 & 1696 vol. I, ed. Andrew 
Clark (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 330. 
 
44 In the Latin, Hobbes writes, …soli…justos qua facit arte dies, Opera Philosophica, lxxxvii.  
 
45 Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Hobbes: Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, trans. Harold 




astronomical literature just as any keen scholar might. In it, he found nothing 
“but grounds for [further] doubt.”46 
From Hobbes’s reminiscence about the comet can be excavated a pair of 
inferences, one related to his use of mathematics in support of empirical 
investigation and the other concerning his philosophical disposition. Beginning 
with the first, the 1618 episode highlights a comfort with mathematica media 
investigation. Astronomy, like other mixed-mathematical subjects, relied 
heavily upon mathematical, and more specifically, geometrical, scaffolding. 
Hobbes’s investigation of the third comet of 1618 is colored by mathematical 
understanding and shows an ease of use of mathematical tools to query about 
underlying complexities disclosed by empirical observation. Second, notable is 
the tide of puzzlement that submerged Hobbes as he contemplated the comet’s 
position in the sky. This puzzlement, which resulted from the peculiar angle of 
the sun and the comet at the time, suggests Hobbes had sufficient depth of 
understanding to be puzzled.47  
Zooming out, the episodes lend support to the idea that, for Hobbes, 
natural philosophy represented an occasional, but nevertheless long-simmering 




47 The conclusion is supported by Karl Schuhmann, who in the essay “Hobbes’s Concept of 
History,” notes that “The only history, or better, as he calls it himself, ‘little history’ (historiola) 
which he himself ever worked out is a history of the comets between 1531 and 1618,” explaining 
that whereas Hobbes’s other compiled histories “took over information from earlier authors,” 
the history of comets did not, having stemmed from “his inability to explain the nature and the 
path of the famous (third) comet of 1618, which he observed during the whole duration of its 
appearance – one of the earliest scientific activities of Hobbes we know of,” in Hobbes and 




Oxford. And he, at times, pursued the interest with a critical vigor. Just as with 
his dissatisfaction with Aristotle at Oxford, a decade later in 1618, Hobbes found 
wanting the existing menu of explanations proffered48 to make sense of natural 
phenomena he observed. Looking forward, it was, in part, an escalating 
dissatisfaction engendered by an awareness of the strangeness and 
unempiricalness of the philosophical explanations being offered up to him49 
that pushed him to mount numerous philosophical campaigns, as he attempted 
to reshape philosophy as he received it. 
Natural philosophy and De mirabilibus pecci (1626-7)50 
 
 
48 Later, in or around 1643, Hobbes would offer the appraisal that “I did not know what to make 
of this, nor, when I had read other authors, did I subsequently find anything but grounds for 
[further] doubt. Let me openly profess my ignorance on the formation and nature of comets – 
not only do I know nothing for sure, but also I do not put forward any conjecture worth of 
consideration: all the men I have so far read declare, each in his own different way, that the 
natures of the phenomena of comets are two different questions. Nor are they satisfied until, 
with regard to the question in hand, they have put forth ridiculous speculations on light,” 
Thomas Hobbes: Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, 87-88. 
 
49 Yet, the terms of Hobbes’s work were, in many instances, unavoidably set by or developed in 
response to (and thereby determined by) philosophical precursors (including scholastic 
philosophers and Aristotle as such). Cees Leijenhorst notes that, in general, “The moderns were 
more affected by their Aristotelian education than they were prepared to admit and whatever 
the force of their attempt to break with petrified Aristotelianism, in many cases they had to 
formulate their alternatives in terms comprehensible to a larger public that like them was 
steeped in Aristotelianism,” “Sense and Nonsense about Sense: Hobbes and the Aristotelians on 
Sense Perception and Imagination,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. 
Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 83. 
 
50 For an extraordinarily substantive and historically rich study (and an examination of the 
intellectual lineage) of Hobbes’s poem, see the remarkable third chapter of Raylor’s Philosophy, 
Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes. Of the date of the poem’s composition, Raylor reasons, “Hobbes 
gives the season as harvest time (‘Anni tempus erat quo tellus foenora soluit’); this tallies with 
Andrews’s dating of his tour to August 1627. The year is congruent with the poem’s treatment of 
William, husband of Christian Bruce, as present Earl of Devonshire, from which it is clear that 
the poem must have been written between the death of the first Earl in March 1626 and that of 
the second in June 1628.9 Since it took place at harvest time, the only possible years for the tour 
are 1626 and 1627. External evidence to support the later dating comes from John Aubrey, 
usually reliable on such matters where Hobbes is concerned, who claims that Hobbes presented 
the poem to the second Earl as a new year’s gift, ‘about 1627’ (i.e. January 1627[/8]), for which he 




Slightly less than another decade later, Hobbes completed De 
mirabilibus pecci (“On the wonders of the peak”), a travel poem51 that follows 
Hobbes and some upper-crust companions52 as they toured the area around 
Peak District, exploring natural curiosities and other local sites. Though 
essentially a travel log put into verse, De mirabilibus pecci offers a rare snapshot 
of Hobbes, his acquaintances and his interests, in a period before he is thought 
to have become fixated on natural philosophy and science.53  
Consequently, it deserves to be pointed out, as Timothy Raylor recently 
has, that among the interests represented in the poem natural philosophy is 
prominent.54 Scrutiny of De mirabilibus pecci reveals lines that are threaded 
 
51 See Jess Edwards’s “Thomas Hobbes, Charles Cotton and the ‘Wonders’ of the Derbyshire 
Peak,” Studies in Travel Writing 16, no. 1 (2012): 1-15. 
 
52 Hobbes set out on the adventure with a coterie of chums. Raylor notes, “From [Richard] 
Andrews [a physician, and member of the group] we learn that there were around seven in the 
party. Prime among these was [the Earl of] Devonshire’s cousin, also named William 
Cavendish, then Viscount Mansfield (and subsequently Earl, Marquess, and Duke of 
Newcastle)….the party included a second physician, Eleazer Hodson (or Hodgson), an 
otherwise unidentified figure named George Deane, and a blusterer to whom Andrew refers 
jestingly as ‘Roister,’ and who Martinich speculates might have been Hobbes,” Rhetoric, 
Philosophy, and Thomas Hobbes, 97-98. 
 
53 It is sometimes taken for granted that there exists a break in Hobbes’s biography, a volte-face 
point at which he took up the study of natural philosophy and geometry. Examples of this style 
of periodization continue to abound in the literature on Hobbes. Quentin Skinner is notable for 
having developed a somewhat strong version of the classic periodization, arguing that, at the 
relevant point in time, Hobbes turned his back on the studia humanitatis and took up science. 
Skinner writes that it was “During the 1630s that Hobbes began to direct his intellectual 
energies along new paths. He began to turn away from – and against – his humanist allegiances, 
and to take an increasingly professional interest in the study of mathematics and the natural 
sciences,” “Hobbes’s life in philosophy,” Visions of Politics: Hobbes and Civil Science vol. III 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5. Whereas Skinner, as other interpreters have, 
posits a break in Hobbes’s biography, the analysis unspooled above and below tells a different 
story: that there is a continuity in Hobbes’s biography, particularly with respect to his interest 
in natural philosophy and the way in which he oriented himself with respect to the world, even 
if Hobbes’s approach to studying nature became more “geometrical” over time and, as Hobbes 
himself points out, he only began to feel the strong pull of geometry somewhat later in life. 
 
54 Raylor pulls the poem into a Baconian frame, situating it within the context Hobbes’s 
relationship with William Cavendish, a fervent admirer (and imitator) of Bacon’s, Philosophy, 
Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes, 106-109. I do not dispute or deny the relevance of the context, 
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with speculation about the hidden causes responsible for the natural spectacles 
observed by Hobbes on the trip. The poem shows Hobbes was not content to 
simply experience the natural curiosities he witnessed. As he did when 
marveled the third comet of 1618, he endeavored to explain what he saw.55 
In particular, the lines supply examples of the styles of natural-
philosophical theorizing of which Hobbes was, at the time, capable. Remarking 
upon the origination of rivers and wind,56 the mechanics of natural fountains,57 
and other natural curiosities,58 Hobbes, throughout the poem, maintains an 
evident interest in tracing the physical lineage of the spectacles he saw. For 
example, his description of a natural fountain is sufficiently vivid as to make it 
easy to picture the process he specifies. 
But while the footsteps of the floud that leads 
 It followes, seeking through the womb of earth  
 For Fountains, whence its waters may have birth,  
 On subterraneous Caves its flouds do fall, 
 With narrow vent, and entrances but small.  
 Hither as oft as that the waters flow, 
 With swelling tides, and stop the vents below  
 With their swift currents, suddenly the air 
 Shut up within, does for the place prepare  
 
nor the influence Bacon and Cavendish exerted or may have exerted on Hobbes. However, 
Raylor and I part company with respect to what the poem illustrates. Whereas Raylor uses the 
poem to construct and then defend a version of the classic periodization of Hobbes’s 
intellectual biography – to show how Hobbes shed these early epistemological commitments as 
he embraced geometry – I use the poem to the contradicting aim of problematizing that 
periodization, and to, thereby, elucidate an underlying continuity across many of Hobbes’s 
works. 
 
55 Hobbes was surely among those who, as he writes in the poem, “long’d to know/The cause of 
things, to seem them joyn to goe,” De Mirabilibus Pecci: BEING THE VVONDERS OF THE PEAK 
IN DARBY-SHIRE, Commonly called The Devil’s Arse of Peak (London: William Crook, 1678), 15. 
 
56 Ibid, 34-35. 
 
57 Ibid, 58-59. 
 
58 Ibid, 39, 46-50. 
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 Defence against the waters, and deny 
 Their entrance, having no where for to fly.59  
 
The content of De mirabilibus pecci, when compared to Hobbes’s earlier 
forays into astronomy, helps to establish the notion of a disposition toward 
straightforward causal analysis and concrete, empirical reasoning. Seeing this 
does not require adducing further examples, or locating Hobbes’s theorizations 
within a particular intellectual milieu (e.g., neo-Aristotelian) or research 
program (e.g., Francis Bacon’s), as Timothy Raylor does in his new 
pathbreaking study.60 It is the mere presence of this kind of explanatory 
content in De mirabilibus pecci that matters, for when combined with the other 
evidence, it shows both how Hobbes’s early philosophical work occasionally 
bent toward natural philosophy and that he possessed a cast of mind that was 
inclined to causal, empirical probing. This bent and inclination features even in 
his translation of Thucydides. 
Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides (1628) 
 
Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides features natural-philosophical 
content not unlike what is found in his poem on the wonders of the Peak 
District, albeit in even smaller quantities. Most interesting are marginalia 
Robin Bunce highlights in an article that aims to measure the extent of Francis 
Bacon’s influence on Hobbes. The occasion for one such marginal note is a 
 
59 Ibid, 65-66. 
 
60 It is Raylor who, just recently, pointed out that “In addition to showing Hobbes’s neo-
Aristotelianism in the 1620s” the poem “reveals [Hobbes’s] engagement with Renaissance 
naturalism and his active interest, during the same period, in the emerging field of Baconian 
natural history: a finding that furnishes fresh evidence for Bacon’s impact on Hobbes’s early 




passage of text that enumerates the particular hardships to which the 
Athenians were subjected as they “beſieged the Lacedæmonians.” These 
included a shortage of both “Corne and Water.” To secure the latter, Hobbes 
translated that the Athenians “turned vp the grauell, and drunke ſuch as they 
were * like to find there.” The asterisk in the quotation refers to a note in the 
margins, inserted by Hobbes, explaining the process by which sea water, once 
“ſtrained, and ſo purged of the ſalt,” becomes potable with “the paſſage of the 
water through the ſand.”61  
Bunce traces the explanation Hobbes supplies to Francis Bacon’s Sylva 
Sylvarum, published a couple years before Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides’ 
History appeared in print.62 The first experiment adumbrated by Bacon in Sylva 
Sylvarum specifies a process by which to create “Water, Freſh and Potable”63 
that maps cleanly onto Hobbes’s own description of the process. Hobbes’s 
inclusion of experimental findings, lifted straight out of the first page of a 
Baconian text, as well as a few other marginalia that Bunce notes "would have 
been of interest to readers of Bacon's other natural histories,"64 may not register 
as peculiar. After all, just a couple years before Hobbes authored a poem that 
 
61 Thomas Hobbes, Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre Written by Thucydides the Sonne of 
Olorus. Interpreted with Faith and Diligence Immediately Out of the Greeke by Thomas Hobbes 
Secretary to Ye Late Earle of Deuonshire (London: Eliot’s Court Press, 1629), 226. 
 
62 Bunce, relying upon the work of Graham Rees, notes that “in the mid-1620s Bacon would 
have been preparing material” for the volume, “Thomas Hobbes’ Relationship with Francis 
Bacon – an Introduction,” Hobbes Studies 16 (2003), 51. It was published posthumously, 
immediately following Bacon’s death in 1626. 
 
63 Francis Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum OR A Natural History, IN TEN CENTURIES (London: J.R., 
1670), 1. 
 




featured the same kind of content. However, that scientific and other interests 
occasionally merge in the translation is a conclusion that disturbs well-
established periodizations of Hobbes’s work and life.    
Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides has been considered a distilled 
expression of his (non-science oriented) “humanism.”65 Indeed, Hobbes’s 
translation of the History of the Peloponnesian War is sometimes construed as a 
bookend, marking the terminus of an early humanist phase, in the period after 
which he turned to natural philosophy66 and geometricized science.67 However, 
for Hobbes, there existed no boundary between so-called humanist projects, 
like translating ancient Greek texts, and engaging in causal probing of natural 
processes.68 This boundary, between humanism and science, or even humanism 
 
65 Like De mirabilibus pecci, Skinner situates the text, and Hobbes’s translation of it, within the 
context of the studia hamanitatis tradition, the paradigm within which Skinner contends 
Hobbes was working until performing an about-face, taking up the study of geometry and 
natural philosophy. He writes, “Hobbes’s next work reflected an even keener interest of the 
other basic element of the studia hamnitatis, the art of poetry. Around the year 1627 Hobbes 
composed a Latin poem of some five hundred hexameters, De Mirabilibus Pecci, Carmen, which 
he presented as a gift to the second earl and subsequently published in c. 1636. But by far the 
most important product of Hobbes’s so-called ‘humanist period’ was his translation of 
Thucydides’s history, which he published as Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre in 1629,” 
“Hobbes’s Life in Philosophy,” 5. The argument is extended in the essay “Hobbes and the studia 
humanitatis,” also in Vision of Politics vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
38-65. 
 
66 Similarly, Raylor holds the poem up as evidence that “there was no sharp distinction between 
his literary and his ‘scientific’ (natural philosophical) interests at this time,” Philosophy, 
Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes, 126. 
 
67 See footnote 53. 
 
68 As Robin Bunce contends in “Hobbes’ forgotten Natural Histories,” Hobbes “attempted to 
provide an edition of Thucydides that would easily yield its natural historical data to an 
interested reader,” 81. Raylor, rightly, draws a parallel conclusion with respect to De mirabilibus 
pecci, writing, as noted in footnote 66, “The poem shows that there was no sharp distinction 
between his literary and his ‘science’ (natural philosophical) interests at the time,” Philosophy, 




and geometricized reason,69 is an artifact of scholarship, something that has 
been reified into existence, and then de-naturalized by scholars like Ted 
Miller.70 Capable of working on behalf of simultaneous interests at one time, 
both the translation of ancient texts and nature-directed causal probing were 
pursuits Hobbes clearly enjoyed. Understanding this, it should be expected that 
the two would become entangled in his translation of Thucydides’ History. 
Taken together, the foregoing evidence supplies an image of Hobbes 
that troubles conventional portraits. Some scholars retroject Hobbes’s later 
 
69 Some humanists went as far as to make philosophical reason equivalent to geometric 
reasoning and the demonstrative proof, while also assaying how the demonstrations rendered 
by geometers enrich other areas of philosophical inquiry (as in mixed-mathematical 
disciplines). Vide Philip Melanchthon, who in a preface to Johannes Voeglin’s Book on the 
Elements of Geometry, effused, “For these [geometric demonstrations] are the true beginnings 
of natural philosophy. Furthermore, since geometrical demonstrations are most distinct, no 
one without a knowledge of that art understands what is the power of demonstrations; without 
it no one will be a master of method. Therefore Plato, too, said that geometry needs to be 
studied for the reason that the knowledge of it leads to understanding the other arts more 
easily and correctly. But its most obvious benefit lies in measuring the size of the earth, of the 
heavenly bodies and of distances. And that is the great success of geometry, that it did not 
cleave to trifling and lower machines, but took flight to the heavens, and raised human minds, 
having cast off the earth, back to the heavenly abode, and showed us the wonderful 
construction and regulation of the world. Furthermore, it led exiled minds to their homeland 
and to acquaintance with the heavens, and even to the recognition of God. For that very 
teaching, in which the construction and the ruling of the world are beheld, has great power in 
strengthening worthy beliefs about God in the hearts of men,” Philip Melanchthon: Orations on 
Philosophy and Education, ed. Sachiko Kusukawa and trans. Christine F. Salazar (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 98-99. Jan Prins punctuates the point in the essay “The 
Influence of Agricola and Melanchthon on Hobbes’ Early Philosophy of Science,” in Rodolphus 
Agricola Phrisius 1444-1485: Proceedings of the International Conference at the University of 
Groningen 28-30 October 1985, eds. F. Akkerman and A.J. Vanderjagt (Leiden: Brill, 1988). He 
writes, “Especially Melanchthon’s ideas on ‘method’ in the strict [i.e., geometrical] sense of the 
word were very influential. Not only did he have many followers in Germany but, like Agricola, 
soon his fame was great abroad as well. He strongly influenced English logicians like John 
Seton, Thomas Wilson, Thomas Blundeville and Robert Sanderson. Although his direct 
influence diminished after 1600, his ideas remain active in the work of the Systematics, 
particularly that of Bartholomew Keckermann,” 297. 
 
70 I owe an unrepayable debt to Ted Miller, whose Mortal Gods opens a door to this style of 
critique (also at work in Raylor’s Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes), and inspired this 
chapter. See especially Mortal Gods’ second chapter “The Humanist Face of Hobbes’s 
Mathematics, Part I,” Mortal Gods: Science, Politics, and the Humanist Ambitions of Thomas 




interest in geometry back onto his earlier life,71 sifting through those 
biographical data with an eye to the few elements of Hobbes’s early biography 
that prefigure a later geometrical preoccupation.72 Instead, what a quick study 
of Hobbes’s early biography puts into relief is a pattern and arch of general 
interest that cannot be reduced to – and is quite separate from – a later interest 
in geometry. Hobbes maintained an empirical interest; using a variety of 
explanatory tools, he desired to understand and map the world he observed.  
However, the inquiry did not stop at natural-causal processes. He also 
expressed an interest in understanding the determinants of human action.73 As 
 
71 In Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes Raylor speculates (of Hobbes’s limited use of 
geometry as a lens through which to admire natural surroundings in De mirabilibus pecci), “His 
praise of the ‘eternal Geometrician’ responsible for the vaulted roof of the Peak Cavern, for 
instance, is not a point of departure for epistemological or methodological comment, it is mere 
Christinized Platonism. Nor is his presentation of the view, from the top of Longstone Edge, of 
Chatsworth on the Derwent as a point on a curved line more than a witty conceit. But the poem 
shows that the distinction of certain from conjectural knowledge was one with which he was 
already familiar. And it may have been his tour of the Peak in the company of two 
methodologically sophisticated investigators of natural signs that first led Hobbes seriously to 
contemplate the epistemological and philosophical implications of the distinction between 
scientia and opinio,” 126-127. It is in the final sentence that Raylor takes a step beyond what the 
evidence allows, and retrojects a distinction at the heart of Hobbes’s later scientific writings 
back onto the Hobbes of the mid 1620s, as he rambled ‘round the Peak District. 
 
72 On the other hand, I attribute the absence of Hobbes’s poem from discussions of his science 
and (even) his biography, to the paucity of “geometric” material within it. For example, 
Malcolm does not discuss the poem in “A Summary Biography,” in Aspects of Hobbes, 1-26. So 
too, Miriam M. Reik gives the poem short shrift in The Golden Lands of Thomas Hobbes, writing 
simply that “Hobbes described an excursion to the Derbyshire Peak near Chatsworth in a poem 
of more than five hundred Latin hexameters, aptly entitled De Mirabilibus Pecci Carmen [“A 
poem on the wonders of the peak”]. The poem is of little interest here (Hobbes himself thought 
little of it later) except that it shows Hobbes’s continued delight in this classical form, and the 
way he chose to amuse himself during these obscure years,” The Golden Lands of Thomas 
Hobbes, 33-34. 
 
73 Though attaching no date to the episode, Hobbes’s prose autobiography describes an 
encounter with “certain learned men,” which set off a decades-long preoccupation with the 
nature and physics of human sense. However, the language Hobbes uses – noting the interest 
strengthened and formed “subsequent” to his youth – indicates the turn to the subject of the 
physics of sense occurred during a still-early period of intellectual development. He recounts, 
“Such were his inclinations that in his youth he was drawn to read history and poetry; and he 
himself composed verse, with a considerable degree of success (as many have judged). On a 
subsequent occasion, when he was in the company with certain learned men, and discoursing 
on the nature of the senses, one of them, speaking contemptuously, asked him ‘what might a 
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signaled in his preface to Thucydides, if we fail to “penetrate into” human 
passions “without much meditation, we are not to expect a man should 
understand them at the first speaking.”74 And just as he endeavoured to 
understand natural-causal processes, Hobbes aspired to develop penetrative 
insights into the operations of human nature. 
In the decades that followed, Hobbes turned meditation on the themes 
of natural philosophy and human passions into a vocation. Accompanying 
Hobbes’s vocational pursuit of these themes were two noteworthy 
developments. The first is well known, but badly understood: Hobbes’s 
escalating preoccupation with geometry. The second, not unrelated to the first, 
was Hobbes’s embrace of motion as a universal and scientifically unifying 
explanatory device. The next several sections consider these and other 
developments, all related to Hobbes’s conception and practice of science 
beginning in or around 1630. 
Hobbes and Euclid (1628-1630) 
 
Hobbes recalled having “seized upon” Euclid at some point in the late 
1620s.75 Thereafter, the conventional story goes, he became a zealous promoter 
 
sense be?’ He no sooner heard this, than he responded, wondering how it might be possible 
that those who had the name of being wise men might so despise the judgement of their own 
senses, which in ignorance they were unwilling to acknowledge. From that time he devoted 
himself to determining the nature of the senses, disputing whether corporeal body and all its 
parts were inert, or in a state of continuous movement, and (in consequence) totally sensate…,” 
“The Prose Life,” in The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, Part I Human Nature, Part II De 
Corpore Politio, with Three Lives, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 252-
253. 
 
74 Thomas Hobbes, “Of the Life and History of Thucydides,” xxix. 
 
75 In the relevant passage, Hobbes uses the Latin verb “capere,” “to seize,” Thomæ Hobbes 




of geometry and geometricized science. However, biographies of Hobbes are 
short on detail about the Euclid episode. Oddly, Hobbes makes no mention of 
the encounter in his verse autobiography. It is in the prose autobiography that 
he explains it was during his second European tour that “he began to study 
Euclid’s Elements. There he read with utmost diligence, delighting in his 
methodology, not only in relation to the theorems, but also in terms of his 
skilful reasoning.”76 The most widely cited account of the episode is provided in 
the biographer John Aubrey’s Brief Lives. Aubrey adds, 
He was…40 years old before he looked on geometry; which happened 
accidentally. Being in a gentleman’s library, Euclid’s Elements lay open, 
and ‘twas the 47th Element at Book I. He read the proposition. “By G--,” 
said he, “this is impossible!” So he reads the demonstration of it, which 
referred him back to such a proposition; which proposition he read. Et 
sic deinceps, that at last he was demonstratively convinced of that truth. 
That made him in love with geometry.77 
 
Some scholars make too much of the encounter. They locate within it 
the germ of a philosophical project and outlook that would later possess 
Hobbes.78 Yet Hobbes’s own autobiographical reminiscence, Aubrey’s 
 
76 Thomas Hobbes, “The Prose Life,” 247. 
 
77 Aubrey, Brief Lives, 332. 
 
78 A recent example, giving voice to the general impulse, is provided by Otfried Höffe, who 
writes, “There is a certain break in the evolution of Hobbes’s thought, namely that marked by 
his ‘conversion’ from a rhetorical humanistic culture to a rigorously scientific form of argument 
inspired by Euclid’s Elements, even if this approach is not itself entirely devoid of rhetorical 
aspects. But once he had fundamentally committed himself to this method, around the age of 
forty, Hobbes’s philosophy remained remarkably constant throughout his significant 
philosophical texts,” Thomas Hobbes, trans. Nicholas Walker (Albany: SUNY Press, 2015), 14. 
Similar patterns of thinking abound in the literature. Some, like Perez Zagorin, offer Hobbes’s 
conversion as evidence of his authorship of the “Short Tract,” noting, “Apart from its contents, 
the Short Tract presents other features that associate it with Hobbes. Its geometric form, 
consisting of the statement of principles resembling axioms and of deductive conclusions that 
include demonstrations with the help of diagrams, was unusual in a philosophic treatise at the 
time. Only Hobbes’s previous exposure to Euclid’s Elements at this early period in his 
philosophic career and the powerful intellectual effect it had upon him can explain this aspect 
of the work,” “Hobbes’s Early Philosophical Development,” Journal of the History of Ideas 54, 
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biographical entry too, are too vague to support the conclusion. It is obvious 
that the force and clarity of the demonstrative proof resonated with Hobbes. 
However, the descriptions of the encounter offer no further details about 
whether it was this encounter, specifically, that pushed Hobbes to contemplate 
geometry as a model for the study of nature and society.79  
Other scholars approach these biographical data with more caution. 
Though Hobbes may have “seized upon” Euclid sometime in the later 1620s, he 
would have been and was familiar with geometry before then.80 As others have 
pointed out81 and I elucidate above, he was even inclined to occasionally think 
about nature geometrically. Similarly, in Mortal Gods, Miller writes about 
Aubrey’s description of the encounter in skeptical tones, remarking that within 
 
no. 3 (1993), 511. Raylor persuasively disproves the conclusion by showing that, in form and 
methodology, the tract is highly reminiscent of a tract by Benedetto Castelli on fluid dynamics, 
which was translated by Robert Payne, who, Raylor (and others) contend, penned the tract, 
“Hobbes, Payne, and ‘A Short Tract on First Principles’,” The Historical Journal 44, no. 1 (2001), 
44. 
 
79 Johann Sommerville agrees, noting that though “The demonstrative certainty of geometrical 
theorems greatly impressed [Hobbes]…it is unclear quite how far his mathematical and 
scientific ideas had developed by 1630,” Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 12. 
 
80 As E.G. Jacoby points out in the review essay “Thomas Hobbes in Europe,” “The geometry 
section of the [Hardwick] reading list includes among its 123 titles 10 different editions of 
Euclid’s Elements, one of them being the famous translation by John Dee (London, 1570). Pacci 
concludes that ‘this also signifies that the English thinker had discovered Euclid and geometry 
before his travel with Clifton’ if his first reading does not really belong to his student years at 
Oxford before 1607,” Journal of European Studies 4 (1974), 60. 
 
81 Martinich notes that Hobbes, in De mirabilibus pecci, “compared Chatsworth to a point, and 
the Derwent to a line; and he referred to God as the eternal geometer,” Hobbes: A Biography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 84-85. For Raylor’s interpretation of the same 
lines, see footnote 71 [Longstone Edge]. In addition, Malcolm, as I do, draws attention to 
Hobbes’s early forays into astronomy, indicating, “It is unlikely, given his known earlier interest 
in astronomy, that this was Hobbes’s first encounter with geometry; nor need we assume that 
he had never encountered Euclid’s work before.” Rather, Malcolm continues, the reminiscence 
“suggests that Hobbes’s mind was already preoccupied with some philosophical problems to 
which Euclidean method seemed to supply the solution. Of the nature of those problems, 




Aubrey’s account are allusions to Pythagoras’s own discovery of the theorem. 
That is, it is possible that Aubrey’s account of the event is more literary and 
figurative than historical. Miller writes, 
There are good reasons to doubt this story of a sudden conversion to the 
church of mathematical worship. Book I, proposition 47, of Euclid is the 
Pythagorean Theorem. Upon its discovery, Pythagoras is said to have 
sacrificed one hundred oxen to the gods. Aubrey’s account, with its 
reference to divinity and Hobbes’s joy upon seeing the truth of 
something he first thought impossible, may be a creative seventeenth-
century inversion allowing us to imagine Hobbes experiencing the same 
revelation centuries later. This story, which has Hobbes encountering a 
book of geometry in the same way enthusiasts encounter an open Bible, 
bespeaks as much humanist continuity as it does sudden 
transformation.82 
 
The details of Hobbes’s encounter with Euclid are fuzzy. It is not clear 
what in Euclid’s Elements dazzled Hobbes, beyond the certainty and 
persuasiveness of a demonstrative proof. Although familiar to him, the idea of 
geometric demonstration, as an epistemological tool, appreciated in value and 
strongly resonated with him in that moment.83 In the moments and years that 
immediately followed, Hobbes did turn to subjects of study that were 
geometry-inflected, like optics. However, it would be wrong to conclude that 
the Euclid episode per se propelled Hobbes in these directions. His interest in 
these subjects, an extension of and continuous with earlier interests, emerged 
separate from, but certainly not at odds with, a burgeoning interest in 




82 Miller, Mortal Gods, 10. 
 
83 Martinich rightly notes that “there is a difference between learning something and being 




b. 1630-1636  
 
Hobbes and the Newcastle Cavendishes 
 
It was around the time of the Euclidean encounter that Hobbes fell back 
in with elements of the Cavendish family. He had long served the aristocratic 
Cavendishes. Upon completing his studies at Oxford, he was hired as a tutor for 
and companion to William Cavendish, son of the First Earl of Devonshire. He 
continued to serve the Devonshire Cavendishes until William, then the Second 
Earl of Devonshire, died in 1628. After leaving the service of the family, he soon 
returned to the Cavendish fold in 1630. It was during these gap years, between 
1628 and 1630, that Hobbes began to study Euclid in earnest. The gap in 
employment also freed him to accompany another aristocrat, the young 
Gervase Clifton, on a Continental tour (Hobbes’s second).  
Not long after returning to England from the Continent, in or around 
1630, Hobbes became increasingly enmeshed with the Newcastle side of the 
Cavendishes.84 At the time, the Earl of Newcastle, also a William Cavendish, 
was not an unfamiliar face. Newcastle, but not his brother Charles, was a 
member of the adventuring party that toured the wonders of the Peak District 
with Hobbes and some others (including William, the Second Earl of 
Devonshire).  
 
84 Malcolm records that “By late 1630, when Hobbes came back from his continental tour with 
Sir Gervase Clifton’s son, Mansfield [Newcastle] and his brother [Charles Cavendish] seem to 
have formed the centre of gravity of Hobbes’s intellectual world in England: during that winter 
he spent some time at Mansfield’s house in Nottinghamshire, Welbeck Abbey, discussing his 
new philosophical theories about sense perception with Mansfield and Sir Charles Cavendish,” 




Not unlike the young Devonshire, who was an enthusiastic devotee of 
Francis Bacon and surely present as Hobbes pursued Baconian projects (like De 
mirabilibus pecci), the Cavendish brothers were similarly inclined to science, 
having been early to the shores of “new philosophy.”85 At their Welbeck estate, 
Newcastle and Charles became the center of an England-located network of 
practitioners whose work focused on newly popular subjects, such as optics and 
mechanics. Hobbes soon represented an important node in the network, and it 
was in the presence of the Cavendish brothers that he honed a long-brewing 
interest in the study of nature and man. 
Motion, optics, and the Welbeck group 
 
Around the time of the encounter with Euclid, Hobbes stumbled into 
another insight, one that Hobbes himself connected to the Cavendish brothers’ 
interest in motion. The insight is reducible to a simple notion: motion can be 
applied as a powerful explanatory device, used to make sense of different 
dimensions of human experience, including light, sounds, and ideas. A decade 
later, Hobbes would recall having rendered a “doctrine of the nature and 
production of light, sound, and all phantasms or ideas…explained by me in the 
presence of those most excellent brothers William Earl of Newcastle and Sir 
 
85 “By the early 1630s,” writes Raylor, “he [Newcastle] and his scholarly brother, Charles, were at 
the forefront of the new philosophy in England, promoting theoretical research and practical 
experiment on optics, mathematics, and mechanics. They established correspondence with 
such European scholars as Claude Mydorge and Marin Mersenne the Minim friar, who acted as 
a conduit for Continental ideas,” “Newcastle’s Ghosts: Robert Payne, Ben Jonson, and the 
‘Cavendish circle’,” in Literary Circles and Cultural Communities in Renaissance England, eds. 




Charles Cavendish…in the year 1630."86 Much of the work that followed 
branched from this basic insight. However, as Hobbes’s early forays into optics 
show, it took him time to convert the insight into a workable scientific precept.  
By 1634 Hobbes had become knitted into the community at Welbeck. In 
the first month of the year Hobbes’s remarks signal an involvement in 
Welbeck-related projects. He apologized to Newcastle for having taken so long 
with “business I haue so long owed to your Lop.”87 The first specific reference to 
Hobbes’s Welbeck business comes in a letter penned by Walter Warner, who, 
like Hobbes, had been drawn into Newcastle’s circle.  
The occasion for the reference was an exchange between Warner and 
Robert Payne, a Welbeck member and chaplain to Newcastle,88 about the 
nature and causes of refraction.89 In the letter, Warner obliquely refers to a 
Hobbes-produced treatment on refraction, which we now know to have been 
written out by Hobbes and ascribed the title “Mr Hobbes analogy” by Warner. 
The treatment, as expected, incorporated the idea of motion. However, the 
approach featured in Hobbes’s “analogy” conformed to prevailing orthodoxy 
 
86 Thomas Hobbes, “Letter 34: Hobbes to Marin Mersenne, from Paris [20/] 30 March 1641,” in 
The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. and trans. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), 108. 
 
87 Thomas Hobbes, “Letter 10: Hobbes to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, from London 
26 January [/5 February] 1634],” in The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. Noel 
Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 19-20. 
 
88 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 81. 
 
89 Franco Guidice, “Those Most Curious of Science: Hobbes’s Optics,” in The Oxford Handbook 





and fell in with “textbook”90 kinematic treatments91 of optics. Such a treatment 
works, Franco Giudice explains, by “resolv[ing]” the “refracted motion of 
light…into perpendicular and parallel components.”92 Amenable to the 
approach, Warner assessed that Hobbes’s treatment was “very conducible to 
the theory and investigation of the cause of refraction.”93  
However, soon after, Hobbes believed Warner’s optimism was 
misplaced. Hobbes would express scepticism about “old” textbook and other 
treatments, which tended to bend toward excessive geometrical abstractness.94 
What old style treatments elided, he believed, were the dynamic, ramifying 
 
90 The adjective is borrowed from Malcolm. He writes, “the kinematic approach adopted in the 
‘analogy’…was merely the standard approach taken by all the optical textbooks: refraction had 
been treated on such a basis, distinguishing vertical and lateral components, as writers from 
Alhazen to Kepler,” Aspects of Hobbes, 120, see also 121. 
 
91 Alan Shapiro explains that “The essence of the kinematic approach was its attempt to give a 
complete description of the motion – rectilinear, reflected, and refracted – of a wave or ray 
front. This attempt to describe mathematically the propagation of a motion in a fluid medium 
reflects a characteristic concern of mid-seventeenth-century science, the high period of the 
mechanical philosophy: to describe natural phenomena in terms of matter and motion,” 
“Kinematic Optics: A Study of the Wave Theory of Light in the Seventeenth Century,” Archive 
for the History of Exact Sciences 11, no. 2/3 (1973), 137. 
 
92 Guidice, “The Most Curious of Science,” 151. 
 
93 Ibid, 151 n. 12. 
 
94 By 1636 Hobbes could no longer countenance the strictly geometrical approach at work in his 
own analogy. The change in methodological posture is recorded in a letter from Charles 
Cavendish to Walter Warner. In the letter, Cavendish recounts that Hobbes had undertaken an 
“experiment of the place of the image of a thing contrarie to the olde tenet; a dandle being put 
into a glasse of a cylindricall forme, the image hangs perpendicularie over the candle itself […] 
and not at the concourse of the perpendicular from the object with the visual line,” as quoted in 
José Médina’s “Hobbes’s Geometrical Optics,” Hobbes Studies 29 (2016), 62. Médina explains 
that the “alternative explanation” proffered by Hobbes “about the reflection of beams in a 
cylindrical mirror shows that the purely geometrical approach (the old tenet) is not satisfying 
because it does not take into account what is a specific aspect of Hobbes’s account of light: a 
dynamic conception of the action of light…Here again, pure geometry is deficient because a 
mathematical point does not give the cause of the radiation and the production of heat (and 
fire) at the focus of the mathematical ray of light,” ibid. However, Médina rejects Malcolm’s 





effects of varieties of matter in motion.95 In the years that followed, it was this 
appreciation rather than an overwhelming preoccupation with geometry that 
was a hallmark of Hobbes’s theorizations. 
Motion as the cause of everything existing 
 
In late 1634, Hobbes found himself back on the Continent, this time 
accompanying the son of his previous charge and friend, the Second Earl of 
Devonshire. In his autobiographies, Hobbes marks out the third Continental 
tour as a period during which important elements of his philosophical identity 
rapidly intensified and then crystalized.96 Not unrelated, it was during the trip 
that Hobbes joined the Continental-based philosophical movement, to which 
the small England-located Welbeck group was an outpost.  
Through a connection supplied by Newcastle and Charles Cavendish, 
Hobbes was introduced to the mathematician Claude Mydorge, and through 
him the Minim friar Marin Mersenne.97 Mersenne was a human switchboard. 
Based in Paris, Mersenne was a central node connecting networks of people, all 
interested in different substantive areas and applications of science.98 Referring 
to himself in the third person, Hobbes recalls, 
 
95 Believing that “the variety of thinges is but a variety of locall motion in ye spirits or unuisible 
partes of bodies,” Hobbes pointed out in a July 1636 letter to Newcastle, “the old way by beames 
and reflection, and refraction leaues a man destitute of any thing to say to it…,” “Letter 19: 
Hobbes to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, from Paris 29 July/8 August 1636,” in The 
Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 33-
34. 
 
96 Namely, it was during the relevant period, as the analysis that follows shows, that Hobbes 
became a zealous promoter of the idea of motion as the cause of everything existing. 
 
97 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 11-12. 
 
98 Peter Dear writes that “Soon after his move to the Minim convent off the Place Royale in 1619, 
his literary career got under way with works of a religious and apologetic nature; he turned 
shortly thereafter to the publication of treatises that dealt primarily with mathematical sciences 
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When he was staying in Paris, he began to investigate the principles of 
natural science. When he became aware of the variety of movement 
contained in the natural world, he first inquired as to the nature of these 
motions, to determine the ways in which they might effect the senses, 
the intellect, the imagination, together with the other natural properties. 
He communicated his findings on a daily basis to the Reverend Father 
Marin Mersenne, of the Order of the Minim Brothers, a scholar who was 
venerated as an outstanding exponent of all branches of philosophy.99 
 
Hobbes found inspiration in the conversations he had during the trip, 
including one with Galileo Galilei.100 He became fully aware of the “variety of 
movement in the natural world.” Specifically, the 1630 intuitions about the 
relation between motion and “all phantasms” of the mind had grown into an 
ideology centered on the ontological principle of motion.  
The fact and weight of this awareness is visible in a letter sent by Hobbes 
to Newcastle in the summer of 1636. In the letter, Hobbes responds to a query, 
from Newcastle, about the optical work of “Mr Warner and Mr Mydorge.” While 
acknowledging both to be “able men,” Hobbes’s criticism of their work is 
devastating. Hobbes criticizes that, while both men referred to their “writings” 
 
of the physical world. The sciences of music, mechanics, and optics engaged his attention above 
all others, but the religious significance of his work was never submerged, always remaining a 
central motivation. His correspondence expanded through the 1620s, and by the following 
decade his role as a philosophical intelligencer had become firmly established.” In the 
preceding paragraph Dear points out that Mersenne freely “promoted the work of…iconoclasts” 
– like “Descartes, Galileo, Bacon, and others” – and, “among other things, he arranged for the 
publication of some of Descartes’s writings and produced his own versions of a number of 
Galileo’s,” Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 4. 
Likewise, Daniel Garber notes that Mersenne was “at the center of the intellectual network that 
put thinkers from all over Europe sympathetic to the new science in touch with one another,” 
“On the Frontlines of the Scientific Revolution: How Mersenne Learned to Love Galileo,” 
Perspectives on Science 12, no. 2 (2004), 136. 
 
99 Hobbes, “The Prose Life,” 247. 
 
100 Details related to the meeting are not well known. For additional information see Frithiof 
Brandt’s Thomas Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception of Nature (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, 




as “demonstrations,” they were wrong to do so, having failed to ground their 
work using correct principles. He writes, 
the grounds and suppositions they vse, so many of them as concerne 
light, are vncertayne and many of them not true. Mr Warner has sent a 
tract to Sr Charles concerning the place of the Image in conuexe and 
concaue glasses…[which relies upon] the old way by beames and 
reflection, and refraction leaues a man destitute of any thing to say to 
it…101 
 
Hobbes took aim at the “old” geometrical “way”102 of analysis that featured in 
Warner’s “tract.” This pattern of analysis, Hobbes inveighs, “leaues a man 
destitute of any thing to say to it.”103  
Hobbes himself offers only a sketchy explanation of similar optical 
experiments,104 admitting his “reason is not cleare enough to make one see how 
nature workes.”105 However, the speculative account Hobbes offers cannot be 
said to develop from “grounds and suppositions” that are “vncertayne and…not 
true.” Instead, Hobbes supplied a thicker, qualitative explanation in which a 
particular variety or quality of “motion” does the explanatory work.106 And 
herein is found the nub of Hobbes’s critique. 
 
101 Hobbes, “Letter 19: Hobbes to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, from Paris 29 July/8 
August 1636,” 33-34. 
 
102 Antoni Malet argues that, “Regardless of what they say, Hobbes suggests, Warner’s results 
are useless because they are purely geometrical and do not convey or support causal physical 
explanations,” “The Power of Images: Mathematics and Metaphysics in Hobbes’s Optics,” 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 32, no. 2 (2001), 317. 
 
103 Hobbes, “Letter 19: Hobbes to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, from Paris 29 July/8 
August 1636,” 34. 
 
104 For a description of the experiments, one related to the appearance of a human image in a 
blood-filled retort, and other of trees on fire on a broken remnant of a retort, see Malcolm’s The 
Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes, 35, footnotes 4-5.  
 





Hobbes assessed that Warner's treatment, set in the "old way," failed 
because it relied upon an unreasonable degree of geometrical reduction.107 In 
other words, it offered no empirical, explanatory grip on the "nature" of the 
image undergoing examination. The insights delivered by Warner, as Hobbes 
said, were premised on principles that were untrue. Instead, Hobbes required 
that demonstrations proceed from true grounds. Consequently, he stipulated 
that a “true” demonstration – that is, a demonstration worthy of the name – 
must make use of correct physical, substantive principles, and, as Hobbes failed 
to do, reliably specify empirical processes of causation. 
Science, sense experience, and experimentation 
 
Yet, the sureness Hobbes felt about motion-based ontologies did not 
prevent him from feeling fundamentally unsure about natural philosophy 
featuring motion as causes. Hobbes believed he had found the correct empirical 
starting point for any demonstration aiming to explicate the operations of 
nature. At the same time, he embraced the idea that human knowledge extends 
only as far as actual human sense allows.108 In other words, while sure he had 
hit upon the “true” grounds for natural philosophy, Hobbes believed that we 
are doomed to speculate, maybe forever, as to how some dimensions of nature 
come together. As Hobbes explains to Newcastle, 
In thinges that are not demonstrable, of wch kind is ye greatest part of 
Naturall Philosophy, as dependinge vpon the motion of bodies so subtile 
 
107 See footnotes 94 and 102. 
 
108 Hobbes, here, tacked with the scholastic “maxim” nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, 
“There is nothing in the mind which was not first in the senses,” Peter Dear, “The Meanings of 
Experience,” in The Cambridge History of Science: Early Modern Science volume III, ed. 




as they are inuisible, such as are ayre and spirits, the most can be 
atteyned vnto is to haue such opinions, as no certayne experience can 
confute, and from wch can be deduced by lawfull argumentation, no 
absurdity, and such are your Lops opinions in your letter...namely, That 
the variety of thinges is but variety of locall motion in ye spirits or 
inuisible partes of bodies.109 
 
Embedded in this view of natural philosophy is a notion of science in 
which sense experience is epistemically privileged. Indeed, Hobbes made sense 
experience a precondition for scientific demonstration. Natural philosophers, 
Hobbes observed, sit at a remove from the processes they theorize. By 
highlighting how these processes “depen[d] vpon the motion of bodies so 
subtile” they may as well be “inuisible,” Hobbes signals it is only possible to 
demonstrate and, in turn, know what is visible. Beyond this boundary – beyond 
literal lines of sight, sound, and so on – it is only possible to have opinions. And 
although weighing one’s opinions against “certayne experience” makes it 
possible to be confident in them, speculation about “ye greatest part of Naturall 
Philosophy,” Hobbes observes, will never be as certain as the “certayne 
experience” against which one’s speculations are tested.  
In practice, Hobbes relied upon particular experiences, often in the form 
of experimental results,110 to test the viability of the opinions put in front of 
him. Hobbes principally used experiments in two ways. First, as with the image 
he sketchily explicates in the letter to Newcastle, experimentally generated 
 
109 Hobbes, “Letter 19: Hobbes to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, from Paris 29 July/8 
August 1636,” 33. 
 
110 James Everest adds that though Hobbes “seems to have been comfortable using instruments 
and conducting experiments” he “apparently had no desire to share details of this activity 
beyond trusted members of a close intellectual network,” “Practical Optics and Polemical 





results were treated as empirical effects demanding explanation. For example, 
in the letter, Hobbes describes an “experiment of ye mans image in ye glasse of 
bloud.”111  
Experiments were also wielded as a tool by which to produce 
experiences that could knock down and disprove the claims of others. Hobbes 
worked in this mode with respect to vitiating the work of Warner and 
undercutting the old-fashioned explanatory toolkit upon which Warner relied. 
112 In a May 1636 letter, Charles Cavendish informed Warner of “an experiment” 
conducted by Hobbes “of the place of the image of a thing contrarie to olde 
tenet.” The experiment proceeded as follows: “a candle being put into a glasse 
of a cylindricall forme, the image hangs perpendicularlie over the candle 
itself…and not at the concourse of the perpendicular from the object with the 
visual line.”113 The point, writes Giudice, was to show that “Such 
phenomena…suggested that geometry was inadequate to achieve the right kind 
of explanation in optics.”114 For later seventeenth century experimentalists, 
Peter Dear writes, “The singular experience,” strictly speaking, “could not be 
 
111 Hobbes, “Letter 19: Hobbes to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, from Paris 29 July/8 
August 1636,” 34. 
 
112 The observation, in dimensions, accords with Everest’s findings regarding Hobbes’s polemical 
use of experimental data against Warner. Everest makes the more restricted, modest claim that 
“the experiments that Hobbes refers to do not exactly invalidate Warner’s ideas, but they 
certainty reveal their limitations,” “Practical Optics and Polemical Purposes in Seventeenth-
Century England,” 100. However, I disagree with the conclusion. Just as Hobbes would later use 
experimental data to put a wrench into the work of René Descartes, so too he did so for the 
purpose of razing the work of Walter Warner. 
 






evident, but it could provide evidence.”115 In practice, Hobbes contravened the 
dictum. The singular experience was, on occasion, treated as both evident and 
evidence. 
In sum, Hobbes attached significant weight to sense experiences. This 
weighting is apparent both in terms of how he conceptualized what is and is 
not science and how he tested different forms of knowledge. However, in so 
doing, his aim, throughout, was to render certain empirical demonstrations. 
And, as Hobbes pointed out in his letter to Newcastle, certain empirical 
explanations, not opinions, are borne of sense experience. It will be important 
to hold this point in mind as we move to examine Hobbes’s first major work, 
The Elements of Law.  
Part II: Science in The Elements of Law (1640) 
 
a. Sense experience and science in The Elements of Law 
 
The beginnings of Hobbesian science 
 
The prominent role sense experience played in Hobbes’s conception of 
science is, at first glance, unremarkable. An emphasis on sense put him well 
within the range of the intellectual mainstream, scholastic antecedents, and in 
particular, other geometry-inclined scientists of his day.116 For example, 
 
115 For such experimentalists, Dear explains, “The new scientific experience of the seventeenth 
century established its legitimacy by rendering credible its historical reports of events, often 
citing witness. The singular experience could not be evident, but it could provide evidence,” 
Discipline and Experience, 25. 
 
116 Peter Dear notes that “The Aristotelian kind of scientific experience [as discussed in the 
pages below] held sway even among figures later regarded as opponents of Aristotle. In his 
famous account of fall along inclined planes…Galileo Galilei…tried to establish the authenticity 
of the experience that falling bodies in fact behave as he claimed they do by deriving it from the 
memory of many individual instances,” “The Meaning of Experiences,” 122. Furthermore, 
writing about Jesuit mathematicians in Discipline and Experience, Dear clarifies that “From a 
practical standpoint, empirical principles concerning the natural world could be made evident 
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through the character Salviati, Galileo, in the Dialogue Concerning the Two 
Chief World Systems (1632), writes approvingly that Aristotle, whose ideas 
about science continued to saturate the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
imaginaries, 
first tried to ascertain the conclusion as much as possible by means of 
the senses, experiences, and observations, and then he searched for ways 
of demonstrating it. In fact, this is more or less what one does in the 
demonstrative sciences...whatever the a priori theorizing preceded the a 
posteriori senses or vice versa, the important point is that Aristotle 
himself places sensible experience before all theorizing….117 
 
Galileo later used the point as a wedge to put distance between Aristotle’s 
practice of demonstrative science and the “most submissive and slavish 
servants of Aristotle,” the “Peripatetics,” who would unthinkingly parrot 
Aristotelianisms, “deny[ing] all experience and all observation in the world and 
even refus[ing] to use their senses in order not to have to make the 
confession.”118 
 
in a similar way, just as (for Aristotle) geometrical axioms themselves ultimately derived from 
the senses: they would be evident if everyone agreed on their truth and judged argument to be 
unnecessary in the establishment of that agreement. Experiential statements, therefore, could 
not play a role in scientific discourse unless they were universal; if they were not, they could 
never be evident. Formal universality did not in itself establish an experience as ‘evident,’ of 
course; the experience had to express, and derive from, the perennial lessons of the senses,” 43. 
The mathematician Isaac Barrow would later reject the Aristotelian view of the role of sense in 
the production of universal experiences (especially in the form of axioms). Paolo Mancosu 
writes that, in the fifth lecture in his Lectiones, Barrow pointed out that “The evidence and 
truth of mathematical axioms…were already questioned in Greek times. One of the main 
skeptical objections usually raised in this connection is that universal axioms are obtained by 
induction and therefore are fallible. This opens up the problem of certainty and the role that 
sense and intellect play in science…Barrow rejected the theory that all principles of 
mathematics depend only upon induction from the senses.” However, Mancosu adds, Barrow 
“is ready to add that sensation plays a role in showing the possibility of a mathematical 
hypothesis,” Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century, 
20. 
 
117 Galilei Galileo, Galileo on the World Systems: A New Abridged Translation and Guide, ed. and 
tr. Maurice A. Finnocchiaro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 96-97. 
 




The Elements of Law (1640), Hobbes’s first significant treatment on 
human nature and politics, delineates a multi-step process by which to 
generate scientific knowledge. Not unlike the process Salviati outlines in 
Galileo’s Dialogue, Hobbes sees the process as beginning with “sense.” He 
explains, “Knowledge, therefore, which we call SCIENCE, I define to be evidence 
of truth, from some beginning or principle of sense.”119 Sense perception, the 
root of all human experience, furnishes the raw material out of which the 
edifice of scientific knowledge is made. The requirement that science, as 
Hobbes put it in his letter to Newcastle, be “demonstrable,” necessitates a 
relation between scientific knowledge and the senses. 
However, it would be wrong to draw broad conclusions on the basis of 
this initial framing, which groups simple sense experience, or “knowledge 
original,”120 and science together. The passages that follow lay out a dyadic 
typology of knowledge, with types of knowledge formed directly out of the bulk 
of sense experience on one side and science on the other. Scientific knowledge 
is set apart from knowledge comprised of un-adapted sense experience. Sense 
experience – a mass of material thrown off by sense perception – may supply 
initial building blocks out of which vast systems of scientific knowledge are 
made; however, Hobbes indicates it would be wrong to run the two, experience 
and science, together.121 
 
119 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 19 [6.4]. 
 
120 Ibid, 18-19 [6.1]. 
 




Scientific knowledge, Hobbes attests, is universal and derived through 
the construction of categorical propositions, which are then laboriously122 
joined together into syllogisms, producing necessary, universal conclusions.123 
(For example, propositions like “all whales are mammals” and “all mammals are 
warm-blooded” combine to produce the necessary, universal, and empirically 
true insight that “all whales are warm-blooded.”)124 It is true that experiences of 
the world furnish the conceptions (of a whale), which, when named (whale), 
become the stuff out of which propositions, and then syllogisms, are made. 
However, the knowledge that results from this kind of syllogizing is unlike bare 
experiential knowledge, furnished by our senses.  
Experience, Hobbes famously exclaimed, “concludeth nothing 
universally.”125 Simple experience, he believed, represents a distinct form of 
knowledge. It is “evidence of fact,”126 not to be confused with syllogistically 
derived truths. Experience is a bulk of unrefined material lodged in our 
memory that we casually, and often unconsciously, mine for conjectural 
insights about the world we inhabit. “Experience,” he describes, “is nothing else 
but” the simple “remembrance of what antecedents [e.g., ash-colored clouds] 
 
122 Hobbes contended that as “to demonstration and teaching of the truth, there are required 
long deductions, and great attention, which is unpleasant to the hearer,” ibid, 140 [27.14]. 
 
123 Ibid, 20 [6.4]. 
 
124 For a discussion of the historical position of Hobbes’s adumbrations on logic, see A.P. 
Martinich’s Hobbes (Routledge: New York, 2005), 137-151. 
 
125 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 12 [4.10]. 
 




have been followed with what consequents [e.g., rain].”127 The insights thrown 
off by experience,128 how we sense and experience the progression of the world 
and life, are contingent129 and diametrical to the necessary, universal truths laid 
down by science. 
Hobbes’s statements produce mixed impressions of the relation between 
sense experience and science. The content of one’s experiences is, through 
comparison, made to appear as an untrustworthy guide, unsuitable to supply 
the kind of necessary, universal conclusions Hobbes sought. As such, 
experience, it can be inferred, is involved in science, but only at the margins. 
However, the inference, and the added inference that Hobbes “denigrate[d]” 
experience,130 flattens and mispresents Hobbes’s understanding of experience 
and its place in the production of scientific knowledge.  
 
127 Ibid, 11 [4.6]. 
 
128 A question overlooked by the secondary literature is whether “experience,” as signified and 
conceptualized in the fourth chapter of The Elements of Law, is pre-linguistic. If so, it is possible 
that a key distinction between accumulated experience and science is a linguistic one; that, in 
part, what makes conjectural speculation uncertain is that it is carried out un-systematically, 
i.e., without the artifice and systematizing structure of language. Language permits the sifting 
and sorting of experience, supplying an apparatus that can be used to put one’s experiences in 
order and discriminate between them. Hobbes comes close to filling out the inference in his 
commentary on Thomas White’s De mundo, writing, “So the beasts also set one present event 
against another; but it is impossible for them, lacking the aid of artifice, to compare past with 
present events owing to the dimness and wavering of the concept,” Thomas Hobbes: Thomas 
White’s De Mundo Examined, 372. In other words, Hobbes elaborates in the sentences that 
follow, beasts are resigned to think without the aid of language, ibid, 372-373. For a treatment 
that gestures toward the possibility, see Arash Abizadeh’s “The Absence of Reference in 
Hobbes’ Philosophy of Language,” Philosophers’ Imprint 15, no. 22 (2015), 2. 
 
129 Hobbes framed the point using the language of probability, writing “As in conjectural things 
concerning past and future, it is prudence to conclude from experience, what is likely to come 
to pass, or to have passed already; [and] so is it an error to conclude from it, that is so or so 
called,” The Elements of Law, 13 [4.11]. 
 




The line Hobbes drew between experience and science is meant to 
disaggregate the two in terms of method and form.131 That is, Hobbes used the 
distinction between science and experience (a bulk of cognitively retained 
sense data) to draw attention to two distinct operations of knowledge 
production, each producing different forms of knowledge. Hobbes did not use 
the distinction to “denigrate” or demean experience as such. He did not 
consider the substance of experience, in all instances, to be unreliable.132 Just 
the opposite. 
As Hobbes telegraphs when he notes that “SCIENCE” originates from 
“some beginning or principle of sense,” the fundamental principles that anchor 
the deductions of science are registered by sense. It is sensate experience, not 
logic, that delivers the sure principles from which syllogistic science branches 
out.133 The point is underscored in the final, summarizing paragraph of The 
 
131 The observation jibes with Tom Sorell’s. Sorell notes, “Instead of taking the place of 
experience, reason is supposed to transform, partly by introducing new ways of organizing,” 
Hobbes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 31. However, there may be issues with the 
larger account within which the observation is nested. Sorell’s account of experience, drawn 
principally from The Elements of Law, is framed by a discussion of appetite-driven means-ends 
reasoning. Although Hobbes, himself, explores the means-ends theme in the paragraphs 
building to the discussion of experience found in chapter 4 of The Elements, that discussion is 
not used as a device to explore the structure and succession of human appetites, and thus, it is 
unclear to what extent Hobbes viewed the discussion of experience, beginning in 4.6, as 
continuous with 4.1-4.5. Rather, Hobbes uses the discussion in 4.6, and in the paragraphs that 
follows, to stake out the epistemological limits of experience, and for the purpose of setting up 
a distinction, drawn latter, between experience and science. This is not to suggest that Sorell’s 
analysis is necessarily misdrawn. Instead, the question posed here about the relationship 
between the different passages in the fourth chapter of The Elements deserves more scrutiny 
than Sorell (rather understandably) gives. 
 
132 For example, Hobbes made experience (“any evident truth whatsoever”) crucial in the 
assessment of the empirical durability of a conclusion, explaining “when from his conclusion a 
man may, by good ratiocination, derive that which is contradictory to any evident truth 
whatsoever, then is he said to have concluded against reason: and such a conclusion is called 
absurdity,” The Elements of Law, 17 [5.12]. 
 
133 As noted previously, elements of Hobbes’s conceptualizations were well within the strictures 
of mainstream interpretations of geometry and geometric science. However, pace persuasive 
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Elements’ second chapter. Hobbes writes that it is easy to be fooled into 
believing that the “accidents or qualities” of “our senses” are really and actually 
“in the world.” However, it is also possible to slice through the deceptions of 
sense. Someone paying attention is capable of navigating the minefield of 
deceptions, and in so doing, discovering fundamental truths. He indicates, 
The things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by 
which these seemings are caused. And this is the great deception of 
sense, which also by sense to be corrected. For as sense telleth me, when 
I see directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the object; so also sense 
telleth me, when I see by reflection, the colour is not in the object.134 
 
“[T]he great deception of sense,” Hobbes explains, is “also by sense to be 
corrected.” The senses do deliver certain, bedrock insights, like the idea of the 
subjectivity of secondary qualities (that “colour is not” actually “in the object”). 
Hobbes contended that what is needed is a mind, like his, capable of registering 
the insights. 
Beyond furnishing principles, Hobbes made it clear that this bulk of 
sense material, if systematized and put in the proper order, becomes the 
content of science. What Hobbes aspired to change with respect to experience 
was its presentation, not its substance. A clarifying example, which elucidates 
 
comparisons drawn by some in Hobbes studies (like John Danford and Hardy Grant), it is 
impossible to know what Hobbes’s precise reference points were. That is, it is unknown, and 
unknowable, whether Hobbes’s conception of science stems from entanglements with work 
that was nearer and more local to him (e.g., Calvius’s, Case’s, Galileo’s, Mersenne’s, 
Descartes’s), or of an older, more ancient vintage (e.g., Aristotle’s and Euclid’s). Put another 
way: because of their commonality, the threads of influence are un-parsable. What is more, the 
sum of Hobbes’s science cannot be reduced to these influences. For the studies referenced 
above, see John W. Danford’s “The Problem of Language in Hobbes’s Political Science,” 116-117 
and Hardy Grant’s “Geometry and Politics: Mathematics in the Thoughts of Thomas Hobbes,” 
Mathematics Magazine 63, no. 3 (1990), 147-149. 
 




the point, is found in Hobbes’s insistence that the principal marker of “truth” is 
the “concomitance of a man’s conception with the words that signify such 
conception in the act of ratiocination [syllogistic reasoning].”135 The words that 
are bolted together to create the propositions and syllogisms of science must 
map directly onto a person’s conceptions – how that person, and more broadly, 
all people experience or should experience the world.  
Scientific knowledge, it follows, is thoroughgoingly loaded with sense-
delivered, experiential, empirical content. And deriving necessary, not merely 
probable conclusions from this content does not entail a radical working of it. 
Rather, generating the necessary, universal conclusions of science involves 
surrounding experiential content with the correct scaffolding. It is simply a 
matter of putting it into the right form and structure. 
To the modern mind, an intriguing corollary emerges from an analysis of 
the place of experience in Hobbes’s science. It is evident that he expected his 
readers, and readers of (true) science more broadly, to experience selfsame 
concomitances of conceptions and words.136 The expectation raises an 
 
135 Ibid, 19 [6.3]. 
 
136 Whereas Cees Leijenhorst uses Hobbes’s materialism as a cypher to explain Hobbes’s view, I 
rely on contextualization to fill out Hobbes’s epistemology and this feature of his philosophy. 
Leijenhorst writes that “scientists are able to reach a communis opinion because ordinary 
language already contains a pre-scientific consensus…Viewed from the material perspective, 
these definitions pertain to a literal consensus, a unity of conception which external bodies 
cause in us,” “Insignificant Speech: Thomas Hobbes and Late Aristotelianism on Words, 
Concepts, and Things,” in Res et Verba in the Renaissance, eds. I. Maclean and E. Kessler 
(Wiebaden: Harrasowitz (2002), 134. While philosophically well-footed, the approach 
Leijenhorst endorses is emblematic of many others’, insofar as it extrapolates on the basis of 
and extends the principles of Hobbes’s metaphysics to address different varieties of problems 
and puzzles in Hobbes’s philosophy, despite a relative shortage of clear textual evidence that 
the puzzles are a byproduct of Hobbes’s materialism. Put differently, Leijenhorst, as others do, 
adduces Hobbes’s metaphysical commitments to close gaps and address ambiguities in his 
philosophy, when it is possible that “materialism” may not be a suitable answer for many of 
these queries. To work, the accounts proffered by Leijenhorst and others must assume that 
 
 56 
interesting possibility: that baked into Hobbes’s mind was the idea that some 
experiences are universal – the notion that an experience, sometimes, delivers 
information so vividly evident as to command universal assent.137 
Experience in early modern science and The Elements of Law 
 
As noted in the chapter’s introduction, interpreters have misunderstood 
the role of experience in Hobbes’s conception and practice of science. The true 
extent and nature of the relationship is distorted by simple caricatures, 
designed to present a clean, easy-to-follow contrast between the two. Yet, by 
Hobbes’s own admission, experience and science are intimately bound up 
together: “right ratiocination,” the organon of science, entails “reason[ing] from 
principles that are found indubitable by experience.”138 The judgment is echoed 
in the stipulation that “SCIENCE” emerges “from some beginning or principle of 
sense.”139  
What simple caricatures overlook is how an early-modern mind, like 
Hobbes’s, would have presumed different forms or modes of experiencing, 
having taken for granted the idea that not all experiences are alike or equal. 
Indeed, some of the confusion related to Hobbes’s treatment of the relationship 
between experience and science in The Elements can be attributed to how 
 
Hobbes applied the premise of materialism consistently and rigorously across his work. In the 
absence of solid textual evidence to support it, I am not convinced by the assumption, 
especially when other, simpler, and more probable explanations abound.  
 
137 For a discussion of the concept and the discursive use of experience in the work of 
seventeenth century geometers and Jesuit mathematical scientists, see Dear, Discipline and 
Experience, especially, 42-43. 
 
138 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 17 [5.12].  
 
139 Ibid, 19 [6.4]. 
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analysts, and Hobbes himself, run together different kinds of experience that 
can be pried apart and conceptually differentiated.  
The work of prying apart the different forms of experience operative in 
Hobbes’s work should begin with manifest, universal, or as he put it in his 
letter to Newcastle, “certayne” experience, a concept that has received little or 
no serious, sustained scholarly attention. That such a notion has currency in 
Hobbes’s work sits at odds with his reputation as a philosopher with deep 
concerns about the reliability of the senses and the hypostatization of 
universals. However, his ideas often fail to assimilate to the rigid ideological 
strictures his interpreters retroject back onto him. Such is the case with his 
appeals to universal experience.  
The concept was an element of early modern scientific discourse 
(including mixed-mathematical or physico-mathematical140 discourse), a 
carryover from scholastic precursors and Aristotle. Peter Dear explains, 
In the academic world inherited by seventeenth-century Europe, an 
“experience” [as for Aristotle] was a universal statement of how things 
are, or how they behave….Experience provided phenomena, and 
phenomena were, literally, data, “givens;” they were statements about 
how things behave in the world, and they were to be taken into account 
when discussing topics concerning nature.141 
 
Universal experience, a universally true “statement of how things are, or how 
they behave,” contrasts with singular, idiosyncratic experience, forms of 
experience that are non-universalizable. What the contrast and distinction 
 
140 The terminology was used by Mersenne, and deployed by Dear in “The Meaning of 
Experience,” 124-126. 
 




between universal and singular experience admits is the common-sense notion 
that not all people, everywhere will experience the same things. Although there 
may be experiences that are universally shared, e.g., that the “sun always rises 
in the east; acorns always (barring accidents) grow into oak trees,”142 one’s 
experiences are also inextricably linked to and symptomatic of a particular 
historical horizon, one’s specific historical circumstance. “Singular 
experiences,” witnessing “the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 c.e. or the coronation 
of Pope Urban VIII,” are the result of historical contingency and one’s historical 
location. They are one-off events, never to be experienced again by anyone in 
human history. Thus, singular experiences, in contrast with universal 
experience, “could only subsequently be known by historical report, as 
something that had happened on a particular occasion. They were thus unfit to 
act as scientific axioms…Most people had not witnessed them.”143 
Within the context of early-modern squabbles over the status and role of 
singular experiences in science building, experiments, as historically bounded 
“experiential event[s],” were occasionally held apart from experience.144 
However, this was not the rule. The authors of early modern scientific tracts 
relied on a range of Latin terms, not always deployed in consistent ways, to 
refer to different modes of experience. For example, the Latin term 
experimentum, which we would associate with experiment, was used to refer to 
 








a variety of kinds of experience, including, counterintuitively, universal 
experience. Thus, rather than draw a consistent, cut-and-dry distinction 
between experiment and experience, or singular and universal experience, early 
modern writers used an assortment of Latin terms in idiosyncratic patterns. 
“More often,” writes Dear, “none [i.e., no distinction] is evident, and each [Latin 
term, experimentum and experientia] seems simply to mean ‘experience’ of 
some kind.”145   
There was an absence of standardization with respect to the Latin 
signifiers used by early modern writers to refer to different kinds of experience. 
While some authors did draw distinctions, as between experientia universalis 
(universal experience) and experientia singularis (singular experience),146 often, 
as Dear highlights, they used the same terms to refer to dramatically different 
forms of experience. In other words, the Latin terms used to mean “experience” 
were polysemic. Writers loaded the terms with different kinds of content and 
fabricated new associational links, connecting them to a range of qualitatively 
distinct forms of experience. “Experience,” in one context, would refer to 
universal experience, and in another, a singular experience or experimental 
result. 
Similar polysemic slippage is present in The Elements. The semiotic 
purchase of “experience” varies in the text. Put differently, the label 
“experience” is applied to conceptually distinct forms of experience, the explicit 
 
145 Ibid, 13 n. 5. 
 




borders between which are faint or even non-existent. Readers will see only a 
single kind of experience defined in the text. Hobbes uses the definition to link 
the concept of “experience” with “experiments,” explaining that “To have had 
many experiments, is what we call EXPERIENCE,” specifying that both 
experiments and experience are the product of “remembrance of what 
antecedents have been followed with what consequences.”147 In the aggregate, 
experience of causes and effects adds up to “prudence:” “experience of fact…if it 
be great, is called prudence.”148 Prudence is an accumulation of “the experience 
of the effects of things that work upon us from without.”149 
Thus, The Elements gives the impression that experience simply entails 
conjectural knowledge, relating solely to the inferences we dig out of 
perceptions of cause and effect. According to the definition Hobbes gives, 
experience is the basis for the simple mental calculus we, like other animals, 
perform as we navigate the world and anticipate its unfolding.150 Compared 
with science, conjectural experience is an inferior guide, but not because it is 
singular. The distinction Hobbes draws cuts in a different direction. As noted 
earlier, conjectural experience is inferior because, unlike the categorical 
propositions of science, it is probabilistic.151 
 
147 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 11 [4.6]. 
 
148 Ibid, 20 [6.4]. 
 
149 Ibid, 19 [6.1]. 
 
150 Ibid, 20 [6.4]. 
 




However, The Elements uses the language of experience in ways that 
violate Hobbes’s own definition of the term. Most significant, the text’s uses of 
the term betray a commitment to a separate, universal conception of 
experience. Consider Hobbes’s definition of right reason. Right reason entails 
reasoning “from principles that are found indubitable by experience.”152 An 
axiomatic principle is not a principle of prudence or a conjectural inference. 
The principle is bedrock, an undoubtable premise demonstrated by experience. 
The Elements takes for granted that experience can furnish universal, 
unimpeachable principles, of a kind suitable for use within the context of 
scientific demonstration. Yet, this particular idea of experience is nowhere 
explicitly explicated in the text. 
There are two additional forms of experience on which the text trades, 
which, like universal experience, receive no explicit analytical treatment. First, 
the idea that there are principles known to be indubitable by experience (i.e., 
that there are principles of universal experience) suggests there are principles, 
and therefore forms of experience, that are less indubitable or less manifest, 
less known and less clear. Indeterminate, or ambiguous experience may 
produce principles that, while not sufficiently crystalline as to be indubitable, 
may serve, for a time, as suppositions – premises to which we grant preliminary 
status as premises, “proposition[s]” which “when, not being evident [i.e., 
sufficiently obvious as to be universally true], [are] nevertheless admitted for a 
time”153 in the course of some reasoning.  
 
152 Ibid, 17 [5.12]. 
 
153 Ibid, 20 [6.5]. 
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Second, and relatedly, the notion that experience can furnish 
indubitable (universal) principles, by logical necessity, admits the possibility of 
non-universal, or singular experiences.154 Although a concept given short 
shrift155 in The Elements, the idea of singular experience, despite its absence, is 
present in the text, as the idea of universal experience is only meaningful when 
situated with respect to its opposite: singular experience. Two political science 
examples clarify the (Derridean) point: “a state’s construction of ‘its’ national 
identity is only possible through a simultaneous delineation of something 
which is different or Other;” likewise, “a ‘terrorist’ can only be identified 
through a differentiation from the legitimate ‘freedom fighter’ or ‘state 
sanctioned soldier.’”156 Similarly, universal experience trades on, and is 
comprehensible only insofar as we understand its opposite: singular, or non-
universal experience.  
Thus, the analysis of The Elements can be said to rely on, at a minimum, 
five kinds of experience, including (i) the sense data and individual sense 
experiences that, in the aggregate, become a basis for (ii) conjectural 
experience, (iii) universal experience, (iv) indeterminate experience, and (v) 
singular experience. Between these it is possible there is some conceptual 
 
154 It is unclear whether singular experience is, in all instances, coextensive with indeterminate 
experience. 
 
155 Hobbes does associate “history” (and, one assumes, natural and political history) with the 
first kind of knowledge; however, the distinction is used to distinguish “experience of effects of 
things that work upon us from without” from “experience men have of the proper use of names 
in language,” The Elements of Law 19 [6.1].  
 
156 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: 




overlap (as between indeterminate and singular experience), and some, like 
singular experience, are present despite their absence in the exposition. 
However, of the kinds of experience listed, universal experience holds 
significant promise as a subject of scholarly study. Its importance to and role in 
Hobbes’s work has yet to be suitably interrogated. The sections that follow aim 
to further pin down what universal experience is, how it was deployed in early 
modern discourse, and how Hobbes’s work partakes in and reproduces forms of 
understanding embedded in this discourse (a subject that receives further 
attention in chapter 3). 
Universal experience in the work of Mersenne and Galileo 
 
Hobbes, like Galileo and Mersenne, used experience with the universal 
valence Dear describes.157 Two simple examples, one from Mersenne’s 
Harmonie Universelle (1636) and the other from Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning 
the Two Chief World Systems (1632), provides a sense of how universal 
experience was deployed in discourse and puts Dear’s description of the 
concept as “statements about how things behave in the world” into more 
concrete relief.  
In Harmonie Universelle, while addressing how his discourse on stringed 
instruments might be brought to bear on “medicine, for mathematics, and for 
many other things,” Mersenne notes that “as experience teaches” a string can be 
applied to horological ends – keeping time. A string will “mark the seconds,” 
Mersenne explains. All one must do is attach one end to “to a nail” and 
 




“attac[h] some weights to the other [of a string],” allowing “the string to hang 
freely toward the center of each, each of its complete vibrations will last exactly 
a second.”158 So suspended, a string can function as a serviceable timepiece. 
With the locution “as experience teaches” Mersenne sets down what he took to 
be “a universal statement of how things are.”  
In the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, Salviati, 
Galileo’s mouthpiece, delivers a demonstration showing how the two regular 
motions of the earth (its daily revolution and annual orbit) produce an irregular 
motion. Such an irregular motion, Salviati reasons, is the cause of ocean tides. 
He proves the point analogically.  
Thus, if it is true (and it is most true, as experience shows) that the 
acceleration and retardation of a vessel’s motion make the water 
contained in it run back and forth along its length and rise and fall to its 
ends, who will want to raise difficulties about granting that such an 
effect can (or rather, must necessarily) happen in seawater, which is 
contained in various basins subject to similar variations, especially in 
those whose length stretches out from west to east (which is the 
direction along which these basins move)?159  
 
In the analogy, universal experience is marshalled for the purpose of 
universalizing an observation – that “acceleration and retardation of a vessel’s 
motion make the water contained in it run back and forth along its length and 
rise and fall to its end” – which undergirds a conclusion that connects the 
production of irregular motion to ocean tides.  
 
158 Marin Mersenne, Harmonie Universelle: The Books on Instruments, trans. Roger E. Chapman 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957), 65. 
 




Hobbes had read Galileo’s work,160 probably Mersenne’s too,161 before 
finishing The Elements of Law. However, close scrutiny of Hobbes’s (more 
frequent) use of statements of universal experience shows a close resemblance 
to the uses in the so-called “Short Tract on First Principles,” with which Hobbes 
is known to have engaged.162 Written on “pot” paper from a batch used by 
Robert Payne in the mid-1630s,163 the unique style of the “Short Tract,” Raylor 
points out, emulated “the applied geometry of Galileo” generally and Benedetto 
Castell’s work on hydrodynamics, Della misura dell’acque correnti, 
specifically.164 Examination of the “Short Tract” helps to illuminate how 




160 For a full accounting of the connection, see Douglas Jesseph’s, “Galileo, Hobbes, and the 
Book of Nature,” Perspectives on Science 12, no. 2 (2004), 192-197. 
 
161 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 123. 
 
162 As shown definitively by Karl Schuhmann in “Le Short Tract, première œuvre philosophique 
de Hobbes,” Hobbes Studies 8 (1995), 3-36. 
 
163 Raylor, “Hobbes, Payne, and ‘A Short Tract on First Principles,’” 42. 
 
164 Raylor notes that though “Professor Zagorin drew attention to a general similarity between 
the structure of the Short tract, and its Principles and Conclusions, and that of Euclid’s 
Elements, with its Axioms” there is “a more immediate model for the method of the Short tract, 
with its division into Principles, Conclusions, and Corollaries,” viz. “Payne’s translation for 
Castelli.” Raylor writes that “Benedetto Castelli (1578-1643), a student of Galileo, was a 
consultant on hydraulics to Pope Urban VIII. His researches into the rate of flow of the Tiber 
led to the publication of Della misura dell’acque correnti in 1628, a work which forms the 
foundation of modern hydromechanics. The second part of the volume, Demonstrazioni 
geometriche della misura dell’acque correnti – a title translated by Payne as ‘Geometricall 
demonstrations of the measure of running-waters’ – is an exercise in applied geometry, in 
which Euclidean principles are employed to calculate the rate of a river’s flow. It begins (in 
Payne’s translation) with a series of three ‘Suppositions’ and a ‘Declaration of Termes,’ before 
moving to a statement of five ‘Principles’ which form the basis for a series of six ‘Propositions,’ 
the second and third of which are each accompanied by a ‘Corollary.’ Propositions and 
Corollaries were, of course, the standard equipment of students of mechanics; but the debt of 
the Short tract to Castelli’s Demonstrazioni geometriche is a specific one. Even the layout of the 
former, with its hanging paragraphs for numbered Principles, appears to be modelled on that of 




“A Short Tract on First Principles” in The Elements of Law 
 
First, some remarks on the “Short Tract on First Principles” are 
necessary. There exists a debate, now multiple decades old, about the identity 
of the tract’s author. Although some have, recently, written off the debate as 
settled,165 it remains live. In one camp are interpreters like Jean Bernhardt,166 
Karl Schuhmann,167 and Perez Zagorin,168 who hold to the view that the tract 
was composed by Hobbes in the early 1630s.169 In the other camp are 
interpreters who attribute the document to Payne or Newcastle, and reckon the 
tract was worked up sometime later, in the mid to later 1630s. Principal among 
 
165 The remark applies to Cees Leijenhorst, who recently dismissed that arguments against 
Hobbes’s authorship are “easily refuted,” noting that “The most decisive argument in favor of 
Hobbes’ authorship is Schuhmann’s discovery of two direct textual parallels in the Short Tract 
and Hobbes’ later work. Apart from this, there is a wealth of less direct parallels,” The 
Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’ Natural 
Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 12. I disagree. Direct parallels – even Hobbes’s use of material 
from the “Short Tract” – proves nothing more than engagement. Hobbes borrowed ideas – even 
organizational schemes and phrasing – from a variety of contemporaries (Bodin, Galileo, 
Grotius, and Selden, to name only a few), often, or usually, without attribution. 
 
166 Raylor gives a short history of the scholarly brouhaha in “Hobbes, Payne, and ‘A Short Tract 
on First Principles,’” 31. 
 
167 See Karl Schuhmann’s “Le Short Tract.” 
 
168 Zagorin, “Hobbes’s Early Philosophical Development,” especially, 508-512. 
 
169 Brandt supplies a less-definitive, but more defensible assessment, reasoning, correctly, that 
extant evidence only proves that, were Hobbes the author of the tract, he would have 





the latter group are Richard Tuck, who touched off the debate,170 Timothy 
Raylor,171 and Noel Malcolm.172  
There exists evidence that the document was produced by close 
associates, viz. that it was authored by Robert Payne,173 or represents a record, 
written out by Payne, of precepts articulated by Newcastle.174 However, the 
ultimate issue of who authored the tract matters little. What is clear, and 
analytically significant, is that Hobbes thoughtfully engaged with its content. 
 
170 Richard Tuck originally concluded, perhaps with insufficient circumspection, “there is 
actually no evidence whatsoever that the Short Tract is by Hobbes. It is among the papers of Sir 
Charles Cavendish, and it is anonymous; the handwriting of the manuscript closely resembles 
that of Robert Payne.” Tuck adds that “There is no reason to suppose that the Short Tract is not 
by Payne himself, or (possibly) by [Charles] Cavendish, or by some other person; there is no 
special reason, other than Tönnies’s enthusiasm, for attributing it to Hobbes,” “Hobbes and 
Descartes,” in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 17-18. Raylor and Malcolm would later add substance to and hunt down 
evidence to support Tuck’s assertion. However, the counterfactual Tuck endorses in the second 
quotation is plausible and needs no added defense: Had Ferdinand Tönnies not attributed the 
“Short Tract” to Hobbes in the first instance, it is likely a connection would have been made, 
but it is unlikely that there would be a claim of Hobbesian authorship. Much of the work 
undertaken to defend Tönnies’s original assessment, when weighed against Raylor’s more 
forensic and empirical study of the document, is best characterized as connoisseurship.  
 
171 Raylor, “Hobbes, Payne, and ‘A Short Tract on First Principles.” 
 
172 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 80-145. 
 
173 Malcolm contends that “It…seems very likely that Payne, who possessed most of the requisite 
interests and abilities, was stimulated – both by his friend Thomas Hobbes and by his 
employer, the Earl of Newcastle – to work on the same set of issues [vis-à-vis human 
psychology] himself. The ‘Short Tract’ is, most probably, a record of his attempt, and in the end 
his failure, to solve those problems….,” ibid, 139. 
 
174 Raylor points out, as other have, a tension in the “Short Tract” between its commitment to a 
metaphysics of species and an opposing commitment to the principle of the subjectivity of 
secondary qualities. In fact, the tension, and muddle, features in Newcastle’s work. Raylor offers 
that the “Short Tract” is a synthetic work, combining ideas that had been expressed by Hobbes 
with others that were circulating at Welbeck, which had shaped and influenced Newcastle’s 
thinking. He writes the tension was a result of “Payne’s inability to develop the ideas which 
Hobbes had adumbrated ad hoc at Welbeck into a fully mechanized account of reality without 
being able to jettison the familiar terms and assumptions of scholastic natural philosophy,” 
“Hobbes, Payne, and ‘A Short Tract on First Principles,’” 52. However, ultimately, as Raylor 
points out, it is impossible to know whether the “Short Tract” represented an attempt to 




Whether Newcastle’s or not, the imprint of the “Short Tract” is visible in 
Hobbes’s own work, The Elements of Law in particular.  
The “Short Tract” and The Elements of Law correspond both in formal 
and substantive dimensions. In terms of form, the third of the three-sectioned 
“Short Tract” covers a range of topics, and offers truncated discussions of, in 
order, the building blocks of comprehension and mental discourse; the basic 
operations of human sense, the nature of phantasms (mental images); 
understanding; the composition of human appetites; and moral and aesthetic 
concepts, like the good (bonum), the bad (malum) and beauty (pulchrum). As 
shown by the chart below (Table 2.1), The Elements of Law proceeds in similar 
fashion, with a procession of chapters on “The cause of sense” (chapter 2), “Of 
imagination and the kinds thereof” (chapter 3), “Of the several kinds of 
discursion of the mind” (chapter 4), “Of names, reasoning, and discourse of the 
tongue” (chapter 5), “Of knowledge, opinion, and belief” (chapter 6), “Of 
delight and pain; good and evil” (chapter 7).  
In addition to a similar procession of content, there are more 
substantive links that connect the two works. For example, the author of the 
“Short Tract” defined “Appetite” as “a Motion of the Animal Spirits toward the 
obiect that moveth them” and its opposite “a motion, or passive power in the 
Animal Spirits, to be moved from the obiect.”175 So too, Hobbes defines pleasure 
and pain as a “solicitation or provocation either to draw near to the thing that 
pleaseth, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth.” Building on the 
 




Table 2.1: A Comparison of the Progression of Discussion Points in Section 3 of 
the “Short Tract on First Principles” and Chapters 2-7 of The Elements of Law 
Progression of discussion points in 
Section 3176 of the “Short Tract on 
First Principles” 
Chapter outline for The Elements of 
Law 
“Animal Spirits are those spirits 
which are the Instruments of Sense 
and motion.”177 
“The cause of sense” (Chapter 2)178 
“A Phantasma is an Action of the 
brayne of the Animal spirits by the 
power it receiveth from externall 
sensible things.”179 
“Of imagination and the kinds 
thereof” (Chapter 3)180 
“The Act of Understanding is a 
Motion of the Animal Spirits, by the 
Action of the brayne, qualified with 
the active-power of the external 
object.”181 
 
“We are sayd to understand a thing 
when we have the Phantasma or 
Apparition of it…”182 
“Of the several kinds of discursion of 
the mind” (Chapter 4)183 
 
“Of names, reasoning, and discourse 
of the tongue” (chapter 5)184 
 
“Of knowledge, opinion, and belief” 
(chapter 6)185 
“Therefore whatsoever is actually 
desir’d, supposeth motion in the 
Animal Spirits, by the obiects, 
immediately or mediately.”186 
“Of delight and pain; good and evil” 
(chapter 7)187 
 
176 Anonymous, “A Short Tract on First Principles,” in The Elements of Law, Natural & Politic, 
ed. Ferdinand Tönnies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), 161-167. 
 
177 Ibid, 161. 
 
178 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, xv. 
 
179 “A Short Tract on First Principles,” 163. 
 
180 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, xv. 
 










186 “A Short Tract on First Principles,” 165. 
 




Table 2.1, continued 
Progression of discussion points in 
Section 3 of the “Short Tract on First 
Principles” 
Chapter outline for The Elements of 
Law 
“Good [bonum] is to every thing, that 
which hath active power to attract it 
locally.”188 
 
“Malum, therefore to everything is 




description of pleasure and pain, Hobbes further specifies that an appetite is an 
“endeavor or internal beginning of animal motion” that “delighteth” or pleases, 
and an aversion of a thing that which “displeaseth.”190 
An illustrative sampling of parallel explanations proffered by the “Short 
Tract” and The Elements of Law are highlighted in Table 2.2 below. The parallel 
constructions are bolded and numbered. 
Although beyond the present scope, further analysis of the expository 
strategy employed by Hobbes in The Elements of Laws would reveal that he did 
not just respond to and build on the “Short Tract,” but perfected and extended 
the lines of inquiry and argumentation it sets out.191 For present purposes it 
 




190 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 22 [7.2]. 
 
191 In substance, Hobbes agreed with the “Short Tract.” He writes that “Every man…calleth that 
which pleaseth, and is delightful…good” while “evil” is that “which displeaseth him,” The 
Elements of Law, 22. As such, like the author of “Short Tract,” Hobbes presented a physicalist 
theory of the good, whereby his understanding of “good” was tied to a physical explanation of 
the way in which “animal motion” works within us. (As regards Hobbes’s physicalism, see Alan 
Cromartie’s “The Elements and Hobbesian Moral Thinking,” History of Political Thought 32, no. 
1 (2011): 21-47.) However, unlike the author of the “Short Tract,” Hobbes unpacked and 
theorized the implications of a physicalist explanation of the good. He notes that such an 
explanation, which posits the variable ways in which “animal motion” works within people, 
militates against the possibility of a summum bonum, an utmost good, and likewise a unified, 
universal theory of the Good. He explains that “insomuch that while every man differeth from 
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Table 2.2: A Comparison of “A Short Tract on First Principles,” Section 3, Article 
7 and The Elements of Law, Chapter 7, Sections 2-3 
“A Short Tract on First Principles,” 
Section 3, Article 7192 
The Elements of Law, Chapter 7, 
Sections 2-3193 
7. Good is to every thing, that which 
hath active power to attract it locally. 
 
Whatsoever is Good is desireable; 
and whatsoever is desireable is Good; 
and whatsoever is actually desir’d, 
suppoeseth actuall sense of actuall 
understanding; but actuall sense and 
Understanding are local motions of 
the Animal Spirits…Therefore 
whatsoever is actually desir’d, 
supposeth motion in the Animal 
Spirits, by the obiects, immediately or 
mediately. 
 
In this motion, that which is desired 
is eyther Agent or Patient…Therefore 
it is Agent; and [i] because that 
which is desired is Bonum, 
therefore Bonum is the Agent; and 
because Bonum is desirable, 
therefore every Bonum may be 
Agent in this motion. Every 
Bonum therefore…hath power to 
move; and because all motion is 
eyther to the Agent or from it, and 
that which is Good cannot be 
imagined to repell that, to which 
it is good, therefore Good hath  
2. [i] This motion, in which 
consisteth pleasure or pain, is 
also a solicitation or provocation 
either to draw near to the thing 
that pleaseth, or to retire from the 
thing that displeaseth. And this 
solicitation is the endeavor or 
internal beginning of animal 
motion, which when the object 
delighteth, is called APPETITE; 
when it displeaseth, it is called 
AVERSION, in respect of the 
displeasure present; but in respect 
of the displeasure expected, FEAR. 
[ii] So that pleasure, love, and 
appetite, which is also called 
desire, are diverse names for 
divers considerations of the same 
thing. 
 
3. [iii] Every man, for his own part, 
calleth that which pleaseth, and is 
delightful to himself, GOOD; and 
that EVIL which displeaseth him: 
insomuch that while every man 
differeth from other in constitution, 
they differ also one from another 
concerning the common distinction 
of good and evil….And as we call  
 
other in constitution, they differ also one from another concerning the common distinction of 
good and evil,” ibid. It follows, Hobbes writes, that there can be no “any such thing” that is 
“simply good,” ibid. What is more, he remarks, is that what pleases people changes – once 
someone has fulfilled an appetite, something else will grab their attention. Thus, there can be 
no capital-“G” Good, because people are, by nature, never satisfied. “Seeing all delight is 
appetite, and appetite pressuposeth a farther end,” Hobbes points out, “there can be no 
contentment but in proceeding,” ibid, 23. Clearly, the author of the “Short Tract” did not make 
Hobbes’s point about the relativity of the “good.” However, it is arguable that, by reducing the 
good (bonum) to mere appetite, the author’s analysis, if logically extended, would resolve in a 
moral relativist point. And support for the suggestion is found in Hobbes’s own analysis, which 
clarifies and zooms in on the implication. 
 
192 “A Short Tract on First Principles,” 165-166. 
 
193 Hobbes, The Element of Law, 22. 
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Table 2.2, continued 
“A Short Tract on First Principles,” 
Section 3, Article 7 
The Elements of Law, Chapter 7, 
Sections 2-3 
power to attract, and [iii] because 
that which is desireable or good to 
one, may not be so to another, 
and so what attracts one, may not 
attract another; Good is to 
everything that, which hath power to 
attract it. 
 
This definition agrees well with 
Aristotle, who defines Good to be 
that, to which all things are moved; 
which hath bene metaphorically 
taken, but is properly true; as if we 
draw the obiect to us, whereas the 
obiect rather drawes us to it by locall 
motion. 
 
Corollary.— Malum, therefore to 
every thing is that which hath active 
power to repell it. 
 
Goodness is the Power of Bonum. 
 
Badness is the power of Malum. 
 
Corollary.—Hence it also appears 
that Pulchrum is the species of Good. 
For whatsoever is Bonum is 
Pulchrum, and whatsoever is 
Pulchrum is Bonum; but it is called 
Bonum, as it attracteth, and 
Pulchrum, as it pleaseth. Bonum 
suppoesth absence of that which it 
attracteth, Pulchrum supposeth the 
Presence of that which it pleaseth. 
[ii] Bonum is the obiect of Desire, 
or Appetite; and Pulchrum is the 
obiect of Love. 
 
Turpe is the Species of Malum. 
 
[iv] Turpitudo and Pulchritudo are 
powers of Turpe and Pulchrum. 
good and evil the things that please 
and displease; [iv] so we call 
goodness and badness, the 
qualities or powers whereby they 
do it. And the signs of that 
goodness are called by the Latins 
in one word PULCHRITUDO, and 
the signs of evil, TURPITUDO; to 





suffices to point out that as a product of someone in the Newcastle circle, and 
composed in the mid-1630s, Hobbes had read the “Short Tract” and composed a 
text, The Elements of Law, that bears some of its expository, discursive, and 
schematic hallmarks. 
Universal experience and the practice of science in “A Short Tract on First 
Principles” and The Elements of Law 
 
One notable expository and discursive strategy upon which the author 
of the “Short Tract” relies is an invocation of universal experience. As 
highlighted earlier, the work of other geometric scientists certainly carried 
similar invocations. However, what makes the “Short Tract” notable is the 
frequency with which the author invokes this mode of experience. Invocations 
of universal experience surface throughout the “Short Tract,” sufficient to make 
the invocations a noticeable feature of the text and its analytical strategy.  
At the same time, the author uses statements of universal experience in 
discursively typical ways. It is invoked to prove points and establish the validity 
of propositions and premises. Propositions are known “from…Experience,”194 
the effects of species are “manifest by Experience,”195 while aspects of the 
mechanics of perception are “proved by Experience.”196 Universal experience is 
also used to knock down counterarguments and to forestall contrary patterns 
of scientific thinking and argumentation. Contrary premises and contrasting 
 
194 “A Short Tract on First Principles,” 157. 
 
195 Ibid, 158. 
 




points of argumentation and conclusions are found wanting, “contrary to”197 or 
“agaynst Experience.”198  An illustrative example of the latter kind of use 
involves the author’s evaluation of whether “Animal Spirits move the body” by 
“power inherent in themselves” or are “moved Locally,” spurred “by Motion 
received from another,” i.e., externally. He finds the first idea of “inherent” 
power implausible, responding that, were it so, “they should always move it 
[the body], which,” the author observes, is simply wrong, “contrary to 
Experience,”199 i.e., experience in all instances, everywhere.  
In most respects, Hobbes’s use of experience follows the “Short Tract” 
template. The uses are most visible and explicit in the early chapters of The 
Elements, which engage most directly with the principles of the “Short Tract.” 
There, the language of experience and claims related thereto, all carrying an air 
of universality, pop up frequently. For example, universal experience is invoked 
to give empirical weight to Hobbes’s discussion of the concept of imagination 
that opens the text. “[E]very man,” Hobbes observes, “by his own experience 
know[s] that the absence or destruction of things once imagined, doth not 
cause the absence or destruction of the imagination itself. This imagery and 
representations…we call our cognition, imagination, ideas,”200 etc. 
 
197 Ibid, 156, 157, 162, 163, 165. 
 
198 Ibid, 159-160. 
 
199 Ibid, 162. 
 




Hobbes also marshaled universal experience to substantiate major 
propositions and premises. At the outset of The Elements’ second chapter, he 
enumerates four “points,” which he aims “to make plain.” The first point posits: 
“the subject wherein color and image are inherent, is not the object or thing 
seen.” He leverages a specific, particular experience, capable of being 
universalized, to prove the point. “Every may hath so much experience,” he 
writes, “as to have seen the sun and other visible objects by reflection in the 
water and in glasses, and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion: that color 
and image may be there where the thing seen is not.”201 After admitting the 
counterargument that, even so, “the color really [is] in the thing itself,” Hobbes 
boldly retorts by “urg[ing]” his reader to “further” consider the universal, 
human “experience” of seeing double. At “divers times men see directly the 
object double.” Seeing double is used to show that the “colors and figures” of 
the doubled object cannot inhere in both, thus, “the one of them is no more 
inherent than the other, and consequently neither of them both are in the 
object.”202 
Hobbes follows the selfsame tack with respect to concretizing point 
three, that “color is but an apparition unto us of that motion, agitation, or 
alteration, which the object worketh in the brain or spirits, or some internal 
substance of the head.” He universalizes the specific, particular experience of 
having been subjected to a violent blow to empirically substantiate the claim. 
“[I]f the stroke be upon the eye, whereby the optic nerve suffereth any great 
 
201 Ibid, 3 [2.5]. 
 
202 Ibid, 3-4 [2.5]. 
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violence, there appeareth before the eyes a certain light, which light is nothing 
without…all that is real being the concussion or motion of the parts of that 
nerve.” He continues that “From which experience we may conclude that 
apparition of light without, is really nothing but motion within.”203 
One final example makes the point. Chapter 9 delivers a much-discussed 
explication of laughter. The discussion begins by offering a loose definition of 
laughter. “There is a passion which hath no name,” Hobbes writes. “[T]he sign 
of it is that distortion of the countenance we call laughter, which is always joy; 
but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh,” he 
claims incredibly, “hath not hitherto been declared by any.” He then adds, 
“That it consisteth in wit, or, as they call it, in the jest, this experience 
confuteth.”204 What “this experience” bears out aligns with classical theories of 
laughter: “for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein there lieth no 
wit or jest at all.”205 By filling “experience” with content from classical theories 
of laughter Hobbes quietly employed a typical strategy: his statement of 
 
203 Ibid, 7 [2.4]. 
 
204 Ibid, 31 [9.13]. 
 
205 As Skinner shows, Hobbes’s explanation of laughter was hardly out of place or wholly 
idiosyncratic. Indeed, in some dimensions, it bears a close resemblance to Descartes’s. 
Ultimately, Skinner assesses that “Few of Hobbes’s original readers would have lacked the 
benefits of a classical education, and almost all of them would in consequence have known that 
virtually nothing in Hobbes’s analysis was as novel as he pretended. On the contrary, almost 
everything that Hobbes and his humanist predecessors say about laughter arises out of two 
strands of ancient thinking about the phenomenon, both of which can ultimately be traced to 
the philosophy of Aristotle,” “Hobbes and the Classical Theory of Laughter,” in Visions of 




universal experience is made on the basis of the authority of classical 
antecedents (Aristotle in particular).206 
The two works are also linked with respect to the methodological 
prescripts Hobbes set down in The Elements, which address the use of 
(universal) experience within the context of suppositional reasoning, as in 
“Short Tract.” Hobbes delineates, “A proposition is said to be supposed, when, 
being not evident…is nevertheless admitted for a time…[until] we may conclude 
something; and so proceed from conclusion to conclusion, for a trial whether 
the same will lead us to any absurd or impossible conclusion.”207 The 
methodological note gives evident (i.e., universal) experience pride of place. A 
proposition is “supposed” if it is not “evident,” that is, perceptibly universal. 
Determinative of whether a supposition is empirically tenable is whether it 
generates conclusions that are “absurd” or, it can interpolated, revealed as 
“[empirically] impossible” by evident experience. 
Like the author of the “Short Tract,” Hobbes used universal experience 
as he indicated one should: as an instrument to evaluate the empirical integrity 
of different strands of reasoning. However, the uses made him vulnerable to a 
temptation that bedeviled the work of contemporaries. Contemporaries played 
fast and loose with invocations of universal experience.208 The practice of 
 
206 As Dear notes, within the context of “the academic world inherited by seventeenth-century 
Europe…one did not need to have acquired such [universal] experiences personally in order to 
use them in argumentation, provided that they were commonly accepted, either through daily 
familiarity or through the statements of a weighty authority,” 22. 
 
207 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 20 [6.5]. 
 
208 Dear explains that although “There were some restrictions, in that principles should be 
primitive and indemonstrable…if a purported empirical principle could be made evident, 
however that might in practice be accomplished, then it was fit for use in scientific 
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regularly invoking (universal) statements of experience as proof latently 
encouraged the universalization of particular or singular (if probably common 
or publicly reported)209 experiences.210 The “Short Tract’s” author was no more 
immune to the temptation than Galileo, who in a dust-up with Orazio Grassi, 
found himself, as Dear describes, having had his invocation of universal 
experience “called into question.” Dear writes, 
The experience is presented [by Galileo] as a general unproblematic 
statement of how things behave, glossing over the constructed character 
of the conditions. In similar circumstances Grassi would probably have 
done the same thing, but in the context of the controversy he decides 
instead to call into question the experience itself.211 
 
 
demonstration. The very imprecision of Aristotle’s talk of ‘induction’ indicates the wealth of 
possibilities open to those who sought new ways of grounding a science of nature,” Discipline 
and Experience, 58-59. 
 
209 See footnote 206. 
 
210 Given Aristotelian dicta, which located the capacity to think and reason universally in the 
normal functioning of human memory (“‘from perception there comes memory…and from 
memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing) experience; for memories 
that are many in number form a single experience’”), the danger could hardly be avoided, Dear, 
Discipline and Experience, 22. Dear highlights how the demarcating line separating singular and 
universal experiences blurred in practice, to an extent that the boundary between the two 
became porous to the point of, at times, non-existence. “A science needed to be certain, 
whereas histories were matters of fallible record and testimony. The difficulty was unavoidable; 
most, if not all, of an individual’s knowledge of the world relies very heavily on things believed 
from the testimony of others…those subscribing to an Aristotelian ideal of science of this kind 
developed a variety of techniques to ‘universalize’ their own specialist empirical work,” “The 
Meaning of Experience,” 109. Likewise, in Discipline and Experience, Dear notes Clavius’s subtle 
treatment of the difficulty, specifically with respect to the use of discrete observations within 
the context of astronomical analysis. “Regarding questions to do with the rotation of the 
heavens and procession,” Dear records, “Clavius concludes: ‘Wherefore faith is to be had in the 
experiences of astronomers, until something else is brought forward to the contrary by which it 
be demonstrated that what is propounded by astronomers concerning the motion of the stars 
from the west towards the east above the poles of the zodiac is not true.’ The ‘experiences of 
astronomers,’” Dear adds, “refers to their general accumulated experience in this matter rather 
than to a body of discrete observations, but the acknowledged possibility is that ‘something 
else’ could be ‘brought forward to the contrary’ admits the practical dependence of 
astronomical doctrine on such observations,” Discipline and Experience, 47. 
 




The discourse of universal experience licensed authors, Hobbes 
included, to invoke experience to justify arguments, enabling the 
universalization of particular, singular experiences. Put differently, the 
discourse encouraged Hobbes to read his own, local experiences out onto the 
wider world. That Hobbes was vulnerable to this universalizing tendency was 
once noted by René Descartes, whom he, for years, detested.212 Descartes, not 
incorrectly, objected to the practice, remarking, “And when he [Hobbes] says it 
is contrary to experience, he is completely mistaken; for experience varies in 
this matter…”213 
Experiential inference in The Elements of Law 
 
Hobbes brought his own (universalized) experience into his work; 
however, it is neither easy nor always possible to draw clear lines around these 
uses. There is a particular difficulty with respect to making solid interpretive 
judgments about which elements of Hobbes’s political theory were carved 
directly out of his own experiences; which derive from the ontological principle 
of motion, a principle that putatively supplies the underpinnings for his 
theorizations; and which represent a fusion, mix, or untidy tangle of the two.  
 
212 Martinich memorably traces the feud to an intuitive, relatable cause: “Similarity breeds 
contempt. Both wanted to give materialistic and mechanistic explanations to the physical 
world. Both wanted the physical laws of the universe to be formulated mathematically. Both 
believed that sensations are noniconic; ideas are not similar to the features of the physical 
objects that cause them. Colors, sounds, tastes, and odors, as they are experienced, exist only in 
being perceived and not in bodies. On a personal level, both were vain, glory-seeking, self-
absorbed, self-proclaimed geniuses. This statement is purely descriptive. Hobbes, like 
Descartes, was obsessed with being first,” Hobbes: A Biography, 169. 
 
213 René Descartes, “Letter 36: René Descartes to Marin Mersenne for Hobbes, from Endegeest 
[11/] 21 April or [18/] 28 April 1641,” in The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. and 




An illustration of how particular qua universal experience is mixed into 
Hobbes’s theorizations about human nature and politics is found across two 
passages in chapter 7. In the relevant passage, Hobbes targeted the ancient idea 
of a finis ultimus. “But for an utmost end,” Hobbes objects, “in which the 
ancient philosophers have placed felicity, and have disputed much concerning 
the way thereto, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it, more than 
to Utopia.”214 Hobbes’s objection is not exclusively borne of conceptual or 
epistemological critique. Rather, Hobbes offers a straightforward empirical 
evaluation of the concept. “[T]here is no such thing in this world,” he writes. 
Within the contents of the world as he received it, he could find no evidence to 
support the notion, nor, surveying the world around him, could he locate tools 
to get himself there. Thus, he assesses universally, the idea of “an utmost end” 
has no place “in this world.” 
What Hobbes saw in the world contradicted the idea of a finis ultimus. 
“Seeing all delight is appetite, and appetite supposeth a farther end, there can 
be no contentment but in proceeding.”215 However, in Hobbes’s contention that 
“there can be no contentment but in proceeding,” experiential inference 
becomes knotted up with the ontological principle of motion, making it 
difficult to discern which is doing the work in the judgment. In the observation 
that “there can be no contentment but in proceeding” motion becomes a 
 
214 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 23 [7.6]. 
 




metaphor216 for understanding the progression of human appetites. Humans 
are perpetually moved to pursue new appetites. While we are alive, the motion 
of our appetites never ceases, but our appetites do change form. Hobbes’s 
observation that “appetite is the beginning of animal motion toward something 
which pleaseth us”217 can be contorted and rearranged to produce the 
observation that we are “animals” perpetually in “motion” oriented “toward 
something which pleaseth us.” Humans are propelled by motion. We are also in 
motion. 
It is unclear whether the assessment that “there can be no contentment 
but in proceeding” originates in an analysis of the effect of motion on human 
appetites, personal observation, or both. However, in the remarks that follow, 
Hobbes relies on his reader’s – and, it is no stretch to think, his own218 – 
 
216 The observation is influenced by Thomas Spragens’s insightful account, which suggests that 
the relation between Hobbes’s theory of human nature and motion may be analogical, rather 
than strictly deductive: “Even where one theoretical model cannot properly produce a 
theoretical model appropriate to another realm of reality by a process of logical deduction, it 
may have a profound influence upon the other area of theory by means of analogy. Theory 
developed to explain one area of reality – the motion of physical bodies, for example – may 
have a persuasive structuring impact upon a second theoretical model directed toward 
understanding another area of reality – the emotions of human beings, for example,” The 
Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 
1973), 166. 
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218 It was a form of competition and gamesmanship, and a character trait, that Hobbes expressly 
admonished in an August 1638 letter to Charles Cavendish, the younger brother of William 
Cavendish, the Earl of Devonshire. The letter, sent by Hobbes to Cavendish who was, then, 
running wild on the Continent, is a stern, somewhat punishing indictment, as of a kind that 
might be delivered by an older family member. In it, Hobbes openly worries that the young 
Cavendish’s behavior could result in “quarrell” and “scandall sufficient to ground an honourable 
duell on,” offering the lesson that “If a man could value himself moderately, & at the rate that 
other men hold him currant, examyning what true and iust title he hath to pretend to more 
respect & priviledge then others, and that done would not (as Children that crye for euery thing 
that is deneyed them) expect more then is due, & when he cannot either out of passion or in 
passion to be offensiue,” “Letter 28:  Hobbes to the Hon. Charles Cavendish, from Chatsworth 
22 August [/1 September] 1638,” in The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. Noel 




experience to give the point extra solidity. “[A]nd therefore we are not to 
marvel, when we see, that as men attain to more riches, honours, or other 
power; so their appetite continually groweth more and more; and when they 
are come to the utmost degree of one kind of power, they pursue some 
other.”219 With the use of the first person plural, “we,” Hobbes subtly invites his 
reader to join him in conjuring what was an experience he and his reader had, 
surely, jointly shared: aristocratic men with progressive, escalating appetites, all 
caught up in an interminable competition with one another for “riches, 
honours, or other power.” For Hobbes, it was undoubtedly a scene and pattern 
repeated enough220 to make the proposition that “appetite continually groweth 
more and more” evident and universal. 
It is unclear whether the observation Hobbes serves up from his 
personal store, something he assumed all readers had experienced, is the basis 
for the state of interminable conflict he describes. The conflict could be 
construed as an outcome that can be traced to motion. It is also possible that 
the two, experience and ontological principle, combined to create a singular 
orientation, which inclined Hobbes to a set of theoretical precepts – like 
interminable conflict – that gave his (somewhat agonistic) political theory a 
unique tone and texture.  
Whatever the case may be, Hobbes was more sensitive to experience and 
observation (both his own, and others’) than his own prescripts, at times, 
appear to make room for. Not unlike the science of the “Short Tract,” Galileo, 
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and Mersenne, he created space for experience – especially universal, or 
universalized particular experience – in his work and used it as an empirical 
ground. He adapted and deployed this feature of scientific discourse to his own 
ends, making experience a signal feature of the science of The Elements of Law. 
b. Truth and propositions in Hobbes’s science 
The relationship between words and things 
A discussion of Hobbes’s conception of truth should begin with the 
more basic units out of which syllogisms are made, words (or names), and the 
relation between words and things. The fifth chapter of The Elements 
designates that a name, generally understood, is “the voice of a man, arbitrarily 
imposed, for a mark to bring to his mind some conception concerning the thing 
on which it is imposed.”221 As the general definition indicates, names stand in 
for a “mark,” which “is a sensible object which a man erecteth…to the end to 
remember thereby somewhat past, when the same is objected to his sense 
again.”222 Marks exist to conjure memories of specific objects in the world. For 
example, “As men…passed by a rock at sea” they might “set up some mark, 
 
221 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 14 [5.1]. The Elements’ formulation of the point, that a name 
replaces or stands in for “a mark” whose purpose is to “bring to mind some conception 
concerning the thing on which it is imposed” (emphasis added) would seem to suggest that there 
was more development in Hobbes’s philosophy of language than is attended to in Abizadeh’s 
analysis in “The Absence of Reference in Hobbes’ Philosophy of Language.” Of Hobbes’s  
mature position, Abizadeh summarizes, “To sum up, for Hobbes, names perform two basic 
functions: they mark conceptions and signify conceptions. True, for Hobbes names also literally 
name things. Indeed, in a non-literal sense, one can say that names mark, signify, and denote 
things. But these are all simply shorthand for saying that names mark or signify conceptions of 
things. They are not ways of saying that names refer to or stand for things (or conceptions),” 
“The Absence of Reference in Hobbes’ Philosophy of Language,” 11. For an opposing view, see 







whereby to remember their former danger, and avoid it.”223 If all names are 
marks, and all marks exist to “remember” when “the same is objected to” one’s 
“sense,” then names are strongly connected to the original sense experiences 
that set off the cycle of marking and naming. 
It is true that names, so conceived, cannot disclose the inner essence of a 
thing. What names – like marks – arouse is “some conception concerning the 
thing on which it is imposed.” However, Hobbes believed all conceptions are 
effects of sensory experience. Names, thereby, are tied to actual things in the 
world by means of the local, sense-derived conceptions encountering those 
things engenders. Recall the whale from earlier. Sensory experiences of whales 
beget conceptions of whales; such conceptions are ascribed the arbitrary name 
“whale.”  
It follows that a proliferation of names, accompanying a proliferation of 
sense experiences, would permit one to catalogue, sort, and then classify 
greater quantities and qualities of things in the world. In turn, combining these 
names in the right pattern and putting them in the correct structure would 
allow one to draw together a reliable roadmap of the world as it is registered by 
human senses. For Hobbes, the “right pattern” and “correct structure” was the 
demonstrative (qua categorical) syllogism: “a syllogism whose premises and 
conclusions are categorical propositions…expressing relationships among 
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whales are mammals.” The proposition, when set in relation to the minor 
premise “all mammals are warm-blooded,” produces the conclusion that “all 
whales are warm-blooded.” 
Evidence of truth 
 
Hobbes’s theory of truth involved more than drawing together true 
propositions into syllogisms that generate true conclusions. He indicates that 
what is determinative of truth, within the context of ratiocinating (that is, 
syllogizing), is “evidence.” The attribute of truth obtains only when words, 
propositions, and syllogisms are supported by observational data collected as 
we navigate the world and experience things. For a statement to be true there 
must exist “evidence of truth.”225 Evidence of truth, he writes, entails the 
“concomitance of a man’s conception with the words that signify such 
conception in the act of ratiocination.”226 He adds, “For if words alone were 
sufficient, a parrot might be taught as well to know a truth as to speak it.”227 
Evidence, Hobbes evinces, is what supplies truth with substance and force. 
“Evidence is to truth, as the sap is to the tree, which so far as it creepth along 
with the body and branches, keepeth them alive…For this evidence, which is 
meaning with our words, is life of truth; without it truth is nothing worth.”228 In 
other words, one must have had empirical experiences that hook up to the 
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words one uses, and which fill those words with content. It is this observational 
data that makes a concomitance of conceptions and words possible.  
Some interpreters have noted that “the names we give to bodies tell 
us…how we think of them,”229 and, relatedly, locate in aspects of Hobbes’s 
philosophy a constructivist impulse, sometimes represented using the language 
of a “linguistic turn.”230 However, The Elements of Law confounds the 
characterization. The rudiments of a constructivist gaze do not lurk within 
Hobbes’s philosophy. For Hobbes, the world was not made with or from words, 
even if some important pieces of it are. Rather, Hobbes believed the world we 
encounter is pre-populated with things. And the words we use elucidate and 
make that world and the things within it cognitively retainable and available to 
be reasoned about. Consequently, an “evident demonstration,” on Hobbes’s 
 
229 Jon Parkin, “Thomas Hobbes and the Problem of Self- Censorship” (paper presented at the 
Morrell Conference on the subject of self-censorship, York, UK, 2007), 17. 
 
230 Terence Ball notes that “Hobbes is hardly a closet critical theorist; nor does he reject the 
standard protopositivist account of explanation via general laws. But if he sometimes seems to 
profess one thing while actually practicing another that is because he does not distinguish 
between the different levels of description. Although trying his hardest to remain a 
reductionist, he fails miserably and magnificently. His account, like that of Thucydides, is too 
richly suggestive, too pregnant with multiple possibilities, to be confined within any austerely 
reductionist framework. This may be because the linguistic turn, once taken, will not permit 
him to take the reductionist route that he apparently wished to follow. Once viewed as 
speaking subjects, and not merely as material objects, human beings become self-defining 
creatures of convention, not of nature,” “Hobbes’ Linguistic Turn,” Polity 17, no. 4 (1985): 747. 
Similarly, Victoria Kahn uses the language in the set-up for “Hobbes and the Science of 
Metaphor,” remarking, “Instead, in Hobbes’s new constructive model of political science, 
language and the will, rather than nature and reason, took center stage. Thus we can say that, 
although the later Hobbes voiced a distinct antipathy for humanist rhetoric, his vision of the 
political scientist as homo faber recast its deepest insights of humanist rhetoric and poetics into 
the power of human beings to shape the world around them. Hobbes’s science is a science of 
language, and language is, conversely, the precondition of this science. The turn to science is 
thus, paradoxically, a turn to language and, in particular, as we will see, to the constructive 
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science, we could say, that founded political science as we know it – paradoxically also 
anticipated some of the insights of eighteenth-century discourse of aesthetics,” in Scientific 
Statesmanship, Governance, and the History of Political Philosophy, ed. Kyriakos N. Demetrious 




model, emerges “from experience.”231 Hobbes, showing his commitment to 
some (weak) form of objectivism, did believe words, if used improperly, could 
twist the human mind into misperceiving the world.  
Hobbes envisaged that, if used properly, words will reflect humanity’s 
shared experience of the world,232 a precondition if there is to be a 
“concomitance of a man’s conception with the words that signify such 
conception in the act of ratiocination.” Even if, as many have repeatedly 
emphasized, the commonwealth, the legal and moral systems that comprise it, 
are pure artifice and wrought by human will and human words, 233 the world 
and meanings that sit beneath and support these constructions are not. The 
language of a “linguistic turn,” and an emphasis on the constructivist elements 
of Hobbes’s civil philosophy, throws a shadow over elements of Hobbes’s 
thought, his theory of truth in specifically, that cannot comport to the 
characterization. 
The empirical determinants of propositional truth 
 
The forgoing analysis adds up to a vision of Hobbes’s theory of truth that 
breaks with principles and interpretive impulses that have reigned in some 
quarters of Hobbes studies. In particular, such a vision sits in tension with 
those that argue truth, for Hobbes, was merely a function of a straightforward 
“logico-linguistic” operation. Marcus Adams summarizes, “Several 
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commentators argue that Hobbes’s account of the nature of science is 
conventionalist, according to which ‘determining scientific truth is purely a 
logico-linguistic matter.’”234 Adams fails to find support for the notion, showing 
how, in Hobbes’s later works, “simplest conceptions” are supplied as 
“foundation for geometry and the sciences in which we use geometry.”235 
Simple conceptions, Adams clarifies, are “form[ed]…from our sense experiences 
and…give us properties of bodies…out of which we explicate definitions such as 
‘place.’” Yet, Adams puzzles, “Hobbes does not detail how exactly experience 
provides us with these conceptions…”236 
As Adams points out, it is not unusual for modern readers to 
misunderstand the place and status of empirical postulates, like “simplest 
conceptions,” in Hobbes’s work. The point can be extended to how some 
interpreters have cast Hobbes’s political theory. Indeed, for some the notion 
that he endeavored to use empirical, material premises to anchor his political 
theory errs in terms of how it portrays the nature of Hobbes’s scientific outlook. 
The view is expressed by John Deigh.237 Deigh pries apart the material and 
formal dimensions of Hobbes’s philosophical project238 to argue that, in 
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conception, Hobbes’s civil science was purely “definitivist” and formal. Hobbes 
intended for definitions to anchor his science, not empirical, material premises 
about the moral psychology of humans. “The definitivist interpretation” 
promoted by Deigh “takes seriously Hobbes's express understanding of ethics 
as a science and his conception of science as proceeding by deductive 
inferences from definitions.” Thus, Deigh explains, “This understanding and 
conception secure the logical independence of his ethics from his moral 
psychology, given Hobbes's view as to what makes a definition correct.”239 
Deigh’s “definitivist” interpretation, in part, turns on a claim about how 
Hobbes’s understanding of science and reason should have been impacted by 
an intellectual commitment to nominalism, the philosophical belief that only 
particular things can be said to properly exist. Put differently, Deigh’s 
definitivist conclusions about Hobbes’s science stem, partly, from implications 
drawn from Hobbes’s countenance of nominalism. Deigh reasons that “a 
material criterion of reason implies either universal concepts that inhere in the 
human mind or a world of universals that exists independently of any 
particulars and is accessible to reason alone.” He continues, “either implication 
contradicts Hobbes’s thesis that nothing universal exists independently of 
speech.”240 Of course, Deigh is correct. However the view Deigh articulates 
makes nominalism into an intellectual straight jacket, a philosophical 
commitment that should have prevented Hobbes from endorsing a view of 
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science or reason that depends upon material premises about, namely, human 
moral psychology. Such a dependence, Deigh shows, would have been a back-
door endorsement of the un-nominalistic idea that there is an extant “world of 
universals that exists independently of any particulars.” 
However, Hobbes did not press the philosophical point as far as Deigh 
presumes. The Elements of Law does broadcast his nominalist credentials, 
proclaiming “there is nothing universal but names.”241 However, as Noel 
Malcolm observes, Hobbes’s “nominalism was a good deal less extreme than is 
popularly supposed.”242 Likewise, Hobbes’s intentions vis-à-vis nominalism 
were less sweeping than, and did not operate in the way Deigh thinks they did. 
As the quotation from The Elements indicates, Hobbes did eschew an ontology 
of universal things. He believed that only particular things properly exist. But 
like Galileo, Mersenne, and the author of the “Short Tract,” Hobbes inherited a 
vision of science within which the notion of universal experience remained 
operative as an assumption. And Hobbes, like the others, was wedded to the 
empirical idea of “indubitable,”243 universal experiences. The idea was simply a 
taken-for-granted feature of Hobbes’s world and outlook. Put differently, it was 
an idea that was baked into the prevailing episteme. 
As S.A. Lloyd correctly diagnoses, Hobbes relied on material premises – 
universal experiences – to anchor his theorizations. Lloyd uses the artful term 
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“indubitable introspectables” to describe the universal, empirical “premises” 
used by Hobbes that, he believed, “reader[s]” would “see as undoubtedly true in 
[their] own case.”244 As the next chapter shows, the concept of indubitable 
introspectables became an explicit cornerstone of his political theory in De cive. 
Against this background, it is unsurprising that Adams locates empirical 
attachments in Hobbes’s later work (De corpore in particular) that disprove the 
idea that Hobbes believed scientific truth to be merely a matter of convention. 
However, Hobbes’s empirical commitments are broader and more entrenched 
than Adams appreciates. The focus of Adams’s study is Hobbes’s later works. 
However, it is in The Elements that there is a more obvious emphasis on 
universal experience as well as a string of methodological prescripts that 
cement the role of experience, including “indubitable introspectables,” in all 
stages of the production of scientific knowledge. Were Adams to look to The 
Elements, he would find the beginnings of an answer to the query of “how 
exactly experience provides us with” base or simple “conceptions.” In The 
Elements Adams would also find evidence of a theory of truth that is more 
roundly and robustly empirical than the one he describes. 
Truth, Hobbes makes clear in The Elements, is intimately bound up with 
experience and made possible through observation.245 More incisively, Hobbes’s 
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enim a rerum singularum contemplatione, ad pracepta universalia, via aperitur”), Elementorum 




theory of truth is, in a strong sense, empirically bounded. He did not think 
truth to be something simply generated through convention. Rather, as it is 
described in The Elements, truth is a feature that accrues when a direct relation 
obtains between the propositions we make and the world without (as 
experienced by us). Put simply, truth, as specified by Hobbes, is a property 
made possible and made by a particular kind of empirical relation.  
c. Causes (and effects) 
 
Is the science of The Elements of Law causal? 
 
The theory of truth and the vision of science set out in The Elements 
impose strict empirical requirements that, as Hobbes had previously pointed 
out to Newcastle, “the greatest part of Natural Philosophy” cannot meet.246 
Remember that Hobbes, in the 1636 letter, surmises “In thinges that are not 
demonstrable, of wch kind is ye greatest part of Naturall Philosophy, as 
dependinge vpon the motion of bodies so subtile as they are inuisible…the most 
can be atteyned vnto is to haue such opinions.”247 In The Elements, Hobbes 
drew a line between truth and science, which are empirically bounded and 
address classes of objects that can be comprehended by human sense, and the 
“opinions” of “the great part of Natural Philosophy.” Speculations about 
discreet processes of nature and imperceptible natural causes ostensibly have 
no role in the manufacture of scientific knowledge.  
 
246 Hobbes, “Letter 19: Hobbes to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, from Paris 29 July/8 





Noel Malcolm notes that it was not until later, into the mid 1640s, that 
Hobbes began to “include the knowledge of causes in his definition” of 
science.248 Malcolm is correct.249 Hobbes left out “knowledge of causes” from 
the definition of science elaborated in The Elements. Science, Hobbes then 
wrote, emerges “from some beginning or principle of sense,” and proceeds by 
way of a four-step process. In not one of the four steps is there room for 
suppositions about natural causes. As Hobbes elaborates, 
The first principle of knowledge…is…that we have such and such 
conceptions; the second, that we have thus…named the things 
[conceived]…the third is, that we have joined those names…to make true 
propositions; the fourth…that we have joined those propositions in such 
manner as they be concluding.250 
 
Yet, Malcolm’s formal point, that Hobbes’s definition of science excludes 
“knowledge of causes” obscures a substantive reality. Hobbes may have agreed, 
to an extent, with Mersenne that “there is nothing certain in physics.”251 
However, specifications of natural causes are deeply enmeshed in Hobbes’s 
arguments in The Elements. Causal narrative represents an integral strand in 
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Causal discourse in The Elements of Law 
 
To Hobbes’s credit, he did cordon off suppositions and conjecture about 
causes,252 even if not always consistently. Specifically, he used conjectural 
language to level down the epistemic status of an explanation, indicating to his 
reader instances where an explanation bent toward less-certain speculation. For 
example, in the eighth chapter of The Elements, Hobbes uses the language of 
supposition to highlight the tentativeness of his reflections on how motion 
ping-pongs around the body, creating conceptions and passions as it goes. He 
notes that in “the precedent chapter” the idea that “motion and agitation of the 
brain which we call conception, to be continued to the heart, and there to be 
called passion” is “presupposed.”253 However, the number of instances where 
Hobbes uses hedging language (like “I conjecture”254) is exceeded by the use of 
causal language and causal explanation. 
Causal discourse acted as scaffolding for Hobbes’s claims about politics 
and the law. He quietly acknowledged the embeddedness of “knowledge of 
causes” in The Elements in the first sentence of the first chapter of the text. 
There, he explains the “explication” of “laws, natural and politic” offered by The 
Elements “dependeth upon knowledge of what is human nature, what is a body 
politic, and what it is we call law.”255 As Hobbes makes clear throughout The 
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Elements, “knowledge of human nature” involves schematizing human nature 
as well as positing its underlying causes.  
Hobbes’s political analysis emerged from such knowledge, specifically an 
understanding of the diverse operations of human passions, having offered an 
explanation of human passions sensitive to the role of motion in their 
generation. He explains, “imagination of men proceedeth from the action of 
external objects upon the brain, or some internal substance of the head; 
and…the passions proceed from the alteration there made, and continue to the 
heart,” and Hobbes took it upon himself to “declare what other causes may 
produce such odds, and excess of capacity, as we daily observe in one man or 
another.”256 “[W]e see by experience,” he continues, that “joy and grief proceed 
not in all men from the same causes, and that men differ much in constitution 
of body…that…helpeth…vital constitution in one” is “delightful, hindereth and 
crosseth it in another, and causeth grief.”257  
The explications of human passions Hobbes gives in the lines above are 
the theoretical set-up for a later discussion of the state of nature. Hobbes 
observes that “considering the great difference there is in men, from the 
diversity of their passions” there ultimately “proceed[s] a general diffidence in 
mankind, and mutual fear one of another.”258 This mutual fear, in turn, sets off 
a cycle of escalating tensions and domination that produces the all-out war of 
the state of nature. 
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It is also possible to conscript Hobbes’s remarks concerning the 
variability of human passions (“joy and grief proceed not in all men from the 
same causes”), itself a symptom of fundamental differences of biology (“men 
differ much in constitution of body”), into an account of the mechanico-
biological underpinnings of the universal experience of all human passions. 
Specifically, the account of the production of passions supplied in The Elements 
supports the notion that, although not always pointed in the same direction, 
humans experience the same base passions – that there are emotional states 
that are universally experienced, like “joy” and “grief,” and the panoply of other 
passions specified in the text. Put differently, Hobbes tells a causal story, 
anchored in an analysis of motion and human biology, that supports the 
notion259 that all human emotional states and psychological drives are truly 
universal. As the point was later perfected in Leviathan, although there may be 
a lack of “similitude” with respect to “the objects of Passions…for these are the 
constitution individual, and particular education may vary,” “whosoever 
looketh into himself and consider what he doth, when he does think, opine, 
reason, hope, fear, &c…shall thereby read and know, what are the Passions of all 
other men.”260 
It is true that Hobbes was attentive to the difference between more 
speculative, cause-oriented branches of natural philosophy and syllogistic 
science. However, the treatments Hobbes delivered in The Elements do not 
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consistently maintain the boundary. Causal analysis was part of the structure of 
Hobbes’s political theory – an essential element, which gave the project a 
distinct texture as well as a deeper, more empirical purchase. Despite 
methodological proscriptions, Hobbes, throughout The Elements, eagerly dug 
into and aspired to reveal the inner nature and causes of things. This was 
particularly true of human passions, which, as Hobbes reflected upon in his 
introduction to his translation of Thucydides, if “penetrate[d] into…without 
much meditation, we are not to expect a man should understand them at the 
first speaking.”261  
d. Conclusion 
 
In The Elements of Law the different strands that make up a long history 
of Hobbes’s philosophical tendencies come together. This is not to deny shifts 
in tendencies. Hobbes’s imagination was pulled in different directions at 
different times. As he became more ensconced in the world of the Cavendish 
brothers, Mersenne, and Galileo, his ideas about science and truth evolved, 
became sharper, more firm, and inflected with the discursive elements, 
precepts, and epistemological orientation of that world. As Hobbes’s use of the 
discourse of universal experience shows, these specific elements helped to 
shape the content of his ideas.  
Yet, however much The Elements of Law may owe to the Welbeck group 
and friends on the Continent, the way in which Hobbes absorbed new ideas 
was shaped by habits of mind with a longer, further-reaching arch. While The 
 




Elements owes much to the tide of enthusiasm for geometry, geometricized 
science, and motion that swept up his friends and patron, it is also an 
expression of the same empirical, concrete thinking that guided Hobbes as a 
young man. In it, we find Hobbes eagerly probing at the world around him, as 
he did in the Peak District, searching for reliable, cognizable answers to the 
empirical phenomena “as we daily observe.”262 
  
 




DE CIVE AND THE POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF THOMAS HOBBES’S 
PHILOSOPHY 
Not long after completing The Elements of Law (1640) Hobbes did 
something unexpected. He chopped up the text and published it in an altered 
form, under a new title, De cive263 (1642). The decision to unstitch, respool, and 
retitle The Elements, thereby making it into a passably new edition, was a 
curious one. Hobbes’s own contemporaneous characterizations of The Elements 
suggest he was pleased with it. In the text’s epistle dedicatory he compared its 
argument to an “inexpungible” “whole,” and boasted the treatment to have 
been erected upon the “true and only foundation of such science.”264 Yet, while 
converting The Elements into a new text Hobbes monkeyed around with these 
foundations and, more shocking, jettisoned the empirical material on human 
nature that made up Part I of that work and lent material support to The 
Elements’ political analysis.  
The alterations necessitated a change in Hobbes’s approach to empirical 
explanation. Whereas The Elements is illustrative of a wide-ranging empirical 
 
263 The full title given to the work, Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive (“The Third 
Section of the Elements of Philosophy, On the Citizen”), framed it within a larger series, the 
texts in which would, in combination, articulate the elements of Hobbes’s philosophy. 
 
264 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, vii [“The Epistle Dedicatory”]. The full quotation reads, “To 
reduce this doctrine to the rules and infallibility of reason, there is no way, but first to put such 
principles down for a foundation, as passion not mistrusting, may not seek to displace; and 
afterward to build thereon the truth of cases in the law of nature (which hitherto have been 
built in the air) by degrees, till the whole be inexpungable. Now (my Lord) the principles fit for 
such a foundation, are those which I have heretofore acquainted your Lordship withal in 
private discourse, and which by your command I have here put into method. To examine cases 
thereby between sovereign and sovereign, or between sovereign and subject, I leave to them 
that shall find leisure and encouragement thereto. For my part, I present this to your Lordship 
for the true and only foundation of such science,” ibid. 
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curiosity, combining causal analysis with different forms of observation, De cive 
is illustrative of how Hobbes’s empiricism evolved to meet emergent challenges 
imposed by shifting circumstances and a new philosophical project. Put 
differently, both the first and second editions of De cive testify to the issues 
Hobbes had with drawing together an empirically plausible version of the 
argument proffered by The Elements, without the probing empirical analysis 
and underpinnings that prop up The Elements’ political conclusions. 
Compensating for the missing empirical content entailed that Hobbes locate a 
new material starting point for his political theory and develop new (or 
adapted) sets of empirical strategies to address the shift.  
In the first edition of De cive, Hobbes solved the analytical and empirical 
puzzle with the concept of universal experience. Universal experience, often in 
the form of “right reason,” became the new foundation for Hobbes’s political 
theory. Nevertheless, Hobbes found the revised argument featured in the first 
De cive difficult to defend, and reviewers of the text gainsaid the new approach. 
The republication of De cive in 1647 encouraged him to modify the approach by 
dropping the concept of “right reason,” while also offering an opportunity to 
recast his political project in new terms, which better reflected the 
philosophical posture into which he settled between 1640, when The Elements 
was completed, and 1647. The second edition of De cive, in particular, illustrates 
the development of Hobbes’s empiricism in the direction of the concept of 
universal experience, a concept that, eventually, became cemented into and 
centered in his designs for a civil science. 
This chapter has five sections, outlined below.  
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(i) The first section sketches the circumstances under which Hobbes 
developed De cive, contemplates his motivations for doing so, and 
compares the text with its predecessor, The Elements of Law, while 
noting important excisions of and adaptations to empirical content. 
The section also features a revised chronology of the development of 
the Elementa Philosophiae (“The Elements of Philosophy”), Hobbes’s 
plan to publish a series of philosophical texts, which, together, would 
elaborate the elements of his philosophy. 
(ii) The second section zooms in on the adaptations to empirical content 
between The Elements and De cive and considers the empirical 
premises to which the political theory of De cive is ostensibly 
moored. Made the linchpin of Hobbes’s theorizations in the text, he 
grappled with how best to establish the empirical force of the 
premises. One solution, already discussed in the preceding chapter, 
entailed invocations of universal experience and the use of personal, 
but nevertheless common experience. A second, related, solution 
involved remaking the moral concept of “right reason” into a cognate 
concept of universal experience, using it to express and establish the 
empirical postulates of universal experience. The conversion of “right 
reason” into an idea with the conceptual purchase of universal 
experience is the focus of section three.  
(iii) The third section shows that Hobbes used the inherited moral 
discourse of “right reason” to lend empirical credibility to the text’s 
analysis. In particular, he specified that the empirical reasoning 
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featured in De cive was an example of “right reason,” a concept 
Hobbes filled with the content of universal experience.  
(iv) The subject of section four is the second edition of De cive. It shows 
that although Hobbes stepped back from the earlier commitment to 
“right reason” he became wedded to the notion that his politics 
could, empirically, stand on its own principles, as “known by 
experience.”265 The edition features a growing reliance on personal, 
but nevertheless common experience. 
(v) In a brief conclusion, I note that the preface to the second edition 
recast Hobbes’s political theory in terms that gave the book a posture 
that reflected the changes that took place to his philosophical plans 
and projects between 1640 and 1647. 
I. The Elements of Law, De cive, and the Elementa Philosophiae plan 
 
 
265 The relevant line is mistranslated in Richard Tuck’s and Michael Silverthorne’s edition of De 
cive, On the Citizen, eds. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 13 [Preface to the Readers 19]. In the edition, the pair give the noun 
experientia the meaning “reason” rather than “experience,” thereby mis-rendering the line, and 
misrepresenting Hobbes’s point. Hobbes does not, in the passage, articulate the existence of 
principles “known by reason,” even if he would not have found the conclusion philosophically 
disagreeable. The original Latin text of the second edition is clear in its use of experientia, 
indicating praesertim cum eam principiis propriis experientia cognitis innixam, praecedentibus 
indigere non viderem (“especially as I could not see a need for the preceding, insofar as it rested 
upon its own principles known by experience”), “Præfatio ad Lectores,” in Elementa 
Philosophica de Cive (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1647). In the notes that follow, like notes in the 
preceding chapters, most references to the Cambridge edition, On the Citizen, edited and 
translated by Tuck and Silverthorne, will comprise three elements: (i) a page number and (ii) a 
chapter and (iii) paragraph number. (ii) and (iii) are presented together in brackets. References 
to De cive’s epistle dedicatory or preface to the readers include a paragraph number, also set in 
brackets. However, unlike the paragraph numbers featured in the chapters of the text, 
paragraph numbers were later added to the epistle dedicatory and preface by Howard 
Warrender. The paragraph numbers introduced into the text by Warrender were retained in 




With The Elements of Law Hobbes had associated himself with a strand 
of partisan political thinking that was under increasing attack in England.266 
Sensing a shift in political winds, he fled England and arrived in Paris in the fall 
of 1640. While unplanned for, the departure was fortuitous. Hobbes is best 
known for his political theory; however, he maintained an eager, unflagging 
interest in the study of nature, and specifically optics, the only area of scientific 
inquiry – apart from civil science – to which he ever claimed to make 
pathbreaking contributions.267 An exile in Paris, spent in the company of Marin 
Mersenne, created an opportunity for Hobbes to pursue non-political inquiries 
in the absence of distraction, with material (and moral) support from Paris’ 
scientific coterie.268 
 
266 Hobbes observes in his prose autobiography that it was around this time that “the Scots, 
who had deposed their bishops, favoring certain English ministers of religion who are called 
Presbyterians, took up arms against the King. Then the most notorious Parliament was 
summoned in England. Its sessions began on the 3rd November 1640. He understood, having 
consulted with some of those who were of the Parliament during the first three or four days of 
the session, that civil war was unavoidable. Fearing for his safety, he returned to France,” “The 
Prose Life,” 247. Noel Malcolm notes the specific impetus, explaining, “What finally prompted 
him to leave England was a debate on 7 November in the newly convened Long Parliament, in 
which John Pym and other anti-royalists attacked ‘Preaching for absolute monarchy that the 
king may do what he list,’” Aspects of Hobbes, 16. The political landscape was moving beneath 
Hobbes’s feet. The change in political environment is best seen in the impeachment of political 
allies. Deborah Baumgold notes, “In the closing months of 1640, Parliament impeached 
Strafford and Laud; both were subsequently executed (although not until 1645 in Laud’s case),” 
“Editor’s Introduction,” in Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political Theory: The 
Elements of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan, ed. Deborah Baumgold (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), xii. 
 
267 The claim appears the final paragraph of “A Minute or First Draught of the Optiques:” “How 
doe I feare that ye attentive reader will find that which I have delivered concerning ye Optiques 
fit to bee cast out as rubbish among the rest. If hee doe, hee will recede from ye authoritie of 
experience, which confirmeth all I have said. Butt if it bee found true doctrine, (though yet it 
wanteth polishing), I shall deserve the reputation of having been ye first to lay the grounds of 
two sciences: this of Optiques, ye most curious, and yt other of Natural Justice, which I have 
done in my booke DE CIVE, ye most profitable of all other,” The English Works of Thomas Hobbes 
vol. VII, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1845), 
471.  
 
268 As Daniel Garber describes, “Mersenne, of course, was central to the new mathematical 
approach to nature in Paris in the 1630s and 1640s. Intellectually, he was one of the most 
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It was in specific service to the interest in optics that Hobbes began, 
through Mersenne, a trail of correspondence with René Decartes about the 
latter’s Dioptrique, an essay on optics that was packaged together with 
Descartes’s Discourse on Method (1637). The first letter in the exchange, from 
Hobbes, was sent before his departure.269 In a response, Descartes dismissed 
Hobbes, straight off, as an interloping, know-nothing philosophical 
 
enthusiastic practitioners of that program, and published a number of influential books in 
those important decades. In addition, he was at the center of the intellectual network that put 
thinkers from all over Europe sympathetic to the new science in touch with one another. His 
rooms at the Minim Convent near the Place Royale were the meeting place for scientific and 
mathematical Paris. His network of correspondence was, in essence, both a scientific society 
and a scientific journal that linked thinkers one to another. And finally, in his books he diffused 
the works of such eminent contemporaries as Galileo, Hobbes, and Roberval, as well as some of 
the otherwise unpublished thoughts of Descartes,” “On the Frontlines of the Scientific 
Revolution: How Mersenne Learned to Love Galileo,” 136. Also see the previous chapter, 
footnote 98. Tom Sorell writes in a similar vein, when he raises the possibility that “Mersenne 
had a wide range of interests in the new science,” and so “encouraged work of all kinds in the 
new science for their own sake, and that the more rigorous pieces of this work, whether done 
with a view to refuting skepticism or not, were sometimes used by Mersenne himself as 
evidence of the weakness of skepticism about the mathematical sciences. According to this 
view, the purely scientific findings reported by members of Mersenne’s circle would have been 
grist for Mersenne’s antiskeptical mill. In other words, certain pieces of science…were open to 
appropriate by Mersenne as proof against the skeptics that real science is possible; but the 
pieces of science would not necessarily have been produced with anti-skeptical purposes in 
mind. In particular, Hobbes may have developed scientific material on topics that were 
interesting to him in their own right, only to have them seized upon by Mersenne to further the 
arguments of La verité des sceinces. Thus, when Mersenne pressed Hobbes’s De cive on Samuel 
Sorbiére to get him to reconsider his skepticism, he may have been appropriating work not 
written with antiskeptical intentions,” “Hobbes’s Objections and Hobbes’s System,” in 
Descartes and His Contemporaries: Meditations, Objects, and Replies, eds. Roger Ariew and 
Marjorie Greene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 94. 
 
269 Although, as Malcolm observes, “Hobbes’s letter has not survived,” the letter, as Descartes’s 
reply to Mersenne indicates, was sent from England. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that, 
inasmuch as Descartes’s reply is dated January 1641, Hobbes’s letter was sent and transmitted in 
the fall of 1641, “Letter 29: René Descartes to Marin Mersenne for Hobbes, from Leiden [11/] 21 
January 1641,” in The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. and trans. Noel Malcolm 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 57, 60 n. 1. Malcolm confirms the inference in the “Textual 
Introduction” to The Correspondence, explaining, “Although the date of it [the letter] is not 
mentioned there, it is known to have been preserved in a bound volume of Mersenne 
correspondence after Mersenne’s death…This volume, consisting mainly of letters from Pierre 
Fermat to Mersenne, disappeared some time in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth 
centuries, but not before the mathematician Louis-François Arbogast (1759-1803) had listed its 
contents, including ‘a long letter from Thomas Hobbes, addressed to Mersenne, dated 5 
November 1640, 56 folio pages,’” “Textual Introduction,” in The Correspondence of Thomas 




mountebank. He wrote, with impatience, that he “was very surprised by the fact 
that, although the style in which it is written make its author [Hobbes] look 
clever and learned, he seems to stray from the truth in every single claim which 
he advances as his own.”270 The letter represented a high-water mark for 
Hobbes’s and Descartes’s early relationship. Thereafter Descartes openly 
scorned Hobbes’s work,271 penned dismissive replies to his objections to the 
Meditations on First Philosophy (1641),272 accused Hobbes of plagiarism,273 and 
 
270 Decartes, “Letter 29: René Descartes to Marin Mersenne for Hobbes, from Leiden [11/] 21 
January 1641,” 57. 
 
271 For example, in the process of demolishing Hobbes’s criticisms, Descartes writes, “He is no 
more felicitous on the subject of refraction, when he distinguishes between the refraction 
which takes place when the moved body itself passes through media, and the refraction which 
takes place when it does not; for in both cases, if the bodies are of the same kind, they will be 
refracted in the same direction. Nor has he sufficiently understood what I wrote on the subject,” 
“Letter 29: René Descartes to Marin Mersenne for Hobbes, from Leiden [11/] 21 January 1641,” 58 
(emphasis added). 
 
272 Descartes’s contempt for the objections levelled by Hobbes becomes visible in his reply to 
Hobbes’s twelfth objection, in the middle of which he laments, “I am surprised that I have so 
far found not one valid argument in these objections,” “Third Set of Objections with Replies,” in 
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes volume II, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, 
and Dugald Murdock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984),  134. Descartes’s 
frustration is, once again, visible in his reply to Hobbes’s fifth objection: “I cannot possibly 
satisfy those who prefer to attribute a different sense to my words than the one I intended,” he 
fumes, ibid, 128. 
 
273 Descartes, René, “Letter 33: René Descartes to Marin Mersenne for Hobbes, from Leiden [22 
February/] 4 March 1641,” in The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. and trans. Noel 
Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 97; for Hobbes’s reply, see “Letter 34: Hobbes to 
Marin Mersenne, from Paris [20/] 30 March 1641,” 107-108. Of the episode, Sorell writes, “The 
striking thing about [Hobbes’s] Latin Optical MS [likely produced after Hobbes had relocated 
to Paris]…was the fact that so much of it took the form of a running critique of Descartes's 
‘Dioptrique.’ This was the short treatise on optics (in particular, refraction) that had been 
published as one of the essays accompanying Descartes's Discours de la methode in 1637 
(Hobbes had been sent a copy of the book by Sir Kenelm Digby soon after its publication). 
Descartes's work had an unsettling effect on Hobbes, for two reasons. First, Descartes's 
mechanistic physics, and his assumption that perception is caused by physical motions or 
pressures that have no intrinsic similarity to the qualities (redness, heat, etc.) that are 
perceived, corresponded very closely to Hobbes's own theories. Although neither Descartes nor 
Hobbes was the first to have such ideas (they had been preceded by Isaac Beeckman and 
Galileo), this was still very much the frontier of modern thinking, and it must have been galling 
for Hobbes to see some of his own research preempted in print. In 1640-1 an exchange of letters 
between Hobbes and Descartes on optics and physics turned (at Descartes's prompting) into an 
acrimonious dispute about who had preempted - or even plagiarized – whom,” “Hobbes’s 
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finally, in April 1641, sarcastically threw down a gauntlet: “If his [Hobbes’s] 
philosophical system is such that he is afraid of other people stealing it from 
him,” Descartes mocked, “let him publish it.”274 
By the early part of 1641, Hobbes was without anything close to 
resembling a philosophical system. There is an absence of evidence to suggest 
that The Elements of Law was, in inception, formulated as part of a larger 
project. From the beginning, The Elements was designed to suit the 
philosophical whims of Hobbes’s patron, the Earl of Newcastle.275 A letter sent 
to Newcastle in the summer of 1635 supplies evidence to support the 
conclusion. Hobbes had been made aware that Walter Warner was, then, 
planning a tract on “ye facultyes & passions.”276 However, as noted in the 
previous chapter, Hobbes’s opinion of Warner was dim. He remarked that “For 
 
Scheme of the Sciences,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 26. 
 
274 Descartes, “Letter 36: René Descartes to Marin Mersenne for Hobbes, from Endegeest [11/] 21 
April or [18/] 28 April 1641,” 118. 
 
275 The text’s epistle dedicatory notes that the work was, as “A Minute or First Draught of the 
Optiques” would be, produced, surely in part, at the behest of Newcastle: “Now (my Lord) the 
principles fit for such a foundation, are those which I have heretofore acquainted your Lordship 
withal in private discourse, and which by your command I have here put into method,” The 
Elements of Law, xvii [Epistle Dedicatory]. It is possible that the content of the “private 
discourse” is summarized in a letter to Descartes, which recounts how “that doctrine of the 
nature and production of light, sound, and all phantasms or ideas, which M. Descartes now 
rejects, was explained by me in the presence of those most excellent brothers William Earl of 
Newcastle and Sir Charles Cavendish…in the year 1630,” “Letter 34: Hobbes to Marin Mersenne, 
from Paris [20/] 30 March 1641,” 108. Hobbes refers to the episode again in the epistle 
dedicatory to “A Minute or First Draught of the Optiques:” “That which I have written of it, is 
grounded especially upon that which about 16 years since I affirmed to your Lord at Welbeck, 
that Light is a fancy in the minde, caused by motion in the braine, which motion againe is 
caused by the motion of the parts of such bodies…,” “Thomas Hobbes’s A Minute or First 
Draught of the Optiques: A Critical Edition, ed. Elaine Stroud (Ph.D. dissertation, The University 
of Wisconsin-Madison, 1983), 76-77. 
 
276 Hobbes, “Letter 16: Hobbes to William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, from Paris 15/25 August 
1635,” in The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon 




ye soule I know he [Warner] has nothinge to giue yor Lop,” while boasting, “if he 
can not I hope to be ye first.”277 
It is likely that Hobbes began to work on The Elements of Law not long 
thereafter. With an emphasis on motion and an analysis of the law informed by 
Grotian antecedents,278 The Elements is emblematic of interests that Hobbes 
cultivated and refined in the mid-1630s.279 Furthermore, correspondence 
evidence exists that indicates he may have begun producing some components 
of The Elements by the winter of 1636/37. In the early winter of 1637 Hobbes 
received a letter from Kenelm Digby, a Briton living in Paris whom Hobbes met 
while on the Continent in the mid-1630s. In the letter, Digby offers notes upon 




278 Baumgold establishes the relationship and how Grotian patterns of analysis were adapted by 
Hobbes in “Hobbes and Grotius: The Elements of Law and De Jure Belli ac Pacis” (unpublished 
manuscript, 2020), typescript. 
 
279 In the verse autobiography, Hobbes recalls of his third Continental tour that “whether on 
ship, or coach, or horse-back, my mind constantly pondered the nature of things; and it seemed 
to me that in the whole world only one thing is real, falsified though it be in many ways. One 
thing only is real, but it forms the basis of the things we falsely claim to be something, though 
they are only like the fugitive shapes of dreams or like the images I can multiply at will by 
mirrors; fantasies, creatures of our brains and nothing more, the only inner reality of which is 
motion. This is the reason why anyone who wishes to learn natural philosophy must first 
master the laws of motion. So I turned my thoughts to matter and the varieties of motion, and 
in this way I beguiled the idle time of our progress through Italy. I wrote nothing, I made no 
notes; for the Mistress who instructed me was ever present. We left Italy and returned to the 
lofty walls of noble buildings of Paris. Here I got to know Mersenne, and I communicated to 
him my mediations on the motion of things. He approved and recommended me to many 
others. From that time I began to be numbered among the philosophers,” “The Autobiography 
of Thomas Hobbes,” 25-26. Of the Grotian components of the text, Baumgold cautions that, 
though “the evidence does not support a broad generalization about the Grotian character of 
Hobbesian theory overall,” “the evidence also contradicts the broad generalization that Hobbes 
conceived political theory within the frame of unified science. That generalization blinds us 
from appreciating what the first of his works in the field plainly, on its surface, is: a treatise on 
law. And, appreciating this, we arrive at the narrower conclusion that The Elements of Law is a 
treatise influenced by and responsive to De Jure Belli ac Pacis. The work is Grotian: its author 
was under the influence of Grotius during a few – crucial – years in his intellectual 




In your Logicke, before you can manage men’s conceptions, you must 
shew a way how to apprehend them rightly: and herein j would gladly 
know whither you work vpon the generall notions and apprehensions 
that all men (the vulgar as well as the learned) frame of all things that 
occurred unto them; or whither you make your ground to be definitions 
collected out of deep insight into the things themseues.280 
 
The remark “your Logicke” has been taken to refer to an early draft of 
Hobbes’s De corpore.281 Published in 1655, De corpore was the first section in a 
 
280 Sir Kenelm Digby, “Letter 25: Sir Kenelm Digby to Hobbes, from Paris 17[/27] January 1637,” 
in The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), 42-43. 
 
281 As Baumgold notes in an article on the composition of The Elements of Law, it is in Jean 
Jacquot’s and Harold Whitmore Jones’s introduction to their edition of the commentary on De 
mundo that the association is made. Baumgold writes, “Scholars think this probably refers to an 
early version of Hobbes’s De corpore, which was eventually to be published in 1655. The 
opening section of De corpore is headed ‘Pars prima or Logica,’ and there exists a manuscript of 
a rudimentary version of the work with the title ‘Logica, ex. T.H.’” However, Baumgold rightly 
adds that “Nonetheless, although Digby seems to be referring to a different work, the method 
he discusses is on display in The Elements of Law. The work is framed in deductive fashion as a 
series of definitions of basic concepts, which appear in black gothic script in the manuscripts,” 
“The Composition of Hobbes’s ‘Elements of Law,’” 21. Also see: the “Introduction” in Critique Du 
De Mundo De Thomas White, eds. Jean Jacquot and Harold Whitmore Jones (Paris: Vrin, 1972), 
16. Like the others, Malcolm thinks it probable that the note may refer to an early draft of the 
De corpore. However, Malcolm makes an association not made by the others, noting that the 
“Logicke” Digby references is “Probably an early version of the first part of De corpore; possibly 
to be identified with the notes ‘De principiis’ (National Library of Wales MS 5297)…,” The 
Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes, 49 n. 2. Although there exists redoubtable textual proof 
that NLW MS 5297 was a part of a body of materials or notes that would eventually feed the De 
corpore project, there is a comparative lack of evidence that the manuscript is the tract Digby 
names (beyond the mere fact that the manuscript opens with a consideration of “the mind of 
man” which is a “mirror capable of receiving the representation and image of all the world”), 
“Of knowledge and the power cognitive in general,” in Critique Du De Mundo De Thomas White, 
eds. Jean Jacquot and Harold Whitmore Jones (Paris: Vrin, 1972), 449. It is obvious that there is 
a genetic link between the manuscript and The Elements of Law, both having been composed 
around the same time. However, the characterization of ratiocination supplied in the 
manuscript presents the possibility that it was composed after The Elements of Law. The tract 
gives the following analysis of naming and ratiocination: “And therefore upon these he would 
1o impose names, 2o he would subtract and compound, 3o and divide and multiply, 4o he would 
consider, 5o he would compute. And in truth upon a diligent advertence of what we do when we 
reason or of the act of ratiocination (things standing or being) we compute nothing else but our 
phantasms or ideas…,” ibid, 449-450. The formulation and description have no antecedent in 
The Elements of Law, and signal that, by the time that the manuscript was composed, Hobbes 
had begun to mathematize his conception of ratiocination, conceptualizing reason as a form of 
computation. Such a conception first appears (among the materials available to us) in the 
commentary on De mundo: “Again, the ‘reason’ is nothing but the faculty of syllogizing, 
reasoning being merely a continuous linking of propositions, or their gathering under one 
head, or (to put it more briefly) ‘the calculating of names,’” Thomas Hobbes: Thomas White’s De 
Mundo Examined, 377 [30.22]. There is no evidence that Hobbes’s thinking had begun to evolve 
in this direction as he was composing De cive.  
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trio of texts, discussed in greater detail below, that comprised Hobbes’s 
Elementa Philosophiae (“Elements of Philosophy”). However, there are reasons 
to doubt the association of “your Logicke” with De coropore. First, the 
presumption that “your Logicke” refers to an early draft of De corpore relies on 
a weak nominal similarity between “Logicke,” the title given by Digby, and the 
title given to a manuscript resembling Charles Cavendish’s early notes on De 
corpore. The manuscript, titled “Logica ex T.H.,” was written in the mid-1640s, 
almost a full decade after Hobbes’s exchange with Digby.282 
Second, if read closely, the content of Digby’s remarks points in another 
direction, away from De corpore and toward the possible conclusion that the 
tract on “Logicke” may have been an early component part of what would 
become the analysis of The Elements of Law, on which, it is likely, Hobbes was 
then working. In the quotation, Digby addresses what would have been a 
fundamental, epistemological question: what is a legitimate basis for knowing? 
How is it possible to know that one’s conceptions are correct or “right?” Is it 
sufficient, he poses, to rely upon “generall notions and apprehensions that all 
men” – including “vulgar,” ordinary men – use to “frame…all things that 
occurred unto them” or must one be more systematic and ordered, making the 
“ground” of knowledge “definitions collected out of deep insights into the 
things themseues?”283 
 
282 Chapter 5 discusses both the evolution of Hobbes’s methodological views and where the 
manuscript fits in this evolution. Also see Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 154. 
 




Hobbes touches on the question in The Elements, using a distinction 
reminiscent of the one deployed by Digby. The Elements weighs and contrasts 
two kinds of knowledge, similar to Digby’s “generall notions” and “definitions.” 
Hobbes, as Digby seems to have, thought “knowledge original,"284 the simple 
conceptions engendered by different forms of sense experience, inferior to 
knowledge begot through ratiocination: syllogistic reasoning, which relies on 
definitions. “[T]here be two sorts of knowledge, whereof the one is nothing else 
but sense, or knowledge original…and remembrance of the same; the other is 
called science or knowledge of the truth of propositions, and how things are 
called, and is derived from understanding.”285 The pivotal question for Hobbes 
was not whether, or by what means conceptions can be “rightly” 
“apprehended,” but rather, whether the words we use, and in turn the 
propositions of science, are tied to our conceptions. Thus, while failing to lay 
out strict protocol for “apprehend[ing] conceptions,” he did address the thrust 
of Digby’s query, by delineating steps that can be taken to convert sense-
generated conceptions into demonstratively certain, usable scientific 
knowledge.286 
The Digby letter is no smoking-gun. The highlighted similarities 
between Digby’s description of the work, likely as described to him by Hobbes 
 








either in person or in a previous letter,287 and The Elements are not sufficient to 
demonstrate that Digby’s “Logicke” was an early draft of The Elements of Law 
(even if Digby does seem to remark upon how Hobbes ordered the chapters of 
the work).288 However, neither does Digby’s letter supply affirmative evidence 
that The Elements was part of a larger philosophical edifice, a series of texts 
comprising a “philosophical system,” or that such an edifice was, at that time, 
in the works. 
Likewise, the text of The Elements gives no indication of the existence of 
an Elementa Philosophiae tripartite plan. In fact, The Elements includes 
language that militates against the speculative conclusion that the plan 
predated or was developed in conjunction with The Elements of Law. As 
Richard Tuck points out,289 after having decided to compose the Elementa 
 
287 As Digby notes in a letter sent several months later, “I summon you of your promise; which 
is that as soon as you haue done any piece of your Logicke, you will let me see it,” “Letter 26: Sir 
Kenelm Digby to Hobbes, from London 11[/21] September 1637,” in The Correspondence of 
Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 50. Based on this, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Digby, in the earlier note, was responding to a description of the 
tract’s contents, as provided by Hobbes. 
 
288 It is notable that Hobbes’s treatment of method and science is delivered later in the 
exposition, in the sixth chapter, the final chapter in the first cluster of chapters, grouped under 
the header “Of the faculties discretive,” The Elements of Law, xv. The organization was retained 
in De corpore, whose first part, like The Elements’, ends with a chapter (chapter 6) on method. 
It is possible that Hobbes made the decisions vis-à-vis chapter organization under the influence 
of the German systematics. Helen Hattab explains, “Although the systematics oppose the 
Ramists, by reinstating the traditional elements of Aristotelian logic, the systematics retain 
Ramist influences in their treatises on logic by including a final part devoted to method. 
Conversely, traditional Scholastic Aristotelian logic texts omit this final part. Not unlike the 
English followers of Keckermann, Hobbes appears to yield to the influence of the emergent 
German systematic logic, as he concludes the first part of his De Corpore on Logic, with a 
chapter on method,” “Hobbes’s and Zabarella’s Methods: A Missing Link,” Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 52, no. 3 (2014), 480. The Hardwick catalogue includes multiple works by 
Keckermann, Talaska, Richard, The Hardwick Library and Hobbes’s Early Intellectual 
Development (Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2013), 92-93. 
 
289 Tuck correctly points out that “Hobbes always used the term section with care.” However, 
the remarks that follow are lacking in analytical and factual precision. He continues, “[Hobbes] 
reserved it for the three great divisions of his universal philosophy, known from their final titles 
(which were clearly adumbrated in 1642) as De Corpore, De Homine, and De Cive. In many of 
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Philosophiae, Hobbes was careful and selective in his use of the word “section,” 
a term he consistently used to refer to each of the trio of texts that make up the 
Elementa Philosophiae.290 In The Elements of Law, “section” is used in a non-
technical way, to refer to the numbered paragraphs that make up each chapter. 
Thus, Tuck is incorrect in the assessment that The Elements is among those 
texts in which Hobbes never “referred to…subdivisions as sectiones.”291 The 
term is equally distributed across the text, appearing in chapters 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 
13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, and often multiple times per chapter.292 Deborah 
Baumgold demonstrates that The Elements was finished in a hurry in 1640, and 
raises the possibility that the latter, political, chapters of The Elements were 
drafted just before the manuscript was finished.293 Thus, it is reasonable to infer 
 
his works (including The Elements of Law, De Corpore, De Cive, and Leviathan) he subdivided 
his text; but never referred to those subdivisions as sectiones. In De Corpore, The Elements, and 
Leviathan, they are partes or parts, in De cive they are simply given specific titles. Moreover, in 
all his works (except for The Elements), even where subdivisions are employed, the chapters run 
in continuous numerical sequence from the beginning to the end of the work,” “Hobbes and 
Descartes,” 20. First, Hobbes did not “adumbrate” the “final titles” of the three sections that 
comprise the Elementa Philosophiae in 1642. Although the first edition of De cive is not without 
references to precedent sections, the title of the work, “The Third Section of the Elements of 
Philosophy, On the Citizen,” simply implies that the Elementa Philosophiae would comprise at 
least three parts. To my knowledge, there is no evidence to suggest that Hobbes had, at the 
time, settled on the titles of either section one or section two. Tuck supplies no citation to 
support the remark. Second, Tuck is incorrect in his assessment of The Elements. Subdivisions, 
at the paragraph level, were characterized as “sections.” The word “section” appears 25 times in 
the text, on the following pages, and in the following chapters and paragraphs: 4 [2.5]; 13 [4.11]; 
18 [5.14]; 21 [7.1]; 24 [8.1]; twice on 33 [9.16]; 36 [9.20]; twice on 51 [13.4]; 69 [17.2]; 69 [17.3]; 76 
[18.11]; 83 [20.1]; 88 [20.14]; 89 [20.16]; 93 [21.3]; 94 [21.7]; 95 [21.8]; 96 [21.10]; 102 [23.1]; 104 [23.4]; 
132 [26.10]; 136 [27.6]; 142 [28.1]. 
 
290 The care with which Hobbes deployed the word is especially visible in Leviathan, on whose 
pages the term appears nowhere. 
 
291 The full quotation and citation are given above, in footnote 289. 
 
292 For a full list of pages and chapters, see footnote 289. 
 
293 Specifically, Baumgold raises three possibilities with respect to the composition timeline of 
The Elements. First, it is possible that “six chapters in Part II” were “hurriedly drafted in the 
spring of 1640 – Chapters 2 and 5, comparing forms of government; 7, which continues the 
religious cause for political obedience; 8, on the causes of rebellion; 9, on the duties of rulers; 
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that, by the time that Hobbes finished the text in May 1640, the term “section” 
had yet to take on the special, technical meaning Tuck describes – the tripartite 
plan was not yet fully settled in his mind.  
An absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. However, what the 
emerging chronology indicates is that it was likely not until after he had 
finished The Elements of Law in May 1640, and perhaps not until he had fled to 
Paris that fall, that Hobbes settled upon the production of a trilogy of “sections” 
that would set out the elements of his philosophy. Indeed, thereafter, the 
evidence shows that the Elementa Philosophiae plan coalesced, in part, as the 
result of a dialectical engagement with Descartes’s Dioptrique. As Hobbes’s 
correspondence with Mersenne show, it was this essay upon which he was 
fixated during the period that he relocated to Paris. At some time during the 
same period, it is possible by the winter of 1641 or later,294 Hobbes consolidated 
 
and Chapter 10, the single chapter on the theme of law,” “The Composition of Hobbes’s 
‘Elements of Law’,” 32. Second, “Focusing on Hobbes’s argument yields a more conservative 
estimate. There are three chapters in the second part of The Elements of Law whose content is 
curious in ways that suggest they were written hurriedly: Chapter 2, which defends 
unconditional sovereignty using the claim that all governments have democratic foundations; 
8, which employs Bodin’s Republique in defense of absolute sovereignty; and 10, the scanty final 
chapter on the subject of law. At a minimum, these chapters appear to have been drafted in the 
spring of 1640,” ibid, 32-33. Baumgold also allows that “It is possible that Hobbes had outlined 
the sequence of chapters of the work as a whole before starting to write and so, in the spring of 
1640, had the task of hurriedly filling in the final pages,” however, notes that she is “skeptical of 
this last possibility because the intellectual and physical evidence suggests a more uneven 
process of composition,” ibid, 33. 
 
294 Relying on correspondence evidence, Franco Guidice reckons that Hobbes began writing the 
tract in the winter of 1641: “we can read a key letter that Hobbes sent to Sir Charles Cavendish 
on 29 January/8February 1641, when he probably began writing his Tractatus opticus II [i.e., the 
“Latin Optical Manuscript],” “Optics in Hobbes’s Natural Philosophy,” Hobbes Studies 29, no. 1 
(2016), 96. I am less confident about this datation. However, it is very likely that the tract was 
started, and even more likely completed, in Paris. Timothy Raylor supplies the relevant 
evidence, explaining that an inspection of the manuscript contradicts Tuck’s and Malcolm’s 
conclusions vis-à-vis date, as the physical evidence “and the Hobbes Papers at Chatsworth 
suggests that the transcriptions of the Latin Optical Manuscript was made after, rather than 
just before, Hobbes’s arrival in Paris. We cannot say exactly how long after, but the evidence 
points to a period soon after his arrival: Mersenne sent Sir Charles the copy of the ‘Receuil’ on 1 
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his criticisms of Descartes’s optics (and the optics of the “Short Tract”) into a 
systematic treatise.295 It is in the tract, the so-called “Latin Optical Manuscript,” 
that the first affirmative evidence of an ambition to create a philosophical 
series, comprising multiple “sections,” appears.296  
Thus, it was not until several months after Descartes’s provocation, and 
a year and a half after having completed The Elements, that Hobbes announced 
a plan to publish the Elementa Philosophiae series. The series, like the “Short 
Tract,”297 would comprise at least three “sections,” on first principles and 
 
March 1641; and the vellum De cive is dated 1641. The evidence therefore seems to suggest that 
Hobbes was still working on his Latin Optical Manuscript at a later point than that proposed by 
Noel Malcolm and Richard Tuck,” “The Date and Script of Hobbes’s Latin Optical Manuscript,” 
in English Manuscript Studies vol. 12, ed. Peter Beal and A.S.G. Edwards (London: The British 
Library, 2005), 208. 
 
295 Stroud explains that “Following this debate with Descartes in 1641, Hobbes…proceeded to 
write an optical treatise directed more specifically against the Cartesian theories: Tractatus 
Opticus II. Tractatus Opticus II, the Latin optical manuscript, reveals the depth of Hobbes’s 
involvement with problems of vision and optics. Where Tractatus Opticus I outlined the theory 
of light, Tractatus Opticus II explains Hobbes’s position in great detail. Hobbes begins this latin 
[sic] manuscript with a statement of the principles of light propagation, and then proceeds to a 
careful analysis of reflection, refraction, and vision in terms of the physical principles of 
propagation. [Frithiof] Brandt’s analysis of Hobbes’s motivation for writing Tractatus Opticus II 
explains why we find direct reference to Descartes in this treatise. Throughout the manuscript 
we see Hobbes grappling with very complex issues that were being addressed simultaneously by 
his contemporaries,” “Background,” In “Thomas Hobbes’s A Minute or First Draught of the 
Optiques: A Critical Edition” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1983), 
19. 
 
296 However, the references to antecedent sections that appear in the tract merely gesture to a 
previous section in which very general concepts and propositions (like “all action, [is] local 
motion in an agent” (Et quia demonstratum est in sectione antecedente omnem actionem, esse 
motum localem in agente…”) and so on are explicated, “Thomas Hobbes: Tractatus Opticus 
(Harley Mss. 6796, ff. 193-266),” ed. Franco Alessio, Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia 18, no. 
2 (1963), 148. Thus, the references, in themselves, do not persuasively demonstrate that Hobbes 
had an antecedent section in hand. 
 
297 J.W.N. Watkins points out the parallel, writing, “The Tract is a condensed, preliminary 
statement of Hobbes’s cosmology, psychology and ethics. With one exception, its ideas 
survived, essentially unaltered, into his later philosophical and political writings,” Hobbes’s 
System of Ideas (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1965), 42. Raylor draws the same 
conclusion while rejecting the attribution of the tract to Hobbes, musing, “It seems possible 
therefore that the value of A short tract on first principles has been mislocated. Rather than 
preserving Hobbes’s first attempt to expound a full-scale mechanist theory of reality, it perhaps 
preserves [Robert] Payne’s failure to do so; this failure may have prompted Hobbes to begin 
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natural philosophy (section one), optics and human nature (section two), and 
moral (and political) philosophy (section three). Whether spurred by 
Descartes’s words or work, or eager to make an impression on the members of 
the Paris circle298 (or both), Hobbes clearly both felt some pressure to publish 
and endeavored to make a philosophical splash.  
However, he had only a limited stock of publishable material available to 
him. It is unclear at what point the “Latin Optical Manuscript” was completed. 
And, what is more, Hobbes made no move to publish the tract on it was in 
hand. In fact, he did not produce a full, preliminary draft manuscript of his 
optics, titled “A first or minute draught on the optiques,” until 1646, and only 
then at the probable behest of Newcastle.299 He waited almost another decade 
to publish the material (albeit in a revised, condensed form). Thus, in the early 
1640s, with the material on optics and human nature not yet ripe for public 
 
work on a Section by Section response that eventually grew into the great Elementa 
philosophiae: De corpore, De homine, and De cive,” “Hobbes, Payne, and “A Short Tract on First 
Principles,” 56. The final inference pushes further than the relevant data allows. Though, as 
others point out, a rough draft of the second section of the series engages with the “Short 
Tract,” as noted above, it was conceived, at least in part, in response to the work of Descartes.  
 
298 In a recent essay, Baumgold and I contend, “Once back in Paris in 1640, it must have 
occurred to [Hobbes] that a good way to make his ideas accessible to Mersenne’s circle and 
build his reputation was to use the existing manuscript [The Elements of Law] as the basis for a 
work in the lingua franca of Continental philosophers and to frame the new work in the 
‘Elements of Philosophy’ scheme,” “Excavating On the Citizen,” in On the Citizen: A Critical 
Guide, eds. Robin Douglass and Johan Olsthoorn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2020), 15. 
 
299 The epistle dedicatory, addressed to Newcastle, notes, “All that I shall be ever able to adde to 
it, is polishing, for being the first draught it could not bee so perfect as I hope hereafter to make 
it in latine. Butt as it is, it will sufficiently give your Lordship satisfaction, in those quares you 
were pleased to make concerning this subject, I am content that it passe, in respect of some 
drosse that yet cleaves to it, for ore, (which is much better than old onds [sic] raked out of the 
kennel of Sophistors bookes) and for such I commend it to your Lord, and myself to your 
accustomed good Opinion, which hath been hitherto so greate honour to mee, as I am nott 
knowne to the world by anything so much as being,” “Thomas Hobbes’s A Minute or First 




consumption, Hobbes’s only option was to publish material that was well in 
hand: his political theory.300 
By November 1641, a year after having arrived in Paris, Hobbes had 
penned the preface for the new work, framed in terms that would have grabbed 
the attention of his Parisian contacts, including Mersenne (who supported the 
publication), and Digby, who both supplied financing for the project301 and had 
 
300 Hobbes does give different reasons in the preface to the second edition of De cive, 
explaining, “While I was filling it [the Elementa Philosophiae series] out, and putting it in order, 
writing slowly and painfully (for I was thinking it through not composing a rhetorical exercise), 
it happened that my country, some years before the civil war broke out, was already seething 
with questions of the right of Government and of the due obedience of citizens, forerunners of 
the approaching war. That was the reason why I put the rest aside and hurried on the 
completion of this third part,” On the Citizen, 13. It bears observing that, in outlines, the 
chronology Hobbes offers is plausible. The evidence supports the possibility that Hobbes 
turned to optics during the transitional period, as he relocated to Paris. Furthermore, it is 
equally plausible that the “approaching war” was an impetus for the edition, however, as 
expounded above, it is entirely unlikely that it was the only reason, or, perhaps, given the 
details of the first edition’s publication, even the principal one. That said, there is evidence in 
the text itself that Hobbes was composing some parts of the text with a narrow set of English 
readers in mind. For example, the volume is dedicated to William Cavendish, Earl of 
Devonshire, and at least twice, he uses metaphors and language that would have been 
appealing to members of the Welbeck group (Newcastle and Payne especially). For example, De 
cive features a new equestrian analogy in chapter 13, “The Duties of Those with Sovereign 
Power.” Newcastle, who was close to the Crown and at one point entrusted with responsibility 
of the education of Prince Charles, and, renowned for his love of horses and riding, surely 
would have found the analogy pleasing. Hobbes writes, “It does sometimes happen that just as 
one must coax a horse because he is fierce, so one must conciliate a defiant citizen because he 
is powerful,” On the Citizen, 149 [13.2]. Likewise, just a few paragraphs earlier, Hobbes relies on 
a metaphor that sits at square odds with his philosophy; however, the metaphor would have 
been received warmly by Newcastle (and probably Payne). Remarking on the collection of 
intelligence, Hobbes analogizes, “Reliable intelligence agents are to those who exercise 
sovereign power as rays of light to the human soul; and it is more correct to say of political 
sight than of natural sight that the perceptible and intelligible appearances of things are carried 
invisibly through the air to the soul (that is, to those who exercise the sovereign power of the 
commonwealth),” ibid, 145 [13.7]. The quotation, as rendered by Tuck and Silverthorne, 
contains an error of translation. The Latin makes it clear that it is the “species of external 
things” [species rerum externarum] that are being “carried invisibly through the air to the soul,” 
Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive, 143 [13.7]. In his correspondence and written 
works, Hobbes flatly rejected the existence of “species.” However, it is an idea that was 
embraced by Newcastle and possibly Payne.  
 
301 Howard Warrender writes, “It appears, moreover, that De Cive was published in part at least 
under the auspices of Sir Kenelm Digby, a friend of Hobbes, who was in Paris at the time, and 
that Digby financed the printing,” “Editor’s Introduction,” in De Cive: The Latin Version, ed. 




sent a copy of Descartes’s Discourse on Method (and Dioptrique) to Hobbes in 
1637.302 Titled Elementa Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive (“The Third Section 
of the Elements of Philosophy, On the Citizen”) the new work by Hobbes 
expressed an orientation and an ambition that reflected the geometrical 
bearing of many in the Paris circle, and specifically, the programmatic vision 
outlined in Descartes’s Discourse on Method. That vision, as Descartes explains 
in the Discourse, was tied up with the idea of geometricizing science, and as 
such, establishing a new basis for and system of philosophy: 
Those long chains composed of very simple and easy reasonings, which 
geometers customarily use to arrive at their most difficult 
demonstrations, had given me occasion to suppose that all the things 
which can fall under human knowledge are interconnected in the same 
way. And I thought that, provided we refrain from accepting anything as 
true which is not, and always keep to the order required for deducing 
one thing from another, there can be nothing too remote to be reached 
in the end or too well hidden to be discovered.303 
 
Hobbes intended the philosophical series to be comprised of “long chains…of 
simple and easy reasonings,” à la geometry, whose parts were set in some form 
of deductive order.304 The Cartesian-esque posture of the plan, and of De cive 
 
302 From Digby in October 1637: “I come now with this to make good wt j promise to you in my 
last: which is to putt Monsieur des Cartes (whom Mydorge so much admireth) his book into 
your hands,” “Letter 26: Sir Kenelm Digby to Hobbes, from London 11[/21] 1637,” 51. 
 
303 René Descartes, “Discourse on the Method,” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes vol. I, 
trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 15. 
 
304 William Sacksteder argues that it is entirely possible that mistaken notions of deductivity 
misrepresent the nature of the relationship between the parts of Hobbes philosophy, 
contending, “This succession is an order of dependence of posterior science on prior science 
[not unlike, if I may interject, a logic of subalternation]. It does not follow that it is an order of 
‘derivation’ or even demonstration solely. The most virulent of the textbook orthodoxies I 
oppose is that Hobbes’s philosophic scheme is ‘deductive’ in such a way that each posterior 
science may be deduced from that which precedes, and all of them, from one some ‘primary 
science,’” “Hobbes’s Science of Human Nature,” Hobbes Studies 3 (1990), 38. (The argument is 
discussed at some length in chapter 5.) Similarly, Tom Sorell argues, “What is more, [Hobbes] 
did not suppose that the links between the closely related sciences of geometry, mechanics, and 
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specifically, was obvious to some of Hobbes’s contemporaries. One, Samuel 
Sorbière, initially misidentified the volume, remarking in a letter to a friend 
that he thought it of Cartesian origin.305 
Yet, however new and on trend the privately published volume may have 
appeared to the small handful of Continental readers privileged enough to 
secure a copy,306 De cive was nothing more than a minimally re-organized, 
 
physics, were ‘deductive’ in the Cartesian sense. That is, he did not suppose that the sciences 
could all be ranged in a series that the mind could take in as it takes in a geometrical 
demonstration. All that Hobbes ever claims is that someone interested in getting as much 
knowledge as he can by the shortest route ought to acquire the sciences in the order he 
prescribes. He does not think that the results of the science that is last in the order of 
demonstration, i.e., the rules of behavior given in the sciences of politics, are remote 
consequences of the axioms of geometry. If there is a unifying principle to Hobbes’s ordering of 
sciences it is that motion is responsible for every class of natural effect. It is this principle that 
informs even Hobbes’s philosophy of mind, offending against Descartes’s categorical 
distinction between the theories of material and immaterial. But it is primarily a principle 
about what is common to the causes assigned by the sciences, not a principle about the 
structure of the sciences,” “Descartes, Hobbes and the Body of Natural Science,” The Monist 71, 
no. 4 (1988), 520. 
 
305 Of his encounter with the text (facilitated by Mersenne) Sorbière reports in a letter sent in 
early 1643 to Thomas de Martel, “The very little that we were able to read hastily in a quarter of 
an hour affected our minds remarkably,” and hypothesized, “I suspected that Descartes was the 
author,” only to learn from Descartes that “he would never publish anything on Morals,” while 
adding, “whoever be the Father, he is certainly not to the vulgar taste,” “Sorbière to Martel. 
Sluys, Flanders. 1 February 1643,” in De Cive: The Latin Version, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983), 300. 
 
306 Of the publication history of the first edition, Johann Sommerville notes, “The evidence of 
the printing and early reception of On the Citizen strongly suggests that from the first it was 
seen as a dangerous work which might bring trouble upon those concerned in its publication. 
Typically, authors and printers like to advertise and sell their books. In the case of the original 
printing of Hobbes’s work, the names of the writer and printer were concealed. We often read 
that On the Citizen was first published in Paris. We also read that it was privately printed. It 
was not published in the usual sense of the term. That is to say, it was circulated among some 
of Hobbes’s learned friends, not made available to the public. It was printed in Paris in 1642, 
but lacked the standard official license authorizing publication. The book – which is now very 
rare – appeared without the author’s name (though the dedication epistle to Devonshire was 
subscribed ‘T.H.’) and without the name of the printer. It also contained no information about 
how or where the readers might procure copies. Hugo Grotius reported in April 1643 that he 
thought the book was not for sale,” “On the Citizen and Church-State Relations,” in On the 
Citizen: A Critical Guide, eds. Robin Douglass and Johan Olsthoorn (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2020), 213-214. Sommerville goes on to add that, “Thomas de Martel wrote to 
Samuel Sorbière informing him that there had appeared in Paris ‘not indeed among the 
common sort, but among the choicer spirits’ a book On the Citizen ‘by an anonymous author.’ 
He observed that ‘it contains many paradoxes about the state and Religion’ and asserted that 
therefore it ‘is not available to everyone,’” ibid, 214. It is unclear to what extent Martel’s remarks 
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lightly revised, and in some areas, expanded edition of The Elements of Law.307 
At the same time, the genetic link between the two texts should not be allowed 
to overshadow differences. Notably, the new plan for a philosophical series 
pressed Hobbes to adapt The Elements of Law and reshape it to accommodate a 
new mold. Doing this entailed making adjustments to its scope, and, in 
particular, removing any content that belonged in another section of the 
philosophical series (i.e., in sections one or two). 
The Elements of Law opens with an outline of the text’s contents. At the 
time of its writing, Hobbes determined that the manuscript’s chapters could be 
grouped together under three broad headings and divided into two parts, with 
the first group of chapters in part one, the second two in part two. Part I of the 
text, organized under the header “Concerning men as persons natural,” 
 
should be allowed to inform assessments of the reasons for which the volume was printed 
privately, with the hallmarks Sommerville highlights. It was not uncommon, nor even for 
Hobbes, to publish works anonymously. Indeed, he had anonymously published a digest of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the mid-1630s. As regards the choice to print a small number of the 
volumes privately, it is possible, too, that the arrangement offered a middle path between 
scribal publication (The Elements of Law having been circulated as a manuscript) and a full 
printing. Similarly, Hobbes may have been reluctant to properly publish the third work of his 
philosophical trilogy first. That Hobbes, ultimately, thought it appropriate to publish a second 
edition of the work in 1647 suggests that he was not made entirely uncomfortable by the 
prospect of the wide, public circulation of his ideas. It is interesting that, in the period before 
the second edition was published, Hobbes grew paranoid, as his concerns turned not to the 
prospect of being filleted for publishing a controversial text, but rather, to possible interference 
from Descartes: “Furthermore, if M. Descartes hears of suspects that a book of mine (this or any 
other) is being assessed for publication, I know for certain that he will stop it if he can. Please 
believe me on this one thing, for I do know. I leave all the other precautions to you, as I am 
fully aware of both your prudence and your goodwill towards me,” “Letter 40: Hobbes to 
Samuel Sorbière, from Paris [6/] 16 May 1646,” in The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, 
ed. and trans. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 127. 
 
307 Baumgold records that “By November 1641, [Hobbes] had completed a revised, expanded and 
translated adaptation of the 1640 manuscript, giving it the title De Cive. In transforming the 
Elements into De Cive, Hobbes put the arguments into Latin, omitted the initial thirteen 
chapters on psychology and epistemology, and expanded two chapters on religion into an 
entire section,” “Editors Introduction,” in Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political 
Theory, ed. Deborah Baumgold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), xii. 
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includes chapters 1-19. In the set are a diverse range of chapters, including ones 
addressing, inter alias, human imagination and evaluative faculties (chapters 1-
6), including sense, imagination, mental discourse, reasoning, knowledge; 
“motive” faculties (chapters 7-9), including “delight and pain,” “good and evil,” 
“the pleasures of sense,” honor, “the passions of mind;” the idiosyncratic 
workings of human imagination (chapter 10), knowledge of God (chapter 11), 
deliberation (chapter 12), human discourse (chapter 13); “the condition of men 
in mere nature” (chapters 14-15); “natural laws” (chapters 16-18); and finally, 
“the necessity and definition of a body politic” (chapter 19). The final chapter of 
Part I of the text, on “the necessity and definition of a body politic,” introduces 
Part II and the chapter set that follows, which address the themes of the “body 
politic” (its origins, nature, and the causes of its dissolution) and the “nature 
and kinds of laws.”308 
Adapting The Elements of Law to the Elementa Philosophiae plan forced 
Hobbes to carve up the text and abandon the scheme and rubrics that 
originally organized it. The strategy he settled upon involved preserving the 
content on human nature – Part I, chapters 1-13 – for another yet-unnamed 
volume and using what remained309 – viz., Part I, chapters 14-19, and nearly all 
of Part II – as the basis for the third, political, section of the Elementa 
Philosophiae series. De cive’s index reflects the change in approach. The text 
 
308 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, xv-xvi. 
 
309 The first edition includes a handful of references that suggestively nod at the second section. 
As noted in the paragraph that follows, the first substantive paragraph of the work begins, “In 
the previous section the whole of human nature has been described, comprising the faculties of 




proceeds with a new organizational scheme, its chapters now grouped under 
three thematically differentiated headers, addressing the broad subjects of 
liberty, government, and religion.310 
However, the expository shift exacted a heavy price. The excision of 
(roughly) the first thirteen chapters of The Elements of Law from the chapter 
outline of De cive emaciated the argument and analysis. As Hobbes notes in 
The Elements of Law, the state of nature deduction, located in chapter 14 of the 
text (later re-presented as chapter 1 of De cive), presupposes support from 
“precedent chapters” wherein “the whole nature of man” was “set forth.” He 
explains, “In the precedent chapters hath been set forth the whole nature of 
man consisting in the powers natural of his body and mind, and may all be 
comprehended in these four: strength of body, experience, reason, and 
passion.”311 The line, copied verbatim, opens De cive;312 but, unlike in The 
Elements of Law, the presupposed empirical material appears nowhere in the 
book. Hobbes’s revisions reveal a sensitivity to the loss of substantive 
anchoring. 
II. The empirical foundations of De cive 
 
 
310 Ibid, 17. 
 
311 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 53 [14.1]. 
 
312 The sentences of the first paragraph of the first chapter of the first edition read, “In the 
previous section the whole of human nature has been described, comprising the faculties of 
both body and mind; they may all be reduced to four kinds; which are, Physical force, 
Experience, Reason and Passion. We shall begin the present section with a consideration of the 
human condition, namely, what attitude men have towards each other, being gifted with these 




Accounting for the excision of empirical content demanded that Hobbes 
adapt the analysis to hold its own weight. The new-found concern for the 
empirical durability of the political analysis delivered in De cive is apparent, we 
will see, in the framing of the text and embeds some of De cive’s most visible 
features and elements of exposition, including its epistle dedicatory and a 
new(ish) first chapter.313 The concern also motivated other revisions, having 
pushed Hobbes to re-couch fine analytical judgments and experiment with 
different solutions that could address the loss of empirical content. 
While building on themes presented in The Elements of Law’s thirteenth 
chapter, the content of De cive’s epistle dedicatory is mostly new and bespeaks 
a key difference between the two texts. Whereas the political theory advanced 
in The Elements of Law depends, at least in part, on an analysis human 
“discretive” and “motive”314 faculties that draws influence from the principle of 
motion, the epistle dedicatory of De cive puts that text on different footing. 
Hamstrung by the Elementa Philosophiae plan, Hobbes used the epistle 
dedicatory to frame the political theory of De cive as originating in principles 
plausibly sturdy enough to stand without the empirical analysis given in The 
Elements of Law.315 The political theory of De cive, Hobbes’s epistle dedicatory 
 
313 See the precis outline comparing the two texts in Baumgold’s Three-Text Edition of Thomas 
Hobbes’s Political Theory, 127-128. 
 
314 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, xv. 
 
315 Writing in a way that is reminiscent of the analytical “mood” so characteristic of Descartes’s 
work (for more on this, see the chapter on De corpore), the Meditations on First Philosophy 
specifically, Hobbes, in the epistle dedicatory, recounts, “And so when I turned my thoughts to 
the inquiry about natural justice I was alerted by the very name of justice (by which is meant a 
constant will to give every man his right) to ask first how it is that anyone ever spoke of 
something as his own rather than another’s; and when it was clear that it did not originate in 
nature but in human agreement (for human beings have been distributed what nature had placed 
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impresses, emerges from “two absolutely certain postulates of human nature.” 
The first is “the postulate of human greed by which each man insists upon his 
own private use of common property; the other, the postulate of natural reason, 
by which each man strives to avoid violent death as the supreme evil in 
nature.”316  
Without the material from The Elements of Law to lean on, De cive, by 
necessity, put the postulates at the center of the analysis. The adjustment is 
most visible with respect to the place of the postulate of natural avarice 
(cupiditas hominis naturalis)317 in De cive’s first chapter. The content for the 
chapter was reworked and expanded to position Hobbes’s theory of human 
nature against Aristotelian or neo-Stoic alternatives. Specifically, he chides that 
“previous writers on public Affairs”318 had held a “superficial view of human 
nature”319 and used the wrongheaded premise that “Man is an animal…born fit 
for Society”320 as ballast for their theory of society formation.321 On the contrary, 
 
in common), I was led from there to another question, namely, for whose benefit and under what 
necessity, when all things belonged to all men, they preferred that each man should have things 
that belonged to himself alone. And I saw that war and every kind of calamity must necessarily 
follow from community in things, as men came into violent conflict over their use; a thing all seek 
by nature to avoid. Thus I obtained two absolutely certain postulates of human nature, one, the 
postulate of human greed by which each man insists upon his own private use of common 
property; the other, the postulate of natural reason, by which each man strives to avoid violent 
death as the supreme evil in nature,” On the Citizen, 5-6 [Epistle Dedicatory 9-10]. 
 
316 Ibid, 6 [Epistle Dedicatory 10]. 
 
317 Hobbes, Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive, 7 [1.7]. 
 
318 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 21 [1.2]. 
 
319 Ibid, 22 [1.2]. 
 
320 Ibid, 21-22 [1.2]. 
 
321 For an extended treatment of the argument, juxtaposed with the work of one of its intended 
targets (Aristotle), see Nicholas Gooding and Kinch Hoekstra’s “Hobbes and Aristotle on the 
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Hobbes judges, “the origin of large and lasting societies lay not in mutual 
human benevolence but in men’s mutual fear”322 – in the psychological states 
and “dangers” that emanate from “men’s natural cupidity.”323 As he writes later 
in the chapter, “Amid so many dangers therefore from men’s natural cupidity, 
that threaten every man every day, we cannot be blamed for looking out for 
ourselves; we cannot will to do otherwise.”324 In other words, the postulate was 
made into an empirical anchor for Hobbes’s political theory, his ideas about the 
tenability of human relations in the state of nature, where property is held in 
common,325 in particular.  
The table below parallels the relevant quotation from De cive with its 
precursor in The Elements of Law to illustrate Hobbes’s process of adaptation. 
As the parallels show, Hobbes refined and honed the argument from The 
 
Foundation of Political Science,” in On the Citizen: A Critical Guide, eds. Robin Douglass and 
Johan Olsthoorn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 31-50.  
 
322 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 24 [1.2]. 
 




325 These ideas plausibly offer an alternative to Hugo Grotius’s, a possibility Gooding and 
Hoekstra may reject, when they argue, “careful scholars have concluded that Hobbes’s 
purported disagreement with Aristotle involves a basic misunderstanding or a careless or 
deliberate distortion; or (more charitably) that Hobbes’s real target was not Aristotle himself, 
but some scholastic or neo-Stoic permutation,” “Hobbes and Aristotle on the Foundation of 
Political Science,” 32. Working forward from the premise that humans, naturally chummy, 
clump together to create societies, Grotius promoted the strong impression that natural law 
would compel human action, even in nature. For example, natural law would compel the 
abstention “from that which is another’s, the restoration to another of anything of his which he 
may have, together with any gain which we may receive from it,” De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres 
vol. II, trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 5-6. He also believed that 
strong forms of accountability would obtain by virtue of natural law, such as “the obligation to 
fulfil promises, the making good of a loss incurred through our fault, and the inflicting of 
penalties upon men according to their deserts,” ibid. In other words, Grotius populated “the 
state of nature with a comprehensive system of rights and duties,” that, in design and content, 
“are extraordinarily robust,” Straumann, Benjamin, Roman Law in the State of Nature: The 




Elements of Law and, as he did so, explicitly marked out and centered the 
postulate of natural cupidity, making it into a fundamental piece of his analysis 
of the circumstances that precipitate the war of all against all in the state of 
nature.  
Table 3.1: A Comparison of The Elements of Law, 16.4 and De cive, 1.7 
The Elements of Law, 14.6326 De cive, 1.7327 
And forasmuch as necessity of nature 
maketh men to will and desire 
bonum sibi, that which is good for 
themselves, and to avoid that which 
is hurtful; but most of all that terrible 
enemy of nature, death, for whom we 
expect both the loss of all power, and 
also the greatest of bodily pains in 
the losing; it is not against reason 
that a man doth all he can to 
preserve his own body and limbs, 
both from death and pain. And that 
which is not against reason, men call 
RIGHT, or jus, or blameless liberty of 
using our own natural power and 
ability. It is therefore a right of 
nature: that every man may preserve 
his own life and limbs, with all the 
power he hath. 
Amid so many dangers therefore 
from men’s natural cupidity, that 
threaten every man every day, we 
cannot be blamed for looking out for 
ourselves; we cannot will to do 
otherwise. For each man is drawn to 
desire that which is Good for him and 
to Avoid what is bad for him, and 
most of all the greatest of natural 
evils, which is death; this happens by 
a real necessity of nature as powerful 
as that by which a stone falls 
downward. It is not therefore absurd, 
nor reprehensible, nor contrary to 
right reason, if one makes every effort 
to defend his body and limbs from 
death and to preserve them. And 
what is not contrary to right reason, 
all agree is done justly and of Right. 
For precisely what is meant by the 
term Right is the liberty each man 
has of using his natural faculties in 
accordance with right reason. 
Therefore the first foundation of 
natural Right is that each man protect 
his life and limbs as much as he can. 
 
Hamstrung by the avowedly political scope of the work, the premise of 
natural cupidity was amplified, and made to bear the considerable weight of 
Hobbes’s political theory. If applied to De cive, the assessment that Hobbes 
 
326 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 54. 
 




strained to “secure the logical independence of his ethics from his moral 
psychology”328 gets Hobbes’s aims backward. He did not aim to “secure the 
logical independence of his ethics from his moral psychology.” Instead, he 
endeavored for the opposite, having sought to empirically ground his ethics in 
his moral psychology, without furnishing a full treatment of it.  
Yet, however sturdy Hobbes considered the two “absolutely certain”329 
postulates of natural avarice and self-preservation to be, he was aware of how 
the missing chapter set from The Elements of Law empirically compromised the 
argument featured in De cive. The excisions, coupled with the knowledge that 
the second volume of the Elementa Philosophiae series was not yet in hand, put 
Hobbes on the horns of a dilemma, faced with a puzzle for which there was no 
easy solution. How would he compose the third section of the Elementa 
Philosophiae without the second?  
Hobbes squared the circle with “indubitable introspectables.”330 He used 
universal experience, statements of how the world is, combined with 
invocations of personal (and often common) experience to substantiate the 
statements, to bridge or fill in the gap left open by the excised material. As a 
result, the concept of universal experience became integral to his political 
 
328 John Deigh writes, “The definitivist interpretation takes seriously Hobbes’s express 
understanding of ethics as a science and his conception of science as proceeding by deductive 
inferences from definitions. The understanding and conception secure the logical 
independence of his ethics from his moral psychology, given Hobbes’s view as to what makes a 
definition correct. His ethics is logically independent in that its theorems have no other ground 
than the definition on which it is based.” The conclusion, drawn in the paragraph above, 
suggests that the assessment, as applied by Deigh to Leviathan, may be untenable, “Reason and 
Ethics in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” 59. 
 
329 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 6 [Epistle Dedicatory 10]. 
 
330 Lloyd, Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Cases in the Law of Nature, 212. 
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theory, and a more prominent feature of his political methodology. Put 
differently, the absence of the extended (causal) analysis of human nature 
found in The Elements required a change in how Hobbes went about 
empirically grounding the political analysis of De cive. To solve the problem, he 
used universal experience (in the form of the “indubitable introspectables” of 
natural cupidity, and especially, self-preservation) as a substantive substitute 
for the missing material. And, in many instances, personal (and often common) 
evidence and observations were used to demonstrate the universality and 
empirical integrity of the two premises – to demonstrate to his reader that both 
are evidently true, sufficiently universally experienced as to make them 
unimpeachably, ineluctably correct.  
Specifically, Hobbes used vivid examples, drawn from personal 
(presumably common) experience to empirically substantiate the universally 
true premises feeding his political analysis. Thus, he, similar to Hugo Grotius, 
relied on a mix of a priori and a posteriori reasoning, a method and approach to 
argumentation that corresponds with the prescriptions of Ciceronian (and 
Aristotelian) rhetoric.331 However, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
 
331 Straumann writes, “The bifurcation of his argument that Grotius undertook in Prolegomena 
40 with his reference to the consensus among various ‘testimonies,’ on the one hand, and to 
‘certain principles’ (notiones certae), on the other, is not remarkable simply because Grotius 
here connected two different rhetorical lines of argument in an exceptionally intricate way. It 
corresponds to a dichotomy in rhetoric of the type suggested by Quintilian, following Cicero 
and most Greek rhetoricians: induction and reasoning (ratiocinatio). In the first chapter of the 
first book of De iure belli ac pacis, a chapter dedicated to identifying natural law, in a paragraph 
bearing the heading ‘How the Law of Nature may be proved’…Grotius provided a more detailed 
discussion of the two fundamentally different proofs of natural law, which in his view 
supplemented one another.” He continues in the paragraph that follows, “Deviating 
terminologically from the methodological passages in the Prolegomena cited above, the two 
main types of natural law proofs are described here as a priori, on the one hand, and a 
posteriori, on the other. The a priori proof of natural law apparently corresponds to a method, 
introduced by Grotius in the Prolegomena and just explained, involving deduction of things 
belonging to natural law from notiones certae or self-evident principles through valid 
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Hobbes’s invocations of universal experience put him closer to scientific works 
with which he would have been, then, engaging. He used universal experience 
as a way to flag analytical judgments as so empirically evident as not to require 
sustained defense.  
Hobbes also relied on the inherited moral discourse of “right reason” to 
establish the empirical tenability of the second postulate – self-preservation – 
and deductions ostensibly predicated thereon. Put another way, Hobbes 
converted “right reason” into a cognate of universal experience, using it to 
express the principles (or content) of universal experience. This section 
concludes with a discussion of Hobbes’s invocations of universal and personal 
(or common) experience; the section that follows offers an analysis of Hobbes’s 
generous use of the concept of “right reason,” a feature that distinguishes De 
cive from every other text in the Hobbesian oeuvre.332 
Without a cache of empirical material to buttress key pieces of analysis 
that make up the political theory of The Elements of Law, Hobbes, in De cive, 
pivoted to different kinds of experience. The conclusion is borne out by the first 
chapter of the text. In the chapter is found wholly new exposition, a new 
 
argumentation…This in turn corresponds to the rhetorical method of logical substantiation and 
reasoning…Essentially, the distinction made by Grotius between the more compelling a priori 
and the more popular a posteriori reasoning harks back to Quintilian, and originally to the two 
forms of dialectical method described by Aristotle – specifically, the description of the 
dialectical syllogism and induction (epagoge) in the Topica, with which Grotius was familiar,” 
Roman Law in the State of Nature: The Classical Foundations of Hugo Grotius’s Natural Law, 67. 
 
332 Robert Greene counts that the phrase “occurs just four times in The Elements of Law, forty-
three times as recta ratio or a variant in De cive, a work one and one half times longer, and is 
largely abandoned in the English Leviathan, appearing only ten times, seven of which are on a 
single page, in a volume rightly called ‘prodigious’ by a contemporary reader. It was more than 
three times the length of either previous book,” “Thomas Hobbes and the Term ‘Right Reason:’ 




expanse of analysis used to set up and elaborate key principles and judgments 
that feed into his explanations of the state of nature and society formation. Just 
as in the larger text, 333 the analysis is threaded with observations that draw on 
personal (and presumably common) experiences and includes an invocation of 
universal experience. Both are used as a buttress, to prop up and lend empirical 
credibility to the analysis.  
The crucial passage lays out undergirding material that supports 
conclusions Hobbes draws about moral reasoning, the mechanics of human 
desire, and the conditions that drive individuals to create social and political 
order. In the passage he is intent on knocking down the premise of “natural 
sociability,” and asks his reader to consider what happens when groups of 
people sit down to “swap stories.” What follows, he writes, is not attentive, 
empathetic listening. Rather, the interlocutors listen only for the purpose of 
engaging in an accelerating game of one-upmanship – what is sought, he 
explains, is “advantage.” Hobbes analyzes, 
And if people happen to be sitting around swapping stories, and 
someone produces one about himself, every one of the others also talks 
 
333 The observations address a range of subjects; examples include asymmetrical warfare, 
hypocrisy, inflated self-assessments, restraint in interstate conflict, the unity of sovereign 
power, and frivolous competition between men of leisure, Hobbes, On the Citizen, 29 [1.12], 33 
[2.1], 49 [3.13], 69 [5.2], 82 [6.13], 138 [12.10]. The text also uses empirical examples and tropes as 
an analogical device to prove points, as when Hobbes expounds “each man is drawn to desire 
that which is Good for him and to Avoid what is bad for him, and most of all the greatest of 
natural evils, which is death; this happens by a real necessity of nature as powerful as that by 
which a stone falls downward,” ibid, 27 [1.7]; “one has to realize that when men enter into 
society there are differences of opinion among them which spring from the diversity of their 
passions…like differences among stones collected for construction, which arise from their 
differences of material and shape. A stone of rough and irregular shape takes more space from 
the others than it falls itself, it cannot be compressed or cut because it is so hard, but it 
prevents the structure from being fitted together, so it is thrown away as unsuitable,” ibid, 48 
[3.9]; “LIBERTY (to define it) is simply the absence of obstacles to motion; as water contained in a 
vessel is not free, because the vessel is an obstacle to its flowing away, and it is freed by breaking 




very eagerly about himself; if one of them says something sensational, 
the others bring out sensations too, if they have any; if not, they make 
them up…So clear is it from experience to anyone who gives any 
serious attention to human behavior, that every voluntary encounter is a 
product either of mutual need or of pursuit of glory; hence when people 
meet, what they are anxious to get is either an advantage for 
themselves…which is reputation and honor among their companions.  
Reason reaches the same conclusions from the actual definitions 
of Will, Good, Honor and Interest [as “derived from the previous 
section”334]. For since a society is a voluntary arrangement, what is 
sought in every society is an Object of will, i.e. something which seems 
to each one of the members to be Good for himself…All society…exists 
for the sake either of advantage or of glory, i.e. it is a product of love of 
self, not love of friends. 
 
The purpose of the invocation of universal experience (the first of two 
bolded phrases), and the extended description of people “sitting around 
swapping stories,” was to close in gaps in the analysis left open by the excision 
of material from The Elements of Law. The second bolded sentence, beginning 
with the word “Reason,” tells the story. By necessity, “Reason,” Hobbes writes, 
“reaches the same conclusions” as universal experience, but “from the actual 
definitions of Will, Good, Honor, and Interest.” In the first edition of the De cive 
Hobbes notes that the definition of each term – will, good, honor, and interest 
– were “derived” from a “previous section,” i.e., from the chapters excluded 
from De cive. In other words, the absence of a full treatment examining the 
nature of “Will, Good, Honor, Interest” – as of the kind that was delivered in The 
Elements of Law – pushed Hobbes to marshal personal (but nevertheless 
 
334 The reference to a previous section, which I have interpolated into the passage, appears in 
the first, but not the second edition of De cive; the translation, as “derived from a previous 
section,” is Howard Warrender’s, De Cive: English Version (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 43 
n. b. While plausibly giving defensible meaning to Hobbes’s words (superior sectione traditis), 
Warrender’s translation of traditis can be reworked to better comport with Hobbes’s 
philosophical intent. The participle, traditis, might also be translated as “delivered” (as in a 
demonstration), a translation that better accords with the pedagogical point Hobbes draws in 




common) observations (“people…sitting around swapping stories”) to prop up 
statements of universal experience: arguments about the conditions that 
engender society, and the states of mind and features of human nature that 
precipitate those conditions.  
III. The role of “right reason” in De cive 
 
Among the differences between The Elements of Law and De cive, there 
is one that represents a source of enduring friction between the two texts. In 
The Elements of Law Hobbes maligned the moral concept of “right reason.” 
Such a “common,” unimpeachable moral “measure,” Hobbes mocked, “is not 
existent” nor “found or known in rerum natura [in the nature of things].”335 In 
De cive Hobbes changed his tune, having executed a stunning volte-face. The 
shift is registered straight off in the text’s epistle dedicatory, which notes that 
“True Wisdom is simply the knowledge of truth in every subject,” it is a matter of 
“right Reason, i.e. of Philosophy.”336 The persistent use of the language of “right 
reason” in De cive represents a principal point of differentiation, distinguishing 
the text from most other Hobbesian works.337  
Although, on the whole, Hobbes’s works used the concept sparingly, 
“right reason” features frequently in early modern discourse.338 It is also a term 
 
335 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 150 [29.8]. 
 
336 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 4 [Epistle Dedicatory 4]. 
 
337 See footnote 332 for a tally of the number of instances of the phrase in each major Hobbesian 
work. 
 
338 Robert Hoopes, tracing the trajectory of “right reason” through the relevant periods, 
remarks, “‘The meanings of ‘reason’ in the seventeenth century,’ as Douglas Bush has remarked, 
‘admit a wide solution,’ and if this study were to undertake to examine all of those meanings its 
solution – to risk a pun – would be a muddy one at best. So far as right reason is concerned, 
although its adversaries multiply [among whom Hobbes would have been counted one], it is 
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with significant theoretical purchase in intellectual traditions upon which 
Hobbes’s work built,339 the traditions of Ciceronian, Thomist, and neo-Stoic 
natural jurisprudence in particular. These traditions of natural jurisprudence 
gave “right reason” a meaning that nods at ancient Greek antecedents, building 
on a view of “reason” as a “human and a divine property…which judges not only 
the truth and falsity of a proposition, but,” critically, “the rightness and 
wrongness of an act as well.”340 In typical conceptualizations of “right reason” 
can be found elements of the ancient Greek view. Right reason often combines 
“truth” and “right,” knowledge and virtue, “the ratiocinative and syllogistic 
faculty” with “an ethical and rational conscience,” rooted in nature and the 
divine, which “makes one…a better and wiser human being.”341 As a faculty, 
“right reason” makes possible practical judgements that are, simultaneously, 
epistemically and morally sound. 
Robert Greene notes it is likely Hobbes encountered “right reason” at 
Oxford.342 There, the concept had utility as both a pedagogical and heuristic-
 
actually reaffirmed during the first two thirds of the century with greater vitality and precision 
than ever before,” Right Reason in the English Renaissance (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1962), 160. 
 
339 In “Roman and Thomistic natural jurisprudence” specifically, Baumgold and Harding, 
“Excavating On the Citizen,” 24. 
 
340 Hoopes, Right Reason in the English Renaissance, 31. 
 
341 Richard Arnold, Logic of the Fall: Right Reason and [Im]pure Reason in Milton’s Paradise Lost 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 3. 
 
342 In his article, Robert Greene explores the use of “right reason” as a pedagogical tool and a 
common curricular feature, writing, “Students at Oxford and Cambridge in the first half of the 
seventeenth century, including Hobbes, learned about right reason in three languages in their 
study of prescribed classical and medieval authors. Linked with the natural law, it was a 
primary component of the study of moral philosophy. Students were also encouraged in 
expected to exercise it in their personal moral conduct, as an historian of Oxford University has 
recently confirmed: ‘Morality was understood in terms of the capacity of the individual to will 
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moral tool. It comprised a “primary component of the study of moral 
philosophy” and was also incorporated into the code of conduct by which 
students, like Hobbes, were bound: “Students were…encouraged and expected 
to exercise [right reason] in their personal moral conduct,” notes Greene.343  
The concept was also a visible feature of Hobbes’s discursive 
environment. In The religion of protestants a safe vvay to salvation (1638), 
William Chillingworth, a famous English ecclesiastic and occasional associate344 
of Hobbes’s, relied on the theoretical force of “right reason” to defend the 
capacity of conscience to correctly steer individuals toward divine “principles of 
nature.” “[R]ight reason,” he explains, is “grounded on Divine revelation and 
common notions, written by God in the hearts of all men,” from which they 
“deduc[e], according to the never failing rules of Logick, consequent deductions 
from them.”345  
In the work of Francisco Suárez the “principles of nature” Chillingworth 
describes are marked out as precepts of natural law, a concept Suárez packaged 
 
that which conformed to the dictates of right reason; by extension within such a framework, 
moral philosophy was viewed as a direct and necessary corollary of right reason,’” “Thomas 




344 As A.P. Martinich notes, Chillingworth was not an unfamiliar figure to Hobbes, having been 
a member of the Great Tew circle: “From about 1634 until the beginning of the Short 
Parliament, a group of young men used to meet to discuss a variety of intellectual subjects. 
They are known as the Great Tew circle because they met at the Oxfordshire estate of Great 
Tew, owned by the de facto leader of the group, Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland,” Hobbes: A 
Biography, 102-103. The circle comprised a vast range of familiar figures, among whom was 
Chillingworth: “William Chillingworth wrote his famous Religious of Protestants (1638) there. 
Anthony Wood reported that Hobbes said that Chillingworth was like ‘a lusty fighting fellow 
that did drive his enemies before him, but would often give his own part smart back blows,’” 
ibid, 104.  
 




together with “right reason.” Suárez’s description of “right reason” was typical. 
It is represented as a moral and epistemic power that facilitates access to the 
perfect moral propositions of natural law. He theorizes circularly that 
“[N]atural law cannot be corrected, as it is posited by right reason, which 
cannot deviate from the truth, for if it does deviate, it is not right reason.”346  
As Suárez did and many others had done,347 Hugo Grotius linked “right 
reason” with natural law. In De jure belli ac pacis (1625), Grotius defines the 
“law of nature” as “a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, 
according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality 
of moral baseness or moral necessity…such an act is either forbidden or 
enjoined by the author of nature, God.”348  
At a glance, Hobbes’s deployments of the term encompass a full range of 
available meanings. As noted by others,349 the definition of natural law given in 
De cive, which portrays natural law as a “Dictate of right reason,”350 finds 
 
346 The quotation is reproduced, as present in James Gordley’s “Suárez and Natural Law,” in The 
Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, eds. Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 217. 
 
347 Sommerville writes, “The idea that right reason tells us the contents of the law of nature was 
utterly conventional. Though the practices of nations might be a helpful guide to natural law, 
said Grotius, right reason was the ultimate ground for establishing that some practice was in 
fact according to the law of nature. ‘The law of nature,’ he said, ‘is the dictate of right reason, 
showing the moral necessity or moral baseness of any act according to its agreement or 
disagreement with rational nature.’ In the opinion of Hooker, ‘the lawes of well doing are the 
dictates of right reason.’ The law of nature, said Donne, is ‘but Dictatem retae rationis’ (the 
dictate of right reason). Suarez said much the same thing. The notion was, indeed, a scholastic 
commonplace,” Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 45. 
 
348 Hugo Grotius, Hugo Grotius: On the Law of War and Peace (Student Edition), ed. Stephen C. 
Neff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 28-29. 
 
349 See Sommerville’s analysis, and conclusion that “The notion was…a scholastic 
commonplace” in footnote 347. 
 




correspondence in Grotius’s. Like Suárez, Hobbes makes right reason 
synonymous with truth, writing, “True Wisdom is simply the knowledge of truth 
in every subject…it is not a matter of momentary flashes of penetrating insight, 
but of right Reason, i.e. of Philosophy.”351 And like Chillingworth, who 
contended that “[R]ight reason” is “grounded on Divine revelation and 
common notions, written by God in the hearts of all men,” from which they 
“deduc[e], according to the never failing rules of Logick, consequent deductions 
from them,” Hobbes asserts both that “divine law lies in right reason” – 
remarking that “reason, which is the law of nature itself, has been given to each 
and every man directly by God as a Rule for his actions” – and that right reason 
entails the derivation of “some truth reached by correct [syllogistic352] 
reasoning from true principles.”  
In sum, Hobbes took advantage of the different, but overlapping 
resonances of “right reason,” a term that, in De cive, refers to the working out of 
moral-practical rules by means of philosophical-scientific – that is, syllogistic – 
reasoning. As William Frankena outlines, “from Aristotle to modern times, the 
operation of the ethical faculty, or of reason or intellect qua practical matters of 
what ought to be done, involved three things.” First, “some kind of grasp of 
general first principles or premises to start from.” Second, “a deduction from 
those secondary principles.” And, finally, third, “an application of principles in 
determining what to do in particular cases.”353 Hobbes’s various uses and his 
 
351 Ibid, 4 [Epistle Dedicatory 4]. 
 
352 Ibid, 232 [17.28]. 
 
353 William Frankena, “The Ethics of Right Reason,” The Monist 66, no. 1 (1983), 8. 
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conception of “right reason” approximate the general features of right-reason 
discourse, as delineated by Frankena. 
However, Hobbes’s was not a rote or mechanical reproduction of a 
common discourse. “Right reason” was remade and recombined with new, 
novel elements to serve the singular analytical and theoretical needs that 
accompanied production of De cive. In particular, Hobbes took the traditional 
concept of “right reason” and imported new, substantive content into it: the 
content of universal experience. “Right reason” was used to validate the 
empirical tenability of reasoning on the basis of self-preservation, to establish 
self-preservation as an evident, true principle of universal experience. In other 
words, the concept of “right reason” became conceptually bound up with, and 
an extension of the concept of universal experience. It was a solution, of a piece 
with explicit invocations of universal experience, to demonstrate self-
preservation as a fundamental human drive, so finely and extensively wired 
into human nature, as to make it indubitable. 
Hobbes’s embrace of “right reason” to promote claims of universal 
experience is not an interpretive position with a direct precedent in the 
secondary literature.  Although small, the literature treating Hobbes’s use of 
“right reason” does posit a variety of rationales for the embrace. The first 
category includes interpreters who are squarely interested in explicating the 
meaning of “right reason” as a moral concept – not, strictly speaking, Hobbes’s 
embrace of it. Members of the group see the use of right reason as inextricably 
linked to the theoretical terrain over which De cive works, moral philosophy, 
and, as such, specify right reason as: “correct prudential reasoning about 
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interpersonal behavior;”354 “the law, which for [the individuals who “covenant 
to set up a sovereign”] is the infallible rule of moral goodness;”355 evidence that 
“Hobbes agrees with Kant on the ‘imperative’ character of the moral law;”356 an 
“ethics and politics” “grounded in a radically subjectivist thesis concerning the 
nature of value;”357 and so on. While the individual specifications can be 
debated, the descriptive point endorsed by the work of this set of scholars – 
that, for Hobbes, “right reason” was a concept with moral purchase, used 
within the context of adumbrating a moral philosophy – cannot be. At the same 
time, the descriptive point overlooks important dimensions of Hobbes’s use of 
the concept, ignoring how it was used to address a real, knotty empirical issue 
that resulted from a change in his philosophical plans.  
In the second category is Andrea Bardin. Bardin connects the turn to 
“right reason” to the changing architecture of Hobbes’s political theory. Bardin 
distinguishes The Elements of Law from De cive by focusing on the way in which 
The Elements posits a political theory, conception of reason and science, and so 
on, borne of Hobbes’s interest in rendering a politics anchored in a physical 
explanation of the effects of motion on the human mind, modeled on optics. 
Thus, Bardin argues that whereas the political theory and science of The 
Elements is anchored in ontological explanation (i.e., in the physics of human 
 
354 Gregory Kavka, “Right Reason and Natural Law in Hobbes’s Ethics,” The Monist 66, no. 1 
(1983), 121. 
 
355 David Gauthier, “Hobbes: The Laws of Nature,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001), 271. 
 
356 A.E. Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes,” Philosophy 13, no. 52 (1938), 409. 
 




mind), the vision elaborated in De cive is markedly epistemological, based in 
natural-law principles358 instead of a substantive diagnosis of human powers (à 
la natural philosophy).359 It is possible to “argue,” says Bardin, “that in The 
Elements of Law the attribution of a ‘motive power’ to reason and science [i.e., 
that reason and science are “powers and acts of the mind”360] is strictly related 
to the claim of an ontological homogeneity between the objects of civil and 
natural philosophy,”361 Hobbes having believed that it is possible to “reduce all 
epistemological questions to a physics of sensation, and, ultimately, to the 
optical model of a theory of light.”362  
Bardin claims that Hobbes fell short of his aim of “providing” a durable 
“ontological description of the body politic:” “he had failed to provide a 
complete geometrical ‘deduction’ of the body politic and its knowledge from 
the mechanical knowledge of matter in motion.”363 It was in response to the 
failure, Bardin argues, that Hobbes sought out new, epistemological 
foundations for his political theory. “In The Elements of Law he had assumed 
that mechanical understanding and geometrical deduction of the body politic 
 
358 Andrea Bardin, “Materialism and Right Reason in Hobbes’s Political Treatises: A Troubled 
Foundation for Civil Science,” 94. 
 
359 Ibid, 90. 
 




362 Ibid, 96. 
 




would correspond and even overlap, following the example provided by 
optics;”364 however, in  
De cive [De cive] he was attacking the same problem on entirely different 
grounds, by developing the third part of a philosophical system in which 
every science…had to be grounded on general principles, definitions and 
terminology established by first philosophy according with the model of 
geometry.365 
 
It is to this programmatic shift in philosophy and methodology that 
Bardin connects Hobbes’s sudden reliance on “right reason.” Bardin notes that 
“Although it sometimes functions as a rhetorical device, in the work [De cive] 
right reason generally corresponds to the ideal of a perfect science of natural 
law independent of any powers, including political power.”366 Thus, “right 
reason” is construed as a symptom of a deeper, wider shift in thinking about 
what the foundations of science, including a civil science, should be.  
Yet, there is reason to doubt that any such shift took place. That Hobbes 
felt “he had failed to provide a complete geometrical ‘deduction’ of the body 
politic and its knowledge from the mechanical knowledge of matter in motion” 
is not supported by contemporaneous texts, and is a conclusion against which 
the text of De cive itself militates. Recall: De cive begins with an 
acknowledgement, which grants as true the content of the missing chapters 
from The Elements of Law. In the first sentence of the De cive, taken over from 










nature has been described, comprising the faculties of both body and mind; 
they may all be reduced to four kinds; which are, Physical force, Experience, 
Reason and Passion.” To this, Hobbes adds, “We shall begin the present section 
with a consideration of the human condition, namely, what attitude men have 
towards each other, being gifted with these natural endowments.”367 The 
statement contains no indication of failure, that Hobbes believed “he had failed 
to provide a complete geometrical ‘deduction’ of the body politic and its 
knowledge from the mechanical knowledge of matter in motion.” Instead, in De 
cive, the rest of the “geometrical ‘deduction’ of the body politic…from the 
mechanical knowledge of matter in motion” operates as shadow scaffolding, 
invisible to the reader, but nevertheless present, supporting the exposition. And 
on occasion the reader is even clued in on the existence of this invisible 
scaffolding, as when the text draws the reader’s attention to the existence of a 
“previous section”368 in which certain concepts and explanations are laid bare. 
The third pattern of interpretation explores a possibility at which Bardin 
quickly nods: that “right reason” is (possibly cynical) rhetorical window-
dressing, employed either in response to considerations vis-à-vis audience or, 
as Michael LeBuffe contends, “insincerely,” to “mak[e] an abbreviated and 
 
367 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 21 n. 1. 
 
368 Warrender records four instances in which Hobbes nods thusly; see: De Cive: English 
Version, 41 n. b-b, 43 n. b, 54 n. a, 85 n. a-a. Also see Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De 
Cive, 2 [1.1], 4 [1.2], 15 [2.7], 52 [5.1]. Warrender indicates (43 n. b) that the reference to a 
preceding section originally found in 1.2 (see footnote 334) was retained in the second edition of 




hastily prepared version of his argument seem plausible.”369 The first 
explanation is floated by Robert Greene,370 who offers that the “commitment” 
to the discourse of “right reason” “may well have had its roots in his [Hobbes’s] 
decision to write in Latin,”371 which was “motivated by his residence in Paris at 
the time, his inclusion in the Mersenne circle, and his intention to address its 
members, unfamiliar with the English language, as well as a university-
educated English and European readership.”372 Greene adds that “The 
‘extremely limited’ distribution of the 1642 printing of De cive may have been in 
his mind when he chose this rhetorical strategy.”373 
LeBuffe, like Greene, develops an interpretation that builds to a 
rhetorical point. But, unlike Greene, LeBuffe, as I do in this chapter, gives an 
explanation for Hobbes’s surprising embrace of “right reason” in which 
 
369 Michael LeBuffe, “Motivation, Reason, and the Good in On the Citizen,” in On the Citizen: A 
Critical Guide, eds. Robin Douglass and Johan Olsthoorn (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2020), 89. 
 
370 It deserves noting that Greene’s analysis of the concept has many more dimensions than 
this, and is not, in its principal dimensions, concerned with the rhetorical point; this element 
makes up only a small piece of Greene’s (very fine) treatment. The typology used to organize 
this literature review encourages placing Greene into this third group; however, he fits in 
equally well among the scholars discussed in the first group, as the primary object of his article 
is to explicate and track the shifting resonances of “right reason” across Hobbes’s works, 
beginning with The Elements of Law. Greene points out that, in De cive, Hobbes adopted a 
kaleidoscopic view of “right reason,” using it in different contexts to mean different, but not 
always inconsistent, things. Greene explains, “in De cive Hobbes identifies recta ratio [right 
reason]…as: ‘correct reasoning [Ratiocinatio recta] from true principles,’ prominently and 
repeatedly as the rational agent in discovering the universal precepts of philosophy, which are 
identical to true wisdom; the arbiter of what is done justly and of right, those actions that 
accord with the dictates of natural law; and the rule or measure of the ultimate good of self-
preservation, the justice of actions, and the nature of right and wrong,” “Thomas Hobbes and 
the Term ‘Right Reason:’ Participation to Calculation,” 1012. 
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considerations related to composition loom large. Specifically, LeBuffe notes 
that it is because “a detailed, naturalistic account of reason in human 
psychology was not available to him in this fragmentary presentation of his 
doctrine” – that is, in De cive – “he rushed to incorporate something [right 
reason] that would serve in its place.”374 LeBuffe further contends that Hobbes’s 
use of the concept was a cynical rhetorical one – that is, “not sincere.” “It seems, 
then,” he writes, “that…Hobbes altered the arguments of The Elements of Law 
by inserting right reason into relevant areas of his argument.”375 
Greene and LeBuffe may be right. Hobbes’s turn to “right reason” may, 
in part, be construed as a shift in rhetoric. However, “right reason” was not 
mere rhetoric. Green and LeBuffe elide the substantive, empirical reasons for 
Hobbes’s alterations to the exposition of De cive and the integration of “right 
reason.” Just as he used different forms of experience as a means by which to 
address a shortage of empirical material, so too, he used “right reason” to solve 
 
374 LeBuffe, “Motivation, Reason, and the Good in On the Citizen,” 105. As Baumgold points out, 
components of The Elements of Law, if not the whole treatise, were likely rushed (see footnote 
293). Baumgold explains, “The bulk of the Elements appears to have been composed 
deliberately and systematically, and therefore was probably completed before the political crisis 
of the spring of 1640. However, the organization breaks down in later chapters. There are six 
chapters at the end of the work that depart from the prior manuscript, in form or content, in 
ways that suggest they may have been hurriedly written. A significant example is the odd claim, 
in the second part of Part II, that democracy is the original form of all government. It was 
hardly a position one would have expected to find in a work defending absolute monarchy, 
especially a work written in the context of the pre-War controversies between parliamentarians 
and the king over their respective powers. Hobbes, in fact, would jettison ‘democracy first’ from 
the revised theory presented in De Cive and Leviathan, presumably due to the argument’s 
unfortunate implication that England had once upon a time had a popular government,” “The 
Composition of Hobbes’s ‘Elements of Law,’” 17. There is a comparative absence of textual (or 
biographical or correspondence) evidence that suggests the same vis-à-vis De cive. As noted, 
Hobbes may have felt some (social) pressure to publish, but that pressure was likely of a 
different kind than the pressure he faced in the spring of 1640. 
 




the empirical bind in which the new Elementa Philosophiae scheme had placed 
him.  
Thus, “right reason” was not, as LeBuffe contends, used “insincerely.” 
What LeBuffe’s account leaves out are the sincerely held philosophical 
commitments that would have made the deployment of “right reason” (as a 
stand-in for universal experience) philosophically possible, and intellectually 
defensible. That is, Hobbes’s use of “right reason” was not a cynical exercise in 
rhetoric, a concept employed insincerely, like a lure, used to hook otherwise 
skeptical readers. In the process of weaving the language of “right reason” into 
the work’s prose, Hobbes invested the concept with new philosophical meaning 
and content, making it into additional means by which to impress the 
ineluctable, evident universality of the twin premises Hobbes highlights at the 
work’s beginning, the principle of self-preservation specifically. 
At the same time, LeBuffe is correct that Hobbes slotted the language of 
“right reason” into the pre-fabricated arguments of The Elements of Law – “that” 
he “altered the arguments of The Elements of Law by inserting right reason into 
relevant areas of his argument.”376 LeBuffe is also correct in his conclusion that 
Hobbes’s use of “right reason” can be connected to the fact that “a detailed, 
naturalistic account of reason in human psychology was not available to him 
in” the “fragmentary presentation of his doctrine”377 offered in De cive. 








LeBuffe’s characterization admits. Hobbes leveraged the concept of “right 
reason” specifically to lend empirical force, credibility, and to establish the 
universality of the premise of self-preservation. That is, “right reason” was used 
as rebar to reinforce De cive’s empirical foundations. Hobbes imported 
empirical content, the premise of “self-preservation,” a premise putatively 
known to be universal and “indubitable” through experience, into “right 
reason.” 
The narrowness of Hobbes’s concern is revealed by close inspection of 
how and where Hobbes “insert[ed] right reason in relevant areas of his 
argument.” Consider the first “area” and its Elements parallel. In addition to 
conferring added solidity to the argument, “right reason” (in bold) is inserted to 
specifically buttress an empirical postulate of universal experience 
(underlined).  
Thereafter, Hobbes further fused “right reason” with the premise of self-
preservation, making both an anchor for his analysis. For example, he 
punctuates the explanation of natural law with a reference to “right reason,” 
packaged together with the premise: “The Natural Law therefore (to define it) is 
the dictate of right reason (*) about what should be done or not done for the 
longest possible preservation of life and limb.”378 In the next paragraph, he, 
likewise, reinterprets self-preservation as a natural impulse to seek peace or 
self-defense, and makes both an effect of “right reason,” noting, “The first law of 
nature (the foundation) is: to seek peace when it can be had; when it cannot, to 
 




Table 3.2: A Comparison of The Elements of Law, 14.6 and De cive, 1.7 
The Elements of Law, 14.6379 De cive, 1.7380 
And forasmuch as necessity of nature 
maketh men to will and desire 
bonum sibi, that which is good for 
themselves, and to avoid that which 
is hurtful; but most of all that terrible 
enemy of nature, death, for whom we 
expect both the loss of all power, and 
also the greatest of bodily pains in 
the losing; it is not against reason 
that a man doth all he can to 
preserve his own body and limbs, 
both from death and pain. And that 
which is not against reason, men call 
RIGHT, or jus, or blameless liberty of 
using our own natural power and 
ability. It is therefore a right of 
nature: that every man may preserve 
his own life and limbs, with all the 
power he hath. 
Amid so many dangers therefore 
from men’s natural cupidity, that 
threaten every man every day, we 
cannot be blamed for looking out for 
ourselves; we cannot will to do 
otherwise. For each man is drawn to 
desire that which is Good for him and 
to Avoid what is bad for him, and 
most of all the greatest of natural 
evils, which is death; this happens by 
a real necessity of nature as powerful 
as that by which a stone falls 
downward. It is not therefore absurd, 
nor reprehensible, nor contrary to 
right reason, if one makes every 
effort to defend his body and limbs 
from death and to preserve them. 
And what is not contrary to right 
reason, all agree is done justly and of 
Right. For precisely what is meant by 
the term Right is the liberty each man 
has of using his natural faculties in 
accordance with right reason. 
Therefore the first foundation of 
natural Right is that each man protect 
his life and limbs as much as he can. 
 
look for aid in war,” and then clarifying, “In the final article of the last chapter” – 
presented with its parallel above – “we showed that this precept is a dictate of 
right reason; and we have just defined natural laws as dictates of right reason. It 
is the first law, because the rest are derived from it; they are instructions on the 
means of securing either peace or self-defense.”381 
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Hobbes integrated the two – “right reason” and self-preservation – so 
effectively as to make them synonymous, coextensive, in the discussions that 
follow. “Drunkenness,” Hobbes writes, is a “violation of natural Law because it 
impedes the use of [right] reason [rectae rationis];382 holy scripture forbids it for 
the same reason.”383 In other words, Hobbes found drunkenness anathema not 
because it makes humans into loud-talking yobs. He found drunkenness 
morally objectionable because it is an impediment to making self-preserving 
calculations: “it impedes the use of [right] reason.” Hobbes also made clear that 
the sovereign, no less than the subject, is affected by the natural impulse. 
Cribbing Cicero, Hobbes posits, “All the duties of sovereigns are implicit in this 
one phrase: the safety of the people is the supreme law.” However, he adds: “For 
although those who hold sovereign power among men cannot be subject to 
laws properly so called…because sovereignty and subjection are contradictory, 
it is nevertheless their duty to obey right reason in all things so far as they can; 
right reason is the natural, moral, and divine law.”384 While the source of 
human law, the sovereign, just like a subject, is bound by a natural duty to obey 
“right reason” to the extent possible – to preserve themself.  
 
382 The Tuck and Silverthorne translation elides the recta, indicating, “drunkenness…impedes 
the use of reason,” 64 [4.19]. Inspection of the second edition of the text reveals the error. In the 
original Latin, Hobbes unequivocally holds that “drunkenness…impedes the use of right reason” 
(Ebrietas…quia rectæ rationis impedit), Elementa Philosophica de Cive, 75 [4.19] (emphasis 
added). Likewise, the first edition of the text contains the selfsame formulation, Elementorum 
Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive, 48 [4.28]. 
 
383 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 64 [4.19]. 
 




In sum, Hobbes envisaged his naturalistic-cum-normative analysis as 
satisfying the conditions for “right” reasoning: “if he [some person] reasons 
rightly (that is, starting from the most evident principles he weaves a seamless 
discourse of necessary consequences), he will go the straightest way.”385 And he 
contended this “most evident principle” – the empirical principle with which 
De cive begins, and the principle to which he tethered the concept of “right 
reason” – to be self-preservation. With “right reason” and the principle, Hobbes 
sought to render a philosophical explication that, as he demands in De cive, 
“fits to the nature of things”386 and “expounds things as they are”387 – an 
explication that is empirically tenable and which conforms to principles as 
made “indubitable by experience.”388 
However, Hobbes did not merely slot the language of “right reason” into 
preexisting prose. The uses of “right reason” highlighted above have no 
 
385 Ibid, 162 [14.16]. 
 
386 Ibid, 123 [10.11]. Hobbes writes, “For this is what persuasion is; and however much reasoning 
they put into it, they do not begin from true principles but from…commonly accepted opinions, 
which are for the most part usually false, and they do not try to make their discourse 
correspond to the nature of things [naturæ rerum] but to the passions of men’s hearts.” For the 
Latin, see: Hobbes, Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive, 115 [10.11]. 
 
387 Ibid, 240 [12.12]. In the passage, Hobbes, again, takes aim at dogmatici, whom, he excoriates, 
“render their hearers insane (who were merely stupid before); to make men believe that a bad 
situation is worse than it is, and that a good situation is bad; to exaggerate hopes and to 
minimize risks beyond reason, is due to eloquence; not the eloquence which expounds things 
as they are, but the other eloquence, which by communicating the excitement of the speaker to 
the minds of others makes everything appear as he had seen it in his own excited mind.” 
Similarly, the thirteenth chapter notes, “For as everyday exposure has given current acceptance 
to propositions which are false and no more intelligible than if you took words by lot from an 
urn and strung them together, how much more would men imbibe true doctrines conforming 
to their own understanding and to the nature of things [intellectui suo & rerum naturæ 
conformes], if they were similarly exposed to them,” 147 [13.9]. For the Latin, see: Hobbes, 
Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive, 146 [13.9]. 
 




corresponding parallel in The Elements of Law.389 He built out and expanded his 
analysis using the concept. Thus, “right reason” was more than rhetorical 
window-dressing. Its appearance portended a wider, deeper shift and pivot to 
universal experience as an empirical strategy in Hobbes’s political philosophy, 
which was then in transition, as he coped with how best to suture De cive’s 
exposition and compensate for the loss of empirical material from The Elements 
of Law.  
In De cive, Hobbes’s use and reliance on the concept of “right reason,” 
remade into an empirical and scientific concept, was proportionate to the loss 
suffered as a result of the implementation of the Elementa Philosophiae plan. 
No mere rhetoric, he employed “right reason” to mount a robust defense of the 
empirical force of his analysis, and in particular, the principles of universal 
experience, viz. self-preservation, upon which he claimed to have erected much 
of the edifice of De cive.  
IV. “Right reason,” experience, and Hobbes’s political theory after the first edition 
of De cive 
 
Following publication of De cive, Hobbes’s position on “right reason” 
changed, but not all at once. His commentary on Thomas White’s De mundo, 
completed a year or two after the publication of De cive,390 carries ambiguous 
 
389 Deborah Baumgold, Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political Theory: The Elements 
of Law, De Cive and Leviathan, ed. Deborah Baumgold (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), 145, 193, 344. 
 
390 The manuscript was completed, at the very earliest, in the spring of 1643. Jacquot and Jones 
write, “Tout ce qu’on peut dire en fin de compte c’est qu’en mars 1643, quelques mois après la 
publication du De mundo, l’ouvrage critique de Hobbes était en bonne voie, et qu’il se tatache 
étroitement à l’actualité scientifique et philosophique,” “Introduction,” in Critique Du De 




remarks on the matter, which give an unclear picture as to the extent of an 
enduring commitment to the idea, and in turn, the concept of universal 
experience. The relevant passage appears in the thirtieth chapter of the 
commentary. Turning his attention to the specification of reason, Hobbes 
explains, just as he had in The Elements of Law and De cive, that “‘reason’ is 
nothing but the faculty of syllogizing…” The discussion of reason sets up 
another, on the feasibility of “right reasoning.” Given the definition of reason, 
“right reasoning,” he indicates, entails consistently right – that is, correct – 
syllogistic reasoning. “‘Right reasoning’ is that reasoning which, commencing 
with an accurate explanation of names, proceeds by means of the syllogism, or 
through an unbroken linking of propositions that are true.” However, Hobbes 
adds that “‘right reason’ (if such exist) is the potential to do, or the faculty of 
doing, this as often as we please…it is doubtful whether the reasoning of any 
man can always be right, but everyone thinks that his alone is.”391 
Thus, Hobbes expressed a reasonable, pragmatic skepticism about the 
faculty of “right reason,” understood as a capacity to consistently build up 
syllogistic structures that are impenetrable to attack – to “always be right.” The 
passage itself gives no indications as to what encouraged the skepticism. 
However, it does not appear Hobbes was overwhelmed by skepticism. In the 
remark, what he offers is a frank general assessment of the epistemic 
boundaries or limits of human reasoning. Thus, it is possible to read the 
 




statement as a narrow rejection of the general concept, instead of a broad 
rejection of the notion that one can ever reason correctly. 
In addition, embedded in the remarks are indications of a further 
change, this one concerning the concept of universal experience and its role in 
“right reason” and, by extension, all science. The commentary on De mundo 
presents a formulation of “right reason” that appears to be shifted away from 
the concept of universal experience. Whereas “right reasoning,” a perfect, 
exemplary form of reason, proceeds from an “accurate explanation of names,” 
De cive offers a stronger formulation of the concept, by tying “right reason” to 
universal experience, and specifying that “right reason” must proceed from 
“absolutely certain postulates,”392 “evident principles,”393 or as in The Elements 
of Law, “principles that are found to be indubitable by experience.”394 While 
slight, the shift signals a transition with respect to the role of “evident 
principles” in Hobbes’s conception of “right reason,” and, as the ideal model of 
reasoning, science and philosophy in general. In sum, in the process of backing 
away from the concept of “right reason,” Hobbes also specified what it means to 
reason correctly, and in so doing, appears to have wavered on the question of 
the place of universal experience, or “evident principles,” in philosophical 
inquiry in general. 
 
392 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 6 [Epistle Dedicatory 10]. 
 
393 Ibid, 162 [14.16]. 
 




The second edition of De cive, like the commentary on De mundo, is 
explicitly critical of “right reason.” In this way, the second edition is continuous 
with the commentary on De mundo. It is most plausible that Hobbes found the 
concept difficult to defend against interlocutors. The conclusion is borne out by 
a note attached to the second edition of De cive, in which he, likely pressed by 
reviewers, clarifies his position. In the note he explains that “By right reason in 
men’s natural state, I mean, not, as many do, an infallible Faculty, but the act of 
reasoning…a man’s own true Reasoning about actions of his which may conduce 
to his advantage or other men’s loss.”395 The annotation attests a reluctance to 
mark out an objective moral standard and is a restatement of the position 
delineated earlier, in The Elements of Law.396  
Yet, the question of whether Hobbes’s commitments actually changed 
remains somewhat open. The same note contains an admission that, whereas 
there exists no “infallible Faculty” of “right reason,” “true reason” is not 
idiosyncratic and subjective, but is universal, and as such, can be used as a 
device to generate objective truths. Thus, while rejecting the idea of an 
“infallible Faculty,” Hobbes pursued a new terminological tack, presenting “true 
reason” as a cognate of universal experience – a concept bound up with the 
empirical postulates of universal experience, self-preservation specifically. “By 
true reasoning I mean reasoning that draws conclusions from true principles 
correctly stated,” he wrote. “For every violation of Natural Laws consists in false 
 
395 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 33. 
 




reasoning or in stupidity, when men fail to see what duties towards other men are 
necessary to their preservation.”397 Thus, even while abandoning the concept of 
“right reason,” Hobbes refused to retreat from the earlier empirical claims and, 
in some sense, “right reason” as it was used in the first edition. 
The second edition of De cive also cements the role of universal 
experience in moral and political philosophy, having used it as a substitute for 
the missing empirical material from The Elements of Law. With “right reason” 
fading from the pages of his work, and prospects for the publication of the 
other sections of Elementa Philosophiae series dimming, Hobbes relied, even 
more, on universal experience to establish the empirical force of his analysis. 
For example, a reference to a previous section was replaced with the language 
of “self-evident” – a way to mark off the affected statement as disclosing 
information that is so experientially obvious as to be evident. In the first edition 
of the text he wrote, “It has been shown in the previous section that men’s 
actions spring from the will, and the will from hope and fear.”398 In an effort to 
scrub all references to the omnibus Elementa Philosophiae project from the 
edition while maintaining the empirical force of the point, the sentence was 
revised to indicate “It is self-evident that men’s actions proceed from their wills 
and their wills from their hopes and fears.”399  
 
397 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 33-34. 
 
398 Ostensum est præcedente sectione, actiones hominum, a voluntate, voluntatem a spe & metu 
proficisci, Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive, 52 [5.1]. 
 




Likewise, the emphasis on personal (presumably common) experience, 
and a clear concern with defending the empirical foundations of De cive, 
strengthened in the second edition. Responding, explicitly, to an objection 
about the tenability of the principle of “mutual fear”400 Hobbes retorted with an 
(undoubtedly) first-hand, but common experience: 
In my view, not only flight, but also distrust, suspicion, precaution and 
provision against fear are all characteristic of men who are afraid. On 
going to bed, men lock their doors; when going on a journey, they arm 
themselves because they are afraid of robbers. Countries guard their 
frontiers with fortresses, their cities with walls, through fear of 
neighboring countries…401 
 
A mix of personal (or common) and universal experience provided 
Hobbes with a means by which to clean up the wreckage that resulted from the 
implementation of the Elementa Philosophiae plan. Having been published 
without its companion sections, De cive, as the preface to the second edition 
points out, contends to rely on “experience” alone, on 
a Principle well known to all men by experience and which everyone 
admits, that men’s natural Disposition is such that if they are not 
restrained by fear of a common power, they will distrust and fear each 
other, and each man rightly may, and necessarily will, look out for 
himself from his own resources.402 
With this invocation of universal experience, combined with the use of other 
forms of experience, Hobbes believed himself to have solved the empirical 
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Hobbes did not, in the first instance, set out to posit a political theory, 
unsupported by a substantive treatment of human nature.403 Nevertheless, 
social pressures, changes in his philosophical project, and, as he claimed in the 
second edition, an encroaching Civil War,404 conspired to create a circumstance 
that necessitated the shift. It forced a change in the way that he talked and 
even thought about his political theory. In the second edition of De cive, the 
shift was cemented into his method. He wrote that although “that part which 
was last in order has come out first,” the out-of-order publication of the third 
section of his series, De cive, posed no problems, as “I saw that it did not need 
the preceding parts, since it rests upon its own principles known by 
[experience] [principiis…experientia cognitis]405.”406 Thus, Hobbes’s later 
intention – of a third philosophical section, held to be fundamentally apart 
from the second – came to overwrite the earlier one, expressed in The Elements 
of Law, of an “explication of the elements of laws, natural and politic” which 
 
403 However, it should come as no surprise that Hobbes, at the outset of The Elements of Law, 
issues the blanket disclaimer that although he can “err no less” than those who have written on 
the same subject, he nevertheless asks that readers “not to take any principle on trust,” having 
be presented with “what they know already, or may know by their own experience,” The 
Elements of Law, 1 [1.1]. As noted above, the reorganization of his political theory demanded 
that Hobbes push the claim and the concept of universal experience in new directions in De 
cive, using it to specifically address the loss of empirical material from The Elements, and to 
support and substantiate the empirical postulates of natural cupidity and self-preservation in 
particular. That is, universal experience was used to plug a hole that opened up as a result of a 
seismic reworking of his philosophy in response to new organizational strictures imposed by 
the Elementa Philosophiae plan. 
 
404 See footnote 300. 
 
405 Hobbes, Elementa Philosophica de Cive. 
 








407 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 1 [1.1]. The full quotation reads: “The true and perspicuous 
explication of the elements of law, natural and politic, which is my present scope, depedeth 






Unmissable in the opening pages of The Elements of Law and De cive are 
allusions to geometrical method and Hobbes’s eager use of the newly trendy 
rhetoric of mathematicized science. It is notable that the references to method 
and the mathematical rhetoric featured in The Elements and De cive are absent 
from the opening pages of Leviathan. Many 20th century readers of Leviathan 
failed to take notice. These readers made method a core component of their 
interpretations of Leviathan, portraying method as a sine qua non of Hobbes’s 
philosophy, seeing the philosophy of Leviathan as an outcome of a particular 
application of method or otherwise centering method in their investigations of 
the text.  
A specimen of the impulse is found in C.B. Macpherson’s introduction to 
his edition of Leviathan. In Leviathan, he writes, can be seen Hobbes’s answer 
to a methodological quandary about the scientific study of politics.408 The 
quandary, Macpherson contends, was resolved through an application of 
ostensibly409 Galilean method. He notes that, “as applied” to Hobbes’s “political 
 
408 Motivated to “construct a political science which would show men how to attain civil peace 
and commodious living,” Macpherson observes that Hobbes was in search for “a hypothesis 
more specific than the general one about motion, and he needed a method more inclusive than 
the deductive method of geometry,” “Introduction,” in Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson 
(London: Penguin, 1968), 25. 
 
409 The link between Galileo’s work and the specifically Zabarellan methods of resolution and 
composition was established in the work of John Randall. The conclusion was reproduced 
throughout the century ad nauseam, and, eventually, the linkage was extended to Hobbes. For 
a discussion of Zabarellan regressus, the context and milieu in which Randall’s study came 
together, and a straightforward, textual evaluation of the conclusion, see Paolo Palmieri’s “On 
Scientia and Regressus,” in Routledge Companion to Sixteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Henrik 
Lagerlund and Benjamin Hill (New York: Routledge, 2017), 319-349. For conflicting assessments 
of the relationship between the method delineated in Hobbes’s De corpore and Zabarellan 
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science,” “…the resolutive stage of the Galilean method…consisted in resolving 
political society into the motions of its parts – individual human beings – and 
resolving their motions in turn into imagined or hypothetical simple forces 
which, compounded, could be shown to explain them.”410   
Macpherson, like many other interpreters, was unaware of the 
significant risks that accompany a methodological interpretation of Leviathan, 
and in particular, one that emphasizes resolutive-compositive (or analytical-
synthetical) methods and their offshoots. At issue is how interpreters, like 
Macpherson, use remarks about methodology from a later work, De corpore, as 
a loadstar to inform and guide their interpretations. As detailed in the next 
chapter, the methodological prescripts set down in De corpore, published in 
1655, reflect the philosophical posture into which Hobbes had settled in the 
mid-to-late 1640s, after he had composed Leviathan’s antecedents, De cive 
(1642) and before that, The Elements of Law (1640).411 As the next chapter also 
details, the methodological prescripts delineated in De corpore are ambiguous, 
vague, and even inconsistent to an extent that makes them untrustworthy and 
unreliable guides to understanding and interpreting Hobbes’s political theory. 
 
regressus see (for the negative view) Jan Prins’s “Hobbes and the School of Padua: Two 
Incompatible Approaches of Science,”Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1990): 26-46, and 
(for the positive view, and a critique of Prins’s position) Stewart Duncan’s “Hobbes: 
Metaphysics and Method” (Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers, 2003), 83-113. 
 
410 Macpherson, “Introduction,” 27. 
 
411 Parsing Hobbes’s methodological pronouncements and substantive work, from 1636 to 1651, 
reveals that his ideas and practice of science, and his approach to political theory evolved and 
varied over time, often in response to different varieties of issues and problems, some related to 
constraints stemming from compositional practices, others resulting from demands imposed by 
shifting philosophical projects (the implementation of the Elementa Philosophiae plan in 




Nevertheless, method, and often the methods of resolution and 
composition, loom large in discussions of Hobbes’s political theory, Leviathan 
in particular. Like Macpherson, scholars have centered method in their 
interpretations of Leviathan, arguing, whether explicitly or by implication, that 
the text’s organization and the broad lineaments of Hobbesian political theory 
are symptomatic of a particular kind of methodological commitment, whether 
resolutive-compositive, “a priori,”412 or other. Examples illustrating the 
interpretive impulse abound across time and space. In his famous text on the 
system of Hobbes’s ideas, J.W.N. Watkins writes, “Hobbes’s method 
determined the shape of his civil philosophy,”413 explaining that “Part II of 
Leviathan tells the compositive story – gives a compressed and rationalized 
history of the way ‘by which the parts of this body politic’ are ‘set together and 
united.’”414 Similarly, Marshall Missner would, later, open the essay “Hobbes’s 
 
412 It deserves noting that not all resolutive-compositive accounts of Hobbes’s political theory 
incorporate “a priori” reasoning in the sense the phrase refers to here, relating to the 
application of the concept of maker’s knowledge to the production of civil science. See: Patrick 
Craig’s “The A Priori Nature of the Political: Democracy and Scientific Method in Thomas 
Hobbes” (Ph.D. dissertation, Duquesne University, 2014), and relatedly, Noel Malcolm’s essay 
“Hobbes’s Science of Politics and his Theory of Science,” in Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 155; Douglas Jesseph’s “Scientia in Hobbes,” in Scientia in Early Modern 
Philosophy: Seventeenth-Century Thinkers of Demonstrative Knowledge from First Principles, 
eds. Tom Sorell, G.A.J. Rogers, and Jill Kraye (New York: Springer, 2010), 124-125; and Ted 
Miller’s Mortal Gods, 50, and, relatedly, Arthur Child’s classic interpretation in “Making and 
Knowing in Hobbes, Vico, and Dewey,” University of California Publications in Philosophy 16, 
no. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953): 271-310. For a textual appraisal of the 
interpretation, which hunts for bits of text and elements of exposition that anticipate the 
position Hobbes would later mark out vis-à-vis the relationship between geometry and civil 
science in Six Lessons and De homine, see David Gauthier’s “Hobbes on Demonstration and 
Construction,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 35, no. 4 (1997): 509-521. For a quick-moving 
appraisal of the “a priori” position, see chapter 6. 
 
413 Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas, 66. 
 




Method in Leviathan,” by asking, “What method did Hobbes use to arrive at the 
theory of human nature he presents in Leviathan?”415  
The question and the presupposition about the role and explanatory 
power of method in Leviathan was hardly out of place in the literature. In Ideals 
as Interests, S.A. Lloyd offers an intricate and interpretively inventive reading of 
how the methods of resolution and composition organize Leviathan’s parts and 
were used to render its content.416 In her study of Leviathan, Jean Hampton, 
writing with the current of the prevailing literature, points out that “Hobbes’s 
political and philosophical beliefs were designed to form a unified integrated 
system.”417 The idea also surfaces in the work of A.P. Martinich, who just 
recently observed that parts III and IV of Leviathan stand apart from the 
methodologically and scientifically unified parts of the text, parts I and II: “the 
method and the content of the second half of Leviathan are substantially 
different from those of the first. The first half aspires to science; the second 
does not.”418 The friction Martinich senses between parts I and II and parts III 
and IV of Leviathan is an artifact of what is, now, an interpretive tradition – a 
 
415 Missner, Marshall, “Hobbes’s Method in Leviathan,” Journal of the History of Ideas 38, no. 4 
(1977), 607. 
 
416 S.A. Lloyd, Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan: The Power of Mind Over Matter 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
 
417 Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 6. 
 
418 A.P. Martinich, “Hobbes’s Political-Philosophical Project: Science and Subversion,” in 
Interpreting Hobbes’s Political Philosophy, ed. S.A. Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




style of interpreting Leviathan that foregrounds method and Hobbes’s putative 
systematizing-methodological ambitions.   
This chapter pits itself against the view that Leviathan is a puzzle that 
can be solved methodologically. Instead, it argues that motivating Leviathan are 
a set of substantive or empirical concerns that neither reduce to method nor 
can be revealed by looking at Leviathan through the correct methodological 
lens. In other words, understanding what makes Leviathan distinctive in its 
aims involves looking beyond method.  
As Hobbes himself noted, Leviathan was meant to delineate a 
curriculum of (re)education.419 He hoped that if read and taught, Leviathan 
would inoculate those who came into contact with it against doctrines and 
beliefs of the kind he blamed for England’s civil wars. The course of instruction 
he prescribed responded to a pair of concerns. First, Hobbes was concerned 
about the ramifying social and political effects of unempirical thinking. He 
aimed to use Leviathan to set the empirical record straight – to bring its readers 
back to the same empirical baseline and to instill an understanding of the 
world that is empirically correct. The second concern is related to the first: 
 
419 While certainly complementary in a great variety of dimensions, the interpretation offered 
here stands apart, in terms of analytical set-up and substantive orientation, from other studies, 
focused on Hobbes’s curricular ambitions; see e.g.: David Johnston’s The Rhetoric of Leviathan: 
Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation, 114-133; S.A. Lloyd’s Ideals as 
Interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), in particular its 
second and third parts; Mary Dietz’s “Hobbes's Subject as Citizen,” in Thomas Hobbes and 
Political Theory, ed. Mary Dietz (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1990), 91-119; and 
especially Teresa Bejan’s “Teaching the Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Education,” Oxford 
Review of Education 36, no. 5 (2010): 607-626. Specifically, I follow a different tack than do some 
of these other studies, with a narrow focus on the ways in which Hobbes’s substantive empirical 
concerns ramify through the text and helped to inform decisions about the adaptation of The 
Elements of Law and De cive into Leviathan. Furthermore, the argument is positioned against 
the explicit methodological framing of some studies, like Lloyd’s. 
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Hobbes worried about causal myopia, ignorance or the misreckoning of cause 
and effect. As with unempirical thinking, he viewed causal myopia as a scourge 
to good political order. To make correct decisions, Hobbes believed, people 
must be capable of “big picture” causal thinking, having the capacity to see how 
individual decisions ripple out, and affect the world around them. The two 
concerns have a particular significance. They, at once, reveal Hobbes’s enduring 
commitment to a strong form of empiricism and can be leveraged to develop a 
fuller understanding of how, and to what end Leviathan was made. 
The framing of this chapter could be read as an endorsement of the view 
that method is wholly irrelevant to the task of interpreting Leviathan. But the 
view would be untenable. Hobbes saw method, in its various dimensions, as a 
weapon to wield in the war against political tumult – a tool that could be used 
to clear away unempirical claptrap and fill in gaps in causal understanding. He 
considered scientific methodology as a handy weapon to attack empirical 
problems. Unempirical thinking was to be attacked with geometry. Hobbes 
believed scientific method adapted from geometry was a machete that could be 
used to cut through the nonsense and absurdity in which Britons had become 
entangled.420 As Leviathan contends, “The Light of humane minds is 
Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from 
 
420 The metaphor is adapted from one used by Jon Parkin in “Thomas Hobbes and the Problem 
of Self-Censorship” (paper presented at the 2007 Morrell Conference on the subject of self-
censorship, York, UK). Parkin writes, “Hobbes’s nominalism and his materialism are put to 
work together, and their cutting effect, like that of a pair of scissors, derives from their mutual 
interaction.  Everything is body, and the names we give to bodies tell us only how we think of 
them; which opens the possibility that we could learn to think differently about them. 
Together, Hobbes’s materialism and his nominalism cut through a whole range of putatively 




ambiguity…”421 Causal myopia was to be met with accurate causal thinking. 
Leviathan elaborates that science also entails “the knowledge of Consequences, 
and dependance of one fact upon another….”422 Having embraced a causal 
conception of science in the mid-1640s,423 Hobbes, by the time that he 
composed Leviathan, was firm in the belief that the raison d'état of science is to 
delineate chains of cause and effect,424 as to extend the vision of humanity and 
bring into focus the “remote causes”425 of its own wellbeing. 
However, the methodological dicta, on their own, carry no instructions 
as to which specific facets of the world they should be applied. Instead, Hobbes 
made determinations about how to deploy method in response to concerns 
about the politically and socially destabilizing effects of unempirical thinking 
and flawed causal reasoning. Put differently, he used Leviathan to interrogate 
facets of his world which, for him, had become sources of concern.426 Of 
foremost concern was how the everyday thinking and decision-making of 
 
421 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Noel Malcolm, vol. II-III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012), 74. 
 
422 Ibid, 72. 
 
423 The shift in conception is recorded in “Logica. Cap 1. Ex T.H.,” an early draft of Hobbes’s De 
corpore, whose content bears similarity to notes written out in the hand of Charles Cavendish 
in 1645, “Logica. Cap. 1. Ex T.H.,” 463. For a quick-moving overview, describing the change, see 
Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 154. 
 
424 Hobbes, Leviathan, 72. “Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one 
fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something 
else when we will, or the like, another time: Because when we see how anything thing comes 
about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes some into our power, wee 
see how to make it produce the like effects.” 
 
425 Ibid, 160. 
 
426 This is a point on which Lloyd and I agree. However, pace Lloyd, I contend that Hobbes did 
not use the method delineated in De corpore to identify what these facets were. Cf. Lloyd’s 




Britons had become encumbered and distorted by unempirical gibberish and 
causal miscalculation. 
The chapter proceeds in five sections. The first finds textual support for 
the view that Hobbes’s concerns about unempirical thinking and causal myopia 
were sufficiently deep as to shape the content of Leviathan. Hobbes’s practice 
of serial composition427 guaranteed material would be carried over from The 
Elements of Law and De cive into Leviathan. However, this continuity cloaks the 
originality of Leviathan. More than double the length of either antecedent, 
much of Leviathan is new and novel. Hobbes’s empirical concerns, and his 
empiricism, shine through in the new material. The second, third, and fourth 
sections show how these concerns manifest in the exposition of Leviathan. I 
focus on four types of exposition in which the concerns appear: explanations of 
nature (section two); critiques of religious concepts and phenomena, and 
Christian theologies (section three); descriptions of political formations and 
political concepts, and Hobbes’s explication of crime and punishment (section 
four).  
The fifth section concludes the chapter. It briefly addresses Hobbes’s 
method, and asserts that, rather than the sine qua non of Leviathan, Hobbes 
used method instrumentally, in the working out of substantive treatments 
 
427 Deborah Baumgold, “The Difficulties of Hobbes Interpretation,” Political Theory 36, no. 6 
(2008): 827-855; Deborah Baumgold, “UnParadoxical Hobbes: In Reply to Springborg,” Political 
Theory 37, no. 5 (2009): 689-693; Deborah Baumgold, “Editors Introduction,” ix-xi. In the 
“Editors Introduction,” Baumgold explains, “serial composition was common in the period as a 
legacy of the transition from scribal to print publication, both methods of publication 
employed by Hobbes. It was accepted that new texts were often composed by revising and 




connected to his empirical concerns. Section five also delivers an appraisal of 
the character of the political theory of Leviathan from the perspective of 
Hobbes’s empiricism.  
I. Hobbes’s empirical concerns and Leviathan 
 
Leviathan was a project that coalesced very suddenly. That Hobbes 
wrote Leviathan at all is surprising. His primary intellectual interest throughout 
the 1640s was not politics,428 but natural philosophy. After finishing a 
commentary on Thomas White’s De mundo, possibly in 1643,429 Hobbes 
completed a voluminous manuscript on optics in 1646,430 and throughout the 
1640s worked to develop another text on first philosophy and physics, which he 
hoped to finish by 1649 or, more likely, the early 1650s.431 He missed the 
 
428 This is not to suggest that Hobbes, during the period, was wholly dis-engaged from political 
work. Though minimally revised, he published a second edition of De cive in 1647. The revisions 
are limited to small adjustments (e.g., scrubbing De cive of language pointing to the larger 
Elementa Philosophiae project), and the inclusion of a new preface and a handful of clarifying 
annotations. During the period, motivated, perhaps, by the politics at the court in Paris, he also 
penned a critique of Bellarmine, later imported into Leviathan, as noted by Karl Schuhmann, 
“Leviathan and De Cive,” in Leviathan After 350 Years, ed. Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 20-21. Hobbes appears to address the tract in the verse 
autobiography, writing, “I could not endure that so many monstrous crimes should be put 
down to the commands of God. I made up my mind to write at once a work on the laws of God. 
For a long time, little by little, and filled with anxiety I labored at this task,” “The 
Autobiography of Thomas Hobbes,” 27. 
 
429 Jean Jacquot and Harold Whitmore Jones, “Introduction,” 45. 
 
430 See Elaine Stroud’s “Background,” in “Thomas’s Hobbes’s ‘A Minute or First Draught of the 
Optiques: A Critical Edition” (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1983), 
5. 
 
431 Thomas Hobbes, “Letter 61: Hobbes to Samuel Sorbiére, from Paris [4/] 14 June 1649,” in The 
Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 
176-177. The letter contains no hint that, by then, Hobbes was working full steam on Leviathan, 




deadline. To the surprise of even close friends,432 he spent much of 1649 and 
1650 writing Leviathan.  
On the one hand, Leviathan is an extension of Hobbes’s previous 
political projects. His use of serial composition, the practice of converting old 
texts into “new(ish)”433 volumes, guaranteed a certain level of continuity 
between The Elements of Law (1640), the first (1642) and second (1647) editions 
of De cive, and Leviathan (1651). As was custom, Hobbes pillaged previous texts, 
including his commentary on White’s De mundo, for content that could be 
recycled and adapted in the new volume.  
On the other hand, Leviathan was completed almost a decade after 
Hobbes finished De cive in 1641-42. Thus, it stands apart, in time and space, 
from its antecedents. During the period a civil war was waged and then waned. 
Hobbes watched, eventually from the court in Paris, as religious, political, and 
politico-religious divisions proliferated, crystallized and Britons divided up into 
different warring camps. He watched as battles in broadsheets and pamphlets 
set the stage for actual battlefield conflict. He observed a regicide, Parliament’s 
ascendence, and, eventually, the collapse of the ancien régime. Leviathan bears 
the imprint of all of these things. 
 
432 As Malcolm notes in the “General Introduction” to the Clarendon edition of Leviathan, 
Robert Payne, in a May 1650 letter, indicated the change in projects was news to him: “I sent 
notice to Mr Hobbes, yt his booke de Cive was translated into English, & desird him to prevent 
yt translation by one of his owne. but he sends me word he hath an other taske in hand, wch is 
Politiques, in English; of wch he hath finished 37 chapters…,” in Leviathan, vol I (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2012), 1-2. 
 




Yet, little is known about what, specifically, impelled Hobbes to write 
Leviathan. What is concretely known is that he used the text to address 
multiple audiences. The content of the text indicates that he presumed it would 
be read by a sovereign, likely Charles II,434 Hobbes’s former pupil. Charles 
received a manuscript copy of the book not long after he returned to the 
royalist outpost in Paris in 1651,435 where Hobbes was still in exile. At the same 
time, the text also addresses Britons whose minds had been or were at risk of 
being soiled by the false and malicious religious and political doctrines to 
which Hobbes attributed England’s civil wars.436 He pointedly decided to write 
and publish a text in “plaine English” in “prose that was simple and direct.”437 
Leviathan was not a text written for Hobbes’s Parisian contacts.438 He desired 
 
434 Lisa Sarasohn, “Was Leviathan a Patronage Artifact?” History of Political Thought 21 no. 4 
(2000): 606-631; Miller, Moral Gods, 115-136; Malcolm “General Introduction,” 51-60. 
 
435 First-hand inspection of the manuscript reveals a peculiar feature: the absence of physical 
evidence indicating it contained an epistle dedicatory. For the contrary view, which can be 
attributed to a misidentification of one of the manuscript’s unusual physical characteristics, see 
Malcolm, Noel, “Textual Introduction,” in Leviathan vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012), 198.  
 
436 David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan, 91, 119; C.W. Schoneveld,  “’Insinuations of the 
Will’: Hobbes’s Style and Intention in Leviathan Compared to Earlier Political Works,” in 
Hobbes’s ‘Science of Natural Justice’ ed. C. Walton and P.J. Johnson (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 118; Geoffrey Vaughan, “The Audience of Leviathan and the Audience 
of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” History of Political Thought 22, no. 3, 457.  
 
437 Hobbes, “The Prose Life,” 250. 
 
438 This is not to suggest that the text does not bear their influence. See, e.g., Gianni Paginini’s 
“Hobbes, the ‘Natural Seeds’ of Religion and French Libertine Discourse,” Hobbes Studies 32, 
no. 2 (2019): 125-158; and, for a more sweeping, piercing analysis and contrasting view, see 
Patricia Springborg’s “A Very British Hobbes, or a More European Hobbes?,” British Journal for 
the History of Philosophy 22, no. 2 (2014): 368-386. Of Malcolm’s edition of Leviathan, 
Springborg objects, “But the apparatus to this edition is missing the wide-ranging work of Yves 
Charles Zarka, Franck Lessay and Luc Foisneau, to mention just some of the most prominent 
French Hobbes scholars; the work of Italian scholars like Arrigo Pacchi, Gianni Paganini and 
Agostino Lupoli on Hobbes’s indebtedness to the Epicureans; the many works of Paganini, on 
the indebtedness of Leviathan to Lorenzo Valla (particularly on points of Biblical exegesis), and 
Renaissance sceptics; the many works of Karl Schuhmann, the German Hobbes scholar, and all 
but one of the essays of his Dutch student, Cees Leijenhorst, on Hobbes’s indebtedness to 
Aristotle and to Renaissance Italian philosophers and new scientists; as well as the works of 
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that Leviathan be accessible and taught in universities, believing the book “may 
be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities,” 
understanding that “the Universities are the Fountains of Civill, Morall 
Doctrine, from whence the Preachers, and the Gentry, drawing such water as 
they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the Pulpit, and in their 
Conversation) upon the people….”439 He viewed the book as an antidote to “that 
subtile liquor, wherewith [“Preachers,” “Lawyers, and others” promoting 
“doctrine” “against the Soveraign Power of the King”] were first seasoned, 
against the Civill Authority.”440 
This antidote was synthesized to neutralize two sources of social and 
political conflict. First, Hobbes endeavored to rid his world of unempirical 
thought, and more narrowly, linguistic absurdity and nonsense – unempirical 
speech.441 Absurdity, Leviathan specifies, is “a generall assertation” that is 
 
almost of all the continental scholars included in my Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, many of whom represent long European traditions of Hobbes scholarship. In a 
critical edition of Leviathan that will be canonical for decades if not centuries to come, this is a 
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“unconceivable,” a descriptor that attaches to “any words whereby we conceive 
nothing but the sound.”442 They are words that have no firm anchor in 
imagination, and therefore the world.443 Such words “are those we call Absurd, 
Insignificant, and Non-sense.”444  
The problem of the plague of absurd speech grew in Hobbes’s mind and 
became a better-defined concern between 1640, when he finished The Elements 
of Law, and 1651, the year of Leviathan’s publication. In 1640 he simply defined 
absurdity as a conclusion derived by means of “good ratiocination” that “is 
contradictory to any evident truth whatsoever”445 and devoted minimal energy 
to the concept’s explication. By 1651 he had developed a typology of absurdities 
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and fleshed out and enlarged the concept. In Leviathan, his discussion of 
absurdity extends across twelve connected paragraphs, in which he delineates 
seven types of absurdity, all centered on the misapplication and misuse of 
names to create meaningless, un-cognizable, and therefore unempirical speech, 
propositions, and systems of thinking. His concern? “…Metaphors, and 
senseless and ambiguous words are like ignes fatui [will-o’-the-wisps].” 
“[R]easoning upon them,” he worries, “is wandering amongst innumerable 
absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.”446  
Thus, unempirical, absurd speech, he believed, was a contagion that had 
wrecked Britain. It caused distemper and drove its carriers to make decisions 
on the basis of specious fears, delusions, and outright nonsense. For Hobbes, 
the stakes of straightening out this morass and reworking language to make it 
responsive to “good” true “principles” 447 could not have been greater. For it was 
“so many contradictions and absurdities,” disseminated by “Schoole-men” 
which “enclined people to revolt” in the first instance.448   
Throughout the chapter I use the language of “unempirical speech,” 
“unempirical fears,” “unempirical thought” and “unempirical thinking,” and 
“unempirical ideas” interchangeably, to point to a selfsame phenomenon: how 
senseless words, ambiguous speech, and absurdity become will-o’-the-wisps, 
leading people into a dangerous wilderness, encouraging ways of being in the 
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world inimical to forms of real, empirical understanding that can support social 
and political order.  
From the perspective of Hobbesian philosophy, the phrases “unempirical 
thought,” “unempirical thinking,” and “unempirical ideas” are, themselves, 
absurdities, not unlike the paradigmatic example Hobbes gives, “incorporeal 
bodies.”449 Strictly speaking, it is not possible for unempirical, senseless speech, 
of the kind Hobbes describes, to provoke or arouse positive thought, 
conceptions. He believed most words of this kind to be unmoored from human 
experience, and thus incapable of engendering thought of any kind. They are 
empty words for which there exists no corresponding, sense-generated 
conceptive content. 
Yet, the language of “unempirical thought” has interpretive and 
analytical value. The analysis of the chapter shows that, although forbidden by 
his philosophy of language, Hobbes harbored a concern about patterns of 
thinking, ways being in and responding to the world, shaped and structured by 
ersatz ideas and words – both nonsense, “contentless” ideas and words, and 
more broadly, ideas and words without clear antecedents in sense experience. 
“Unempirical thought” gets at and encapsulates the concern, even if it, at times, 
fails to square with the apparently rigid, formal strictures of Hobbesian 
philosophy. 
Second, Hobbes fixed his attention on the turmoil wrecked by causal 
myopia and worried about peoples’ capacity to correctly apprehend causes and 
 




effects. However, he believed that it was better to be wholly “ignorant of 
causes” than to misreckon them. “For ignorance of causes,” he contends, “does 
not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for 
causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the 
contrary.”450 For Hobbes, misunderstanding the relation between cause and 
effect was more than a philosophical abstraction, a matter without bearing on 
the world he inhabited. Within the context of practical political decision-
making, miscalculations of cause and effect, “taking for causes of what” one 
means to do the “causes of the contrary,”451 could result in the compounding 
miseries of disobedience, lawlessness, and ultimately, civil war. It was precisely 
with reference to this concern that Hobbes justified his work, pitying those 
“destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely Morall and Civill Science,) to 
see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such 
payments be avoided.”452  
At the same time, Hobbes considered the failure to “enquire” about 
cause and effect a scourge, and attributed various political ills to a failure to 
inject everyday decision-making with “generall Rules” worked out through the 
targeted application of science to the world.453 In Leviathan he frets that in the 
absence of such causal understanding about the “originall constitution of Right, 
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Equity, Law, and Justice” individuals will instead rely upon “Custome and 
Example,” shabby, unreliable, and mutable conventions, as “the rule of [their] 
action.”454 He further specifies that without an understanding of reliable rules 
about consequences, the ignorant are susceptible to “credulity”455 and, worst of 
all, estranged from the true “Causes of peace.”456 
Hobbes found estrangement from the true causes of peace particularly 
troubling. He believed it was important for individuals to have the capacity to 
engage in “big picture” causal reasoning about factors that would affect their 
wellbeing, the determinants of peace in particular. He actively worried about 
those unable to understand and see how the downstream consequences of their 
actions would or would not support the social and political project of peace in 
the long term. As he points out, “Ignorance of remote causes” will dispose “men 
to” wrongly “attribute all events, to the causes immediate and Instrumental,”457 
and thereby make choices at cross-purposes to their real interests (peace).  
The concern about the facility to engage in “big picture” causal thinking 
extended, in principal, to two populations of readers. The first were sovereign 
readers. As he wrote Leviathan, England’s was a political and social order in 
flux, as old routines and institutions were reworked and reimagined or 
scrapped altogether. That is, Hobbes’s was a world of constant churn and 
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becoming. Leviathan was composed, in part, for a transitional moment in 
which many, or most things were up in the air. He meant for the sovereign to 
have what was needed to navigate the moment and this change. And what 
rulers needed most were hard-and-fast empirical rules: an understanding of 
how discrete decisions would ripple out and change and affect the political and 
social landscape. As Hobbes memorably puts it, from “Negligent government of 
Princes” naturally follows “Rebellion.”458 Dressed up in the language of our 
time, Leviathan can be characterized as a white paper, something to be used by 
political leaders for the purpose of making smart, empirical policy decisions 
informed by a long-view analysis. As noted, it is likely Hobbes presumed the 
book would be read by a sovereign, most likely Charles II. However, the balance 
of evidence contradicts the stronger thesis that the book was exclusively 
written for a sovereign, whether his former pupil or someone else. 
Leviathan presumes another principal audience. Hobbes hoped to 
remake the public imaginary, as to facilitate individuals to make choices 
informed by correct causal calculus. To do this, the ideas would need to suffuse 
the different strata of society. Aristocrats needed a course correction as much 
as ordinary folks. And he viewed the university as the mechanism for 
deployment. Recall his belief that “the Universities are the Fountains of Civill, 
Morall Doctrine, from whence the Preachers, and the Gentry, drawing such 
water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the Pulpit, and in their 
Conversation) upon the people….” Both groups needed the capacity to think in 
 




real, empirical, causal terms. In other words, Hobbes viewed peace as a 
collective project, and “ignorance of causes” as at odds with the project of 
peace. 
Thus, Hobbes saw myopia as corrosive to a well-ordered society. He 
blamed short-sighted thinking and “ignorance of the Causes of Peace” for the 
proliferation of “men that are grieved with payments to the Publique,” who 
“discharge their anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, 
and other Officers of the pulique Revenue…adhere to such as find fault with the 
publike Government” and who ultimately “fall…upon the Supreme 
Authority.”459 What follows from ignorance of causes, Hobbes is saying, is a 
kind of social combustibility that is dangerous and deleterious to political 
order. “From ignorance of the Causes of Peace,” the text’s marginalia 
summarizes, follows “Adhaerence to private men” 460 – to specious opinion, not 
true causal calculus.  
Hobbes took it upon himself to specify these causes. He “sif[ted] to the 
bottom, and with exact reason weig[hed] the causes, and nature of Common-
wealths” for those who “suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from 
ignorance thereof….”461 This orientation – Hobbes’s concern about both causal 
myopia and unempirical speech – is encoded into the text’s exposition and 
appears in a variety of locales, including discussions of nature, theology, 
politics, and crime and punishment. 
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II. Nature, human mind, and the specter of false doctrine 
 
Leviathan, like The Elements of Law, opens with a highly memorable 
discussion of human sense experience and the human mind. However, it would 
be wrong to conclude that the discussion serves the same programmatic ends 
in both texts. The rationale provided for the study of human nature changed 
from The Elements to Leviathan. Put differently, though Leviathan retains The 
Elements’ distinctive organizational scheme, with a thick set of chapters on 
human nature and human psychology, followed by additional sets on the state 
of nature, the composition of political formations, and the law, it would be 
wrong to take the similarity of organizational set-up as indicative of a deeper 
selfsame programmatic-philosophical ambition.  
The Elements of Law, as originally conceived, was an expression of 
Hobbes’s early enthusiasm for motion and newly trendy Continental-style 
approaches to science. The signal conceit of The Elements was to bring this 
knowledge, and way of knowing, to bear on the study of politics and law, 
setting Hobbes’s work apart from other recent contributions to the field, 
including (and especially) Hugo Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis and John 
Selden’s Mare clausum (itself a response to Grotius’s Mare liberum). That is, 
The Elements’ chapters on human nature putatively served a philosophical 
ambition to develop a political science undergirded by natural-philosophical 
treatment. Specifically, Hobbes justified the inclusion of the chapters by noting 
their importance to the study of politics. He wrote that political analysis should 
be grounded, in part, in the study natural human bodies. “The true and 
perspicuous explication of the elements of laws, natural and politic…dependeth 
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upon the knowledge of what is human nature, what is a body politic, and what 
it is we call a law.”462  
It is notable that the opening paragraphs of the first chapter of Leviathan 
no longer tout knowledge of human nature, the workings of human sense 
experience in particular, as a prerequisite for understanding political systems 
and political bodies. By the time that he began composing Leviathan, Hobbes 
had embraced the view (discussed in the previous chapter) that it is possible to 
know the rudiments of civic duty without first having knowledge of human 
nature, believing “To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to 
the business now in hand.” He nevertheless thought the explication of sense a 
necessary inclusion as it “fill[ed] each part of” his “present method,”463 by 
satisfying the plan outlined in Leviathan’s introduction, which calls for a 
consideration of “the Matter” that makes up the commonwealth: man.464  
However, Leviathan’s analysis gives another reason for the inclusion of 
the chapters on human nature. The reason serves a new, distinct set of 
epistemological and political ends. Hobbes repurposed the discussion and used 
it to identify nugatory theories of sensation and, in turn, neutralize senseless 
speech. Thus, the discussion was not mechanically included to merely “fill” in 
of “each part of” the “present method.” He used the discussion of sense to 
correct mistaken empirical claims about the origins and operations of “naturall 
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sense,” and in so doing, to sound alarms bells about the need to combat the 
“insignificant Speech”465 being promulgated by England’s universities.  
Put differently, Hobbes aimed Leviathan’s discussion of sense at the end 
of revealing and eradicating insignificant speech, rather than strictly to the end 
of developing a deductive political science. He may have viewed knowledge of 
the “naturall cause of Sense” as “not very necessary to the business now at 
hand” and unneeded to comprehend the basic principles of his politics. 
However, Leviathan’s first chapter on sense was necessary to put into relief 
doctrines and patterns of thinking, beamed into the minds of students of 
England’s universities, which he judged capable of feeding social and political 
tumult.  
A comparison of the discussion of sense in the first chapter of Leviathan 
with its antecedents, from The Elements of Law, elucidates the shift. In The 
Elements the discussion of sense operates as an expository device, used to 
demonstrate a pair of linked epistemic and ontological propositions. The first 
proposition is about the subjectivity of secondary qualities; the second, in turn, 
addresses the principle of motion. That is, “whatsoever accidents or qualities 
our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are 
seemings and apparitions only [proposition one] 466. The things that are really 
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in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused 
[proposition two]467.”468  
Leviathan conscripts the analysis of the mechanics of human sense into 
a broader critique of unempirical speech. Hobbes begins by importing and 
repeating The Elements’ account of the physics of sense.469 However, Leviathan 
moves on to explicitly position the account against the wrongheaded theories 
of sensation that had been spread around by “Philosophy-schooles.”470 
Circulated in some of the philosophical circles in which Hobbes ran,471 these 
theories made sensation the result of the emanation and flow of “species” – a 
mysterious, and by Hobbes’s lights, obviously made-up kind of physical particle 
– from an object to the organs of human sense. By his account, a species-view 
of sensation posits that an object, say an apple, emits species, which when 
received by the eye, are registered and facilitate a particular type of sense 
experience: the experience of seeing that apple, as it really exists. Leviathan 
chastises “all the Universities of Christendome” for having taught the “doctrine” 




468 Ibid, 6 [2.10]. 
 
469 As in The Elements of Law, Leviathan notes how all dimensions of sensing, at root, are 
caused by the effects of motion: an interaction between an “External Body, or Object” and “the 
organ proper to each Sense,” which are “presse[d]” on “diversely” by the “many several motions 
of the matter,” 22. Also see: Baumgold, Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political Theory, 
5-9. 
 
470 Hobbes, Leviathan, 24. 
 
471 See the essay “Robert Payne, the Hobbes Manuscripts, and the ‘Short Tract’,” in Malcolm’s 





(for seeing), “Audible species” (for hearing), and even “intelligible species” (for 
understanding).472 
The purpose of the discussion is not to supply philosophical 
underpinnings sufficient to prop up the superstructure of Hobbes’s political 
theory. Rather, Hobbes reframed the chapter on sense to make it responsive to 
a growing concern about unempirical speech and its effects. The extended 
treatment of a species theory of sense was intended to offer an object example 
of “insignificant Speech,” disseminated by “Universities,” which needs to be 
“amended.”473  
At a first glance, a species-based theory of sense may appear to be 
nothing more than benign hokum. However, Hobbes considered this and other 
kinds of unempirical explanation to be socially and politically dangerous 
hokum. Belief in unreal things and unempirical thinking, he worried, sets the 
stage for misunderstandings of a more fundamental and consequential kind, 
creating the conditions for social strife and political upheaval.  
Hobbes used Leviathan’s inquiry into imagination as a vehicle to 
connect the dots, showing how ostensibly benign unempirical hokum creates 
the conditions for destructive forms of misunderstanding. The discussion of 
imagination follows the pattern established in the first chapter of the text.474 
The inquiry, imported from The Elements, was remade to serve a new political 
 








point. Specifically, the inquiry drives a wedge between two forms of mental 
experiences, pure fancies, unmoored from sensible reality and internal motions 
of the mind prompted by “Vision and Sense.”475 Hobbes contends that were the 
cognitive capacity to distinguish between the two short-circuited things could 
go very wrong in a hurry. What will result is a culture saturated by unreal, 
unempirical belief. “From” the “ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and 
other strong Fancies, from Vision and Sense, did arise” the worship of “Satyres, 
Fawnes, Nymphs, and the like.” So too, “now adayes the opinion that rude 
people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches.”476 
What follows from superstition, Hobbes believed, is a country of dupes, easily 
stirred into action by the unreal specters aroused by “evill men.”477 More 
precisely, the text explains that what follows from superstition and the 
unempirical fears that accompany it is credulity – a willingness to put one’s 
belief in and act for “evill men” who “under pretext that God can do any thing, 
are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn.”478  
Thus, the discussion of imagination serves Hobbes’s empirical concern. 
It is used to demonstrate how neutralizing the inclination to embrace forms of 
subterfuge and superstition associated with Catholicism,479 and in so doing, 
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restoring a person’s capacity to parse what is real from what is not, would 
produce subjects more suited to civil order. “If this superstitious fear of Spirits 
were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, 
and many other things depending thereon…men would be much more fitted 
than they are for civill Obedience.”480 In other words, Hobbes worried that, 
without a solid understanding of nature and the world, people would 
unthinkingly accept “insignificant speech” and bunk metaphysics as true, and 
in turn lack the cognitive capacity to distinguish what is real from what is 
unreal. In particular, people would be inclined to religious superstition, fear of 
unreal spirits, mistake the content of dreams for reality, and, in general, think 
in patterns at odds with political order and Hobbes’s own austere 
Protestantism.  
Likewise, Leviathan’s account of mental discourse, human memory, and 
understanding was remade and used to mount an empirical attack on the 
political problem of prophecy. The account, like the others in the early chapters 
of Leviathan, is mostly rehashed, taken over and adapted from The Elements. 
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However, to the account Leviathan adds quick asides that turn a previously 
innocuous discussion of memory and conjecture against the politically 
consequential concept of prophecy. What results is a deflationary account of 
prophecy that remakes it into an empirical concept and phenomenon. 
Leviathan indicates that only God is capable of supplying providence, “For the 
foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him [God] by 
whose will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds 
Prophecy.”481 It follows that true providence cannot originate in humans. 
Human “prophecy,” Hobbes minimizes, is equivalent to mean guesswork. “The 
best Prophet naturally is the best guesser,” he wrote, “and the best guesser, he 
that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at…”482 The discussion 
of prophecy draws clear lines around what is real or not, what is empirical and 
certain and what is not. The analysis of the operations and kinds of human 
thought Hobbes delivered? Real, reliable. Human-generated, super-natural 
prophecy? Impossible. The discussion, like others, demolished unempirical 
claims and reflexive, rote patterns of understanding that failed to square with 
Hobbes’s empiricism. 
In place of prophecy Leviathan offers empirical insight and exalts a form 
of causal-cum-geometrical reasoning capable of generating rules about and 
descriptions of the causes of things in the world superior to the mean 
guesswork of prudence-peddling prophets. Hobbes was no prophet. Rather 
 






than focused on what will be, he endeavored to spell out what is. He did this by 
holding his world – full of superstition, misunderstandings about nature, and 
the true capacities of the human mind – up to an empiricizing mirror. He 
sought to encourage changes in the “Appetites” of readers by mapping out 
“long chain[s] of consequences,” something “which very seldome any man is 
able to see the end.”483 He observed that “he who hath by Experience, or 
Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best 
himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsell unto others.”484 The 
substance of Leviathan shows that Hobbes reckoned himself to have had this 
capacity.  
Thus, while owing material to The Elements, Leviathan’s opening 
chapters are calibrated in part to the project of bringing this philosophical 
material to bear on problematic features of the world as observed by Hobbes. 
Repeatedly, he uses discussions of nature, the human mind, and the human 
experience as a staging ground to mark out and correct different forms and 
patterns of unempirical thought, and to call out its promulgators. Put 
differently, Leviathan gives the material from The Elements on nature and 
epistemology a more prominent political edge. And the chapters that follow 
continue in the established vein, supplying content to replace ersatz, 
unempirical ideas while delineating sets of rules that can be used to clean up 
everyday discourse and purge it of empirically hollow speech. In addition to 
supplying an empirical corrective intended to point out errors in thinking 
 





about nature and the human mind, the chapters aim Hobbes’s empiricizing 
mirror at a variety of other features of his world, correcting mistakes in 
reasoning about religious ideas and doctrines, the nature and purpose of 
political formations, and crime and punishment, themes the sections that 
follow pick up and address in turn.  
III. Religious nonsense 
 
Concerned about the way in which religious doctrine and ideas imperil 
and color decision-making, Leviathan’s discussions of imagination,485 mental 
discourse,486 reason and science,487 and the passions,488 mount attacks on a range 
of explicitly religious positions and concepts, subjecting each to hard-nosed 
empirical scrutiny. The same empiricism is visible in the attacks that 
immediately follow, on the nature of enthusiasm, the work of Francisco Suárez, 
the natural origins of religion, and the prospect of “eternall rewards” after death. 
In addition, the selfsame orientation, and use of empirical critique, is on display 
in parts III and IV of the text. That is, the orientation, and method of critique, 
appears in all parts of Leviathan, something elided by Martinich’s assessment 
that parts III and IV of the text are distinct in terms of “method and…content,” 
and thus “substantially different” from the first two parts.489 
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Hobbes found the idea of enthusiasm, the idea that humans can serve as 
vessels for divine spirit, empirically and scripturally implausible. He demolished 
the concept by subjecting it to a rigorous form of scriptural-cum-empirical 
analysis, noting that there is an absence of scriptural precedent to support the 
idea that “prophecy by possession of Spirit”490 is possible, and writing that God 
communicated to the prophets of the Bible through the senses. “Neither did the 
other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God spake in 
them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream; and the Burthen of the Lord, was 
not Possession, but Command.”491 Hobbes believed that God communicates in 
ways that are empirically cognizable, “by Voyce, Vision,” and less verifiable but 
nonetheless explicable, through “Dream[s].” Such an empirical account of the 
modus operandi by which God transmits divine command precludes the 
possibility of possession and the in-dwelling of spirit. Instead, Hobbes supplied 
an alternative explanation of “possession of Spirit,” one rooted in the operations 
of human anatomy and the passions. “Enthusiasme” was held to be passion-
driven madness, a psychological state that results from a “stronger…more 
vehement Passio[n] for anything.”492 Enthusiasm, he believed, is a kind of 
delusion, driven by an overwhelming surfeit of passion for something. 
Similar empirical assessment follows in Hobbes’s evaluation of Francisco 
Suárez, an avatar of both scholasticism and Catholicism. As he did to the notion 
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of enthusiasm, Hobbes took an empirical sledgehammer to ideas associated with 
Francisco Suárez, in whose and others’ work Hobbes found willful, self-serving 
obfuscation. Empirical assessment of the concept of transubstantiation for 
example, reveals it and similar concepts promoted by thinkers like Suárez to be 
meaningless claptrap. Their “words,” Hobbes writes, “are without any thing 
correspondent to them in the mind,”493 and thus anything in the world. He saw 
in defective thinking, as of the sort encouraged by Suárez, the germ of a disease 
capable of ravaging a body politic. Suárez and his ilk, all chronic absurdity-
peddlers, were either mad or “intend to make others so.”494 Hobbes labeled the 
inclination to abuse words and traffic in absurdity a form of madness, not unlike 
enthusiasm, driven by “by clear Thoughts of…worldly lust.”495 
The empirical theme continues in a new standalone treatment of natural 
religion, which discovers the origins of religion in the natural human impulse to 
speculate about causes. The anthropology highlights the depth of Hobbes’s 
concern about the extent to which the human mind is naturally vulnerable to 
empirically misleading religious ideas. These ideas, whether well informed by 
genuine scripture or, as with Francisco’s, “without any thing correspondent to 
them in mind,” are an expression of a real, ineradicable human impulse. Hobbes 
assesses that religion, “an opinion of a Diety, and Powers invisible, and 
supernaturall…can never be abolished out of human nature, but that new 
 








Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, 
as for such purpose are in reputation.”496  
It is this concern about the human natural impulse to fill in gaps in 
understanding with speculative, supernatural causes that haunts Hobbes’s 
discussion of eternal rewards, the eager search to “attai[n]” knowledge of the 
means to “eternall felicity after death.” 497 People in Hobbes’s world were 
especially vulnerable to alluring notions of “eternall felicity after death.” His 
response was to hold the idea of foreknowledge of eternal rewards up to 
empirical scrutiny. He argued that, while the causes of peace on earth are known 
and fully cognizable, “there is no natural knowledge of mans estate after death; 
much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to breach of Faith…”498 However 
much we may probe around for answers about the afterlife, there exists no 
positive empirical evidence to support speculation about “eternall felicity after 
death.”  
The larger point lurking within the discussion of eternal rewards is that 
introducing speculative notions into the causal calculus that governs decision-
making works against precepts of reason, which are verifiable and specify the 
empirically true causes whereby “the preservation of mans life on earth” is 
secured. Hobbes persistently worried about how particular ideas concerning 
“eternall felicity after death” could serve as justification for all manner of horrible 
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acts, including rebellion, leading people to believe “it a work of merit to kill, 
depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted over them by their 
own consent.”499 
In the third and fourth parts of Leviathan can be found the same 
analytical-empirical posture. That is, in parts three and four are areas of 
exposition illustrative of Hobbes’s deepened empirical concerns, in which 
method is used as a means to work through and substantively address elements 
of his world, features of common discourse and different patterns of thinking, 
that he found worrisome. Such a portrait of the relation between the four parts 
of Leviathan sits in tension with the characterization of the relation proffered by 
a major Hobbes interpreter, A.P. Martinich.  
In a recent essay, Martinich explains “the method and the content of the 
second half of Leviathan are substantially different from those of the first. The 
first half aspires to science; the second does not.”500 Martinich does note that, 
throughout all parts, Hobbes maintains his trademark, communicative style, the 
“ideals of clarity and precision.”501 Martinich also recognizes that the “second half 
of Leviathan” targets “False and nonsensical language in religion,” which “caused 
contention and sedition.”502 However, what his analysis overlooks is how this 












used the text to mark out and correct patterns of unempirical thought, making 
method into a device that serves or is subsumed under the substantive, empirical 
concerns that make Leviathan distinctive.503 That is, I argue that Martinich 
misdiagnoses the relation between concern and method in the text, and in so 
doing, misunderstands the role of method in Leviathan and the ends it serves. 
Rather than divergent, the two “halves” of Leviathan are, in important and 
appreciable ways, substantially similar, and speak to a common project. 
An illustrative example from part III of Leviathan that elucidates the 
continuity between the different parts of the text is found in Hobbes’s discussion 
of “the Signification of SPIRIT, ANGEL, and INSPIRATION in the Books of the Holy 
Scripture.”504 The discussion, in important respects, mirrors Leviathan’s account 
of human sense, which was imported from The Elements of Law,505 and as already 
noted, adapted, expanded, and remade to serve the substantive ends that 
orientate the new text. In addition to revising and expanding the explanation of 
 
503 Although plausibly motivated by a set of concerns and motivations altogether different from 
the ones that are the focus of this chapter, Hobbes may have nevertheless used method in a 
similar way in the latter (mostly new) chapters of De cive. Nevertheless, and interestingly, 
Martinich’s characterization may gain some traction within the context of a study of the 
religious chapters of De cive. Alison McQueen detects a change in scriptural strategy between 
The Elements of Law and De cive, as Hobbes pivoted to address the conscription of Old 
Testament material to serve Parliamentarian designs, “‘A Rhapsody of Heresies:’ The Scriptural 
Politics of On the Citizen,” in Hobbes’s On the Citizen: A Critical Guide, eds. Robin Douglass 
and Johan Oslthoorn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 193-196. The largely new 
chapter set divaricates not just thematically, but, in some elements of exposition, with respect 
to analytical strategy (see, e.g., the sweeping historical analysis in De cive’s sixteenth chapter). 
For more on the “drift” of Hobbes’s political texts, and how a need to respond to and address 
contemporaneous events and changes in his world may have plausibly resulted in forms and 
patterns of analysis that transgress the strictures of Hobbesian methodology and complicate 
notions vis-à-vis the systematicity of Hobbesian political theory, see the conclusion to chapter 
5. 
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sense given in The Elements, Leviathan conscripts the account into a project of 
education reform and the eradication of insignificant speech, as shown in Table 
4.1 below. The pertinent additions are bolded. 
Table 4.1, which puts the relevant passages on sense from The Elements 
and Leviathan in parallel, is intended to supply a reference point against which 
to compare the pattern of adaptation between the discussion of the signification 
of spirit set out in The Elements versus Leviathan. Similar to its account of sense, 
Leviathan’s discussion of spirit pulls inspiration from a companion discussion 
from The Elements. The relevant passage in The Elements is compact and limited 
to simply distinguishing between two significations of the word “spirit,” as (i) “a 
body natural, but of such subtilty that it worketh not on the senses” and (ii) the 
commonplace understanding of spirits as “substance without dimension.” 
Hobbes rejected the second signification, as “substance” and “without 
dimension” cannot be copulated to produce meaning since they “flatly contradict 
one another.”506  
The parallel discussion in Leviathan was set up to bring the full de-
ambiguating, methodological might of “true Ratiocination” to bear on the 
question of how to signify the term. It transforms the short discussion from The 
Elements into a sprawling, empirical explication of the words “SPIRIT” and  
“BODY” calibrated to the explicit purpose of stamping out “the language” 
promulgated by “the Schools.”507 An excerpt from Leviathan’s discussion of spirit 
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Table 4.1: A Comparison of The Elements of Law, Chapter 2, Paragraph 9 and  
Leviathan, Chapter 1, Paragraphs 4-5 
The Elements of Law, Chapter 2, 
Paragraph 9508 
Leviathan, Chapter 1, Paragraphs 4-
5509 
9. As colour is not inherent in the 
object, but an effect thereof upon us, 
caused by such motion in the object, 
as hath been described: so neither is 
sound in the thing we hear, but in 
ourselves. One manifest sign thereof 
is: that as a many may see, so also he 
may hear double or treble, by 
multiplication of echoes, which 
echoes are sounds as well as the 
original; and not being in one and the 
same place, cannot be inherent in the 
body that maketh them. Nothing can 
make anything in itself: the clapper 
hath no sound in it, but motion, and 
maketh motion in the internal parts of 
the bell; so the bell hath motion, and 
not sound. That imparteth motion to 
the air; and the air hath motion, but 
not sound. The air imparteth motion 
by the ear and nerves to the brain; and 
the brain hath motion but not sound. 
From the brain it reboudeth back into 
the nerves outward, and thence it 
becometh an apparition without, 
which we call sound…That as in 
conception by vision, so also in the 
conception that arise from other 
senses, the subject of their inherence 
is not the object, but the sentient. 
4. The cause of Sense, is the externall 
Body, or Object, which preseeth the 
organ proper to each Sense, either 
immediately, as in the Tast and 
Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, 
Hearing, and Smelling: which 
pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, 
and other strings, and membranes of 
the body, continued inwards to the 
Brain, and Heart, causeth there a 
resistance, or counter-pressure, or 
endeavour of the heart, to deliver it 
self: which endeavour because 
Outward, seemeth to be some matter 
without. And this seeming, or fancy, is 
that which men call Sense…So that 
Sense in all cases, is nothing els but 
originall fancy, caused (as I have said) 
by the pressure, that is, by the motion, 
of externall things upon our Eyes, 
Eares, and other organs thereunto 
ordained. 
 
5. But the Philosophy-schooles, 
through all the Universities of 
Christendome, ground upon certain 
Texts of Aristotle, teach another 
doctrine [viz. a species-based theory 
of sense]…I say not this, as 
dispproving of the use of 
Universities; but because I am to 
speak hereafter of their office in 
the Common-wealth, I must let 
you see on all occasions by the way, 
what things would be amended in 
them; amongst which the 
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is paired, below, with its antecedent from The Elements. As in Table 4.1, the key 
adaptation – which shows how Hobbes conscripted the discussion into a project 
of education reform and the eradication of insignificant speech – is in bold. Put 
differently, Table 4.2 shows how the explication of the word “spirit” imported 
from The Elements was turned against the “Schools” and used to highlight 
commonplace uses of the word that traffic in “Idols” – apparitional phenomena, 
that are, properly speaking, “nothing.” 
The full discussion of spirit in Leviathan has more heft than The Elements’, 
having been expanded into a multi-paragraph treatment that opens with an 
indictment of unempirical specifications of the term. In ordinary language, 
Leviathan points out, the word is understood to be synonymous with material, 
cognizable phenomena, like “Wind, or Breath.” However, the term also attaches 
to  
…those Idols of the brain, which represent Bodies to us, where they are 
not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a Dream, or to a Distempered brain waking, 
they are…nothing, Nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to bee; and 
in the brain it self, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the action 
of the objects, or from the disorderly agitation of the Organs of our Sense. 
And men, that are otherwise imployed, then to search into their causes, 
know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be 
perswaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some call 
them Bodies, and think them made of aire compacted by a power 
supernaturall, because the sight judges them corporeall; and some to call 
them Spirits, because the sense of Touch discerneth nothing in the place 
where they appear, to resist their fingers: So the proper signification of 
Spirit in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid, and invisible Body, or a 
Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the Imagination.510 
 
Hobbes used the discussion of “body” and “spirit” to purge the theological 
 
 




Table 4.2: A Comparison of The Elements of Law, Chapter 11, Paragraph 4 and 
Leviathan, Chapter 34, Paragraphs 1 & 3 
The Elements of Law, Chapter 11, 
Paragraph 4511 
Leviathan, Chapter 34, Paragraphs 1 & 
3512 
4. By the name of spirit we understand 
a body natural, but of such subtilty 
that it worketh not on the senses; but 
that filleth up the place which the 
image of a visible body might fill up. 
Our conception therefore of spirit 
consisteth of figure without colour; 
and in figure is understood 
dimension: and consequently, to 
conceive a spirit, is to conceive 
something that hath dimension. But 
spirits supernatural commonly signify 
some substance without dimension; 
which two words do flatly contradict 
one another. And therefore when we 
attribute the name of spirit unto God, 
we attribute it, not as a name of 
anything we conceive, no more than 
when we ascribe unto him sense and 
understanding; but as a signification 
of our reverence, who desire to 
abstract from him all corporal 
grossness. 
1. Seeing the foundation of all true 
Ratiocination, is the constant 
Signification of words; which in the 
Doctrine following, dependeth not (as 
in natural science) on the Will of the 
Writer, nor (as in common 
conversation) on vulgar use, but on 
the sense they carry in the Scripture; 
It is necessary, before I proceed 
any further, to detemerine, out of 
the Bible, the meaning of such 
words, as by their ambiguity, may 
render what I am to inferre upon 
them, obscure, or disputable. I will 
begin with the words BODY, and 
SPIRIT, which in the language of 
Schools are termed, Substance, 
Corporeall, and Incorporeall. 
 
3. …Therefore in the common 
language of men, Aire, and aeriall 
substances, use not to be taken for 
Bodies, but (as often as men are 
sensible of their effects) are called 
Wind, or Breath, or (because the same 
are called in the Latine Spiritus) 
Spirits; as when they call that aeriall 
substance, which in the body of any 
living creatures, gives it life and 
motion, Vitall and Animall spirits. But 
for those Idols of the brain, which 
represent Bodies to us, where they 
are not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a 
Dream, or to a Distempered brain 
waking, they are (as the Apostle 
saith generally of all Idols) 
nothing; Nothing at all, I say, there 
where they seem to bee; and in the 
brain it self, nothing but tumult, 
proceeding either from the action of  
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Table 4.2, continued 
The Elements of Law, Chapter 11, 
Paragraph 4 
Leviathan, Chapter 34, Paragraphs 1 & 
3 
 the objects, or from the disorderly 
agitation of the Organs of Sense…So 
that the proper signification of Spirit 
in common speech, is either a subtile, 
fluid, and invisible Body, or a Ghost, 
or other Idol or Phantasme of the 
Imagination…. 
 
imaginary of unreal specters, semantic associations that are “Nothing at all,” but 
which, if internalized, would make people available to be “perswaded, by those 
whose knowledge they much reverence.” In other words, seeing how patterns of 
unreal or unempirical thought could kickstart and then feed the machinery of 
rebellion, Leviathan’s discussion of the signification of the word “spirit” aims to 
cut the term free from meanings that could neither be substantiated scripturally, 
nor just as important, empirically. And Biblical exegeses, Hobbes contends, 
supports an empirical understanding of the term. “How we came to translate 
Spirits, by the word Ghosts, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor 
earth, but the Imaginary inhabitants of mans brain, I examine not; but either 
properly a real substance, or Metaphorically, some extraordinary ability or 
affection of the Mind, or of the body.”513 Scripturally informed signification 
supports the idea that the term ought refer to empirical things – real substances 
or states of mind – not “Idols.” 
Thus, Hobbes altered the semantic purchase of the term, draining it of 
offending content. After all, what he was worried about were will-o’-the-wisps. 
 




He was concerned that folks, both aristocrats and ordinary folks, would get 
tripped up on or entangled in unempirical snares. As noted in the introduction, 
he viewed the geometrical practice of definition – cleansing words of ambiguity 
and cutting them free from ersatz meanings – as a machete that could slice 
through the snares of unempirical thought. In the relevant passage, he wields 
this machete to diminish and demolish certain ordinary language 
understandings of the word “spirit.” The commonplace signification of the term, 
as “Ghosts,” represented a form signification Hobbes could not abide. 
The empirical concern is also woven into the wholly new part IV of the 
text, including Hobbes’s discussion of the second of the Ten Commandments, 
the proscription that “they [the Israelites] should not make to themselves any 
Image to Worship, of their own Invention.”514 In its thrust, the discussion corrects 
misimpressions about what an “Image” is. To do this, Leviathan uses a quotation 
from Paul, that “We know that an Idol is Nothing,”515 as a lever to displace 
misunderstandings around the issue of religious images and idol worship. The 
exegesis offers that it is not that Paul “thought that an Image of Metall, Stone, or 
Wood, was nothing,” but rather, more sensibly, “that the thing which they 
honored, or feared in the Image, and held for God, was a meer Figment, without 
place, habitation, motion, or existence, but in the motions of the Brain.”516 The 
point of the discussion is to banish religious practices that rely on “meer 
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Figment[s]” – an “Image” that, empirically speaking, attaches to nothing (an 
imaginary figment that cannot properly be said to exist). So determined was 
Hobbes to pull the empirical point out of the words of Paul, and to turn his words 
against the agitating specters about which he was worried, that he imputed to 
the Paul his own ambition of explaining “an Idol” as nothing more than mere 
“motions in the Brain.”  
Recall that Hobbes assessed unempirical hokum, like species-based 
theories of sense, to be socially and politically dangerous, encouraging patterns 
of misapprehension which could snowball into forms of thinking and being in 
the world inimical to political and social order. So too, he concluded honoring 
and fearing a “meer Figment” was not an offense without wide social and political 
ramifications. “[I]f the people had been permitted to worship, and pray to Images 
(which are Representations of their own Fancies,) they had had no farther 
dependence on the true God, of whom there can be no similitude.” What is more, 
“nor” did the “people” have dependence on “prime Ministers, Moses, and the 
High Priests; but every man had governed himself according to his own appetite, 
to the utter eversion of the Common-wealth, and their own destruction for want 
of Union.”517 The text points out that the social and political costs that 
accompany image worship are of a particularly acute kind, and entail a 
circumstance in which people are prevented from engaging in the kind of 
accurate, “big picture” causal thinking necessary to create peace. Instead, the 





a state of insecurity and perpetual war, the “utter eversion of the Common-
wealth.” 
The technique used in the passage on idol worship and the Second 
Commandment is the same technique wielded across Leviathan. In new 
additions to the text, Hobbes often aimed to clarify nonsense speech, misleading 
boasts (like prophecy), or ersatz rites and practices, in empirical terms, all in an 
attempt to bring his reader back to planet earth. In the discussion of the Second 
Commandment, a crude empirical hermeneutics is at work, enacted in response 
to concerns about ideas and practices common to his world which, he thought, 
would lead people astray. Misunderstandings about what an image is within the 
context of divine worship would engender an end-of-days-style breakdown in 
political order and society. 
IV. Political concepts as empirical concepts 
 
A concern for causal myopia in political decision-making also appears in 
Hobbes’s defense of the indivisibility of sovereignty. The Elements of Law and 
De cive marshal an argument in support of absolute sovereignty that focuses on 
the general hallmarks and underpinning logics of the concept. The 
corresponding eighteenth chapter of Leviathan treats the same subject, 
however, in so doing, adds arguments and material that tack in a more 
concrete, empirical direction.  
Specifically, Hobbes endeavored to make his reader understand more 
clearly the real-world effects that follow from ostensibly small compromises 
vis-à-vis unified sovereignty. A comparison of the sixteenth paragraph of the 
chapter, with its antecedents from The Elements and De cive, puts the point in 
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high relief.518 In The Elements of Law, the relevant passage addresses what 
Hobbes terms the “marks” of “absolute sovereignty.”519 The discussion 
highlights a few key hallmarks, all inferred from his analysis of sovereignty, 
including impunity vis-à-vis punishment; the unilateral creation of laws (and 
their abrogation); the “appoint[ment] of magistrates, judges, counsellors, and 
other ministers of state;” and last, unlimited, complete discretion in all things – 
one’s ability to “do any act, which another of the same commonwealth may 
not.”520 Similarly, in De cive, the emphasis of the discussion is on the near-
limitlessness of sovereign power, the indefeasibility of sovereign right, and the 
general hallmarks of sovereignty.521    
Hobbes fills out the analysis in Leviathan, putting greater stress on the 
real-world turmoil that would result from imperfect crystallizations of or 
challenges to unified sovereign power. “[I]f [the sovereign] grant away the 
Power of raising Mony” he explains, “the Militia is in vain.” Likewise, he writes, 
“if he give away the government of Doctrines, men will be frighted into 
rebellion with fear of Spirits.” Without these rights, Hobbes indicates, the 
others a sovereign continues to “hold” will produce “no effect,” that is, no real-
world effect “in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all 
Common-wealths are Instituted...”522 There is nothing probabilistic about 
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Hobbes’s reasoning. He was not engaged in an ex hypothesi inquiry into the 
possible effects of “grant[ing] away the Power of raising Mony” or “giv[ing] 
away the government of Doctrines.” Nor was he, merely, mapping the concept 
of sovereignty and tracing its theoretical limits. He thought himself to have 
witnessed the effects of both “grant[ing] away the Power of raising Mony” and 
“giv[ing] away the government of Doctrines.” These are the effects Hobbes was 
saying to his reader – reason accordingly. 
Other new additions made to the analysis of sovereign right in Leviathan 
reveal a complementary concern. Specifically, Hobbes tacked on new analyses 
focused on the entailments that accompany covenanting;523 the process by 
which titles of honor are conferred, as to address misunderstandings that 
produce “Emulation, Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre;”524 the limited 
practical, binding effects of “words” to compel or restrict action, or to protect 
individuals from harm;525 and the actual conditions under which sovereign 
power is relinquished.526 
Similarly, he pivoted to the empirical527 in his treatment of the “dual 
sovereigns” problem. As he showed in his analysis of indivisible sovereignty, the 
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discussion with the definition of science presented in the fifth chapter, and relatedly, but more 
important, to put an empirical point on an otherwise abstract explication of the rights of 




unity of sovereignty is not merely a logical necessity or a conceptual conceit – it 
is an empirical reality. The “dual sovereigns” problem describes a situation 
wherein indivisible sovereignty comes under threat when a people claim to be 
represented by a second sovereign. Hobbes explained that such an arrangement 
is not tenable or sustainable in practice. “For that were to erect two 
Soveraigns,” he writes, “and every man to have his person represented by two 
Actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that Power, which (if 
men will live in Peace) is indivisible.”528 Again, no conceptual matter, the “dual 
sovereigns” problem corresponds to a reality Hobbes had witnessed, and 
Britons had lived, beginning in 1642, after Hobbes had already completed the 
prose for The Elements of Law and De cive. The idea of a second sovereign, 
Hobbes now took pains to point out, is empirical nonsense.529 To solidify the 
empirical point, and underscore the absurdity of the proposition, Hobbes 
presented his reader with a quick-and-dirty overview of the history of England’s 
monarchy. “I know now how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little 
observed,” he laments, “that in Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a 
descent of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign…and was unquestionably 
taken by them for their King.”530 To suggest otherwise, Hobbes meant to show, 
is to traffic in meaningless, unempirical talk. 
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Hobbes’s empirical concerns also sit at the top of an explication of crime 
and punishment in an analysis that, like the others, is new to Leviathan. 
Chapter twenty-seven introduces a new standalone treatment of “CRIMES, 
EXCUSES, and EXTENUATIONS.”531 Early in the chapter, crime is traced to three 
“sources:” “some defect of Understanding; or some errour of Reasoning; or 
some sudden force of the Passions.”532 In other words, crime is the byproduct of 
“Ignorance,” “Erroneous Opinion,” or a swell of dangerous passionate 
energies.533 And Hobbes’s analysis of crime, as well as the chapter on 
punishment that follows it, is calibrated to fill in these gaps of understanding, 
while helping his reader to appreciate the causal determinants of crime as well 
as the deleterious outcomes that flow from misreckoning.  
What Hobbes does throughout Leviathan’s discussion of crime and 
punishment is draw distinctions, but not for the sake of drawing distinctions. 
Rather the legal distinctions Hobbes draws have an empirical purchase. One 
simple representative example, illustrative of the tack Hobbes follows in the 
analysis, is the discussion of ex post facto laws. He specifies that “No Law, made 
after a Fact done, can make it a Crime.”534 His description of ex post facto laws 
is pedestrian – and uninteresting – in all dimensions. However, the dullness of 
the explanation is what makes it the perfect illustration of the point. The 
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purpose of the passage, like the passages around it, is not to abstractly map the 
law and its substrates, or to engage in heady philosophical contemplation, 
rarified legal theorizing, or the mechanical development of legal typologies. 
The point of the discussion of ex post facto law is to correct deficits in 
understanding and supply readers with information that can be relied upon to 
inform the causal calculus in which they engage as they move through the 
world.  
In the absence of information about which kinds of undertakings are 
criminal and which are not, people make mistakes, whether due to sheer 
ignorance or a fundamental misunderstanding of what the effects of actions 
will be. It is this understanding that informs Hobbes’s discussion of the various 
“defect[s] of reasoning” that make “men prone to violate the Lawes.”535 It colors 
his adjudication of crime and sin, wherein he draws an easy to follow, 
commonsense line between the two, noting that “till it [intention] appear by 
some thing done, or said, by which the intention may be argued by a human 
Judge, it hath not the name of Crime.”536 The understanding also informs the 
prescription that laws be publicly, widely declared, as, he signals, without such 
a declaration it is unreasonable to hold a person to account with respect to a 
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The selfsame concern for practical decision-making and practical cause-
effect assessments is at work in Leviathan’s analysis of self-defense, which 
supplies the reader with a set of decision rules that can be used to discriminate 
between circumstances in which extraordinary, otherwise criminal action is 
warranted, and those in which it is not, as when one suffers a small injury or 
experiences petty contempt.538  The concern is also at work when Leviathan 
takes up the timely and relevant matter of whether fear of “Invisible Spirits” is 
an excuse sufficient in weight as to offset criminal liability. Rather than carve 
out an exemption for criminal acts perpetrated in response to persecutory 
delusions, he reminds his reader of the empirical analysis given in the early 
chapters of the text, which reveals “strange Dreams and Visions” to have no 
existence beyond the imagination that renders them.539 In all instances, Hobbes 
thought it critical that subjects have the capacity and requisite information to 
engage in correct causal evaluation. Indeed, he believed “The want of means to 
know the Law, totally Excuseth.”540  
Hobbes also worried deeply about the spread of “Vain-glory,” a passion 
that prevents individuals from conducting accurate, empirical assessments of 
the world and their own capacities. He viewed “Vain-glory” as an impediment 
to good causal calculus, and balked at the notion that criminal activities 
undertaken by the vain-glorious are informed by a full understanding of what 
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the effects of those crimes will be. Indeed, it is for the benefit of presumably 
vain-glorious readers that Hobbes drew out and listed the long-term effects of 
vain-glory. “For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of 
Common-wealth [among whom the vain-glorious are prominent]…very few are 
left alive long enough,” he explains, “to see their new Designes established: so 
that the benefit of their Crimes, redoundeth to Posterity, and such as would 
least have wished it.” Consequently, the vain-glorious are “not so wise, as they 
thought they were.” What the passage impresses is that the effects of vain-
glorious behavior cut against the interests of the vain-glorious. By tracing 
through the chain of cause and effect of this behavior, Hobbes wanted to shake 
his reader out of “false opinion of their own Wisdome,”541 and put into bold the 
true, unintended costs of causal miscalculation. 
The point is further borne out by Hobbes’s discussion of natural 
punishments, seemingly placed in the text to benefit sovereign and subject 
alike. The discussion appears in chapter 31, “Of the KINGDOME OF GOD BY 
NATURE,” which, although the concluding chapter of part II, serves as a bridge, 
connecting parts II (Of COMMON-WEALTH) and III (Of A CHRISTIAN COMMON-
WEALTH), Leviathan’s “political” and “religious” parts. In typical fashion, the 
statement about natural punishments was tacked onto the end of a discussion 
of the natural kingdom of God, whose substance, in no small part, was taken 
over from De cive.542 Hobbes himself remarked on the novelty of the passage, 
indicating, 
 
541 Ibid, 462. 
 
542 Baumgold, Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political Theory, 410-415. 
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…I will adde onely to this Chapter a short declaration of his [God’s] 
Natural Punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not 
the beginning of so long a chain of Consequences, as no humane 
Providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in 
this Chayn, there are linked together body pleasing and unpleasing 
events; in such manner, as he that will do anything thing for his 
pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and 
these pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those actions, which are 
the beginning of more Harme than Good. And hereby it comes to passe, 
that Intemperance, is naturally punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with 
Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; 
Cowardise, with Oppression; Negligent543 government of Princes, with 
Rebellion; and Rebellion with Slaughter. For seeing Punishments are 
consequent to the breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments must be 
naturally consequent to the breach of the Lawes of Nature; and therefore 
follow them as their natural, not arbitrary effects.544 
 
In the passage, Hobbes does not occupy the position of disinterested 
social scientist or social theorist. The purpose of the passage is to trace through 
a chain of causal relationships, and in so doing, to put before his readers’ eyes a 
roadmap embedded with the aim of helping them to understand how fine 
misjudgments in practical decision-making will throw off harmful, long-term 
effects. Put differently, Hobbes is relating a common-sense judgment, known to 
him as a physical scientist, long before Newton posited the third law of motion: 
the force of an action will produce a proportionate reaction. From 
“Intemperance,” he writes, “Diseases” will follow; from “Rashnesse” comes 
“Mischances;” from “Injustice,” violent responses by “Enemies;” “Pride” will lead 
to “Ruine;” Cowardise…Oppression;” and most shocking, from “Negligent” 
governance naturally follows “Rebellion.” It is easy to mistake the final remark 
 
543 The assessment is of a piece with the explanation of punishments, and the effects of 
unlawful, negligent punishment, proffered in chapter 28, Leviathan, 484. 
 




for incipient support of a people, qua nature, in rebellion. However, the 
purpose of the remark about rebellion is to map out a causal relationship, and 
in so doing, expand his readers’ scope of vision. The statement is a corrective 
lens, used to right near-sighted (mis)assessments of cause and effect. 
V. Conclusion: Method, empiricism, and the political theory of Leviathan 
 
For Hobbes, as for modern social scientists, method was a tool that 
could be wielded in a variety of directions. However, understanding Leviathan, 
and what makes it distinctive and of its time, involves looking beyond method, 
to the substantive, empirical concerns that shaped the text and helped to 
determine the trajectory of its exposition, including its final two parts on 
religion, both, in part, devoted to the cause of stamping out unempirical 
thinking.  
Furthermore, an emphasis on the way in which substantive, empirical 
concerns helped to define Leviathan’s scope and exposition throws another 
methodological bias into doubt: the idea that Hobbes was a “system builder,”545 
or as Jean Hampton put it, “Hobbes’s political and philosophical beliefs were 
designed to form a unified integrated system.”546 It is, in part, an assumption 
about systematicity that is operative in Martinich’s observation that the first 
two parts of Leviathan fail to square with the second two parts. The 
characterization of Hobbes qua “system builder,” as extended to Leviathan, 
mispresents the work in two ways.  
 
545 Though the metaphor abounds, I take the quotation from Malcolm’s “General Introduction,” 
in The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), xxix. 
 




First, the characterization suggests that, as he composed Leviathan, 
Hobbes harbored grand, architectonic ambitions. There is no denying that his 
ambitions were grand. However, as the chapter shows, rather than focused on 
architectonics, Hobbes’s tendency was to think at a smaller scale, his attention 
often fixed on the explication of discrete, empirical topics that spoke to 
immediate, emergent concerns. In other words, as Deborah Baumgold and I 
note in a recent paper, when composing, Hobbes “operated at the level of 
arguments rather than of the edifice as a whole.”547   
Second, the characterization portrays Hobbes as an ideal theorist in the 
mold of a Thomas More,548 aiming for a degree of systematicity and rigor that 
typifies some of the most-studied works of ideal political theory in the Western 
intellectual tradition. Hobbes did not aim to idealize his world, nor did he use 
reason as a sieve to strain out its impurities, leaving behind something pure 
and perfect. In Leviathan, Hobbes aimed to write of and for the world he 
inhabited. Leviathan does not show the world as it should be. It aims to show 
what the world is, why it is as it is, and to put in bold the elements of that 
world Hobbes found concerning. Leviathan is not the image of a world as 
reflected back in an idealizing mirror. It was composed to reveal the world, as it 
really existed, to Hobbes’s readers. In sum, the political theory of Leviathan 
 
547 Baumgold and Harding, “Excavating De cive,” 21. 
 
548 Echoes of Johnston’s The Rhetoric of Leviathan are heard in Richard Tuck’s contention that 
“The appropriate comparison here is partly (again) Rousseau, but it is also More, the founder of 
the modern utopian tradition, in whose narrative Senecan or Stoic wise men, purged of their 
harmful passions by a combination of reflections and discipline, maintain ‘the best state,’” “The 
Utopianism of Leviathan,” in Leviathan After 350 Years, eds. Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 136. 
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does not form an ideal system. It is empirical. It is genealogical. But most of all, 






DE CORPORE, THE METHODS OF SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS, AND 
HOBBES INTERPRETATION 
Rarely remarked upon is the note that concludes Leviathan. In it, 
Hobbes acknowledges the text as an intellectual nuisance, an emergent 
distraction that had slowed down the more serious work on natural philosophy 
he had been engaged in throughout the 1640s. Consequently, it was with more 
than a modicum of wistfulness that he expressed a desire to “return to my 
interrupted Speculation of Bodies Naturall; wherein, (if God give me health to 
finish it,) I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this 
Aritificall Body it useth to offend.”549 God granted Hobbes’s prayer. He 
published De corpore in Latin in 1655, and in 1656 an English translation of the 
work appeared in print.550 Had God not granted Hobbes’s prayer, and had his 
 
549 Hobbes, Leviathan, 1141. 
 
550 Hobbes, Thomas, The Elements of Philosophy, The First Section Concerning Body (London: R. 
& W. Leybourn, for Andrew Crocke, 1656). The history of the English version of the text 
deserves some explanation, as it diverges, in some dimensions, from the Latin text. Noel 
Malcolm explains that “Within months of the publication of De corpore, Hobbes seems to have 
been contemplating a second edition, in which further alterations would also have been made. 
Reasons for making such changes included the evolution of his own thinking, and the 
suggestions and criticisms he received from his friends; but the most powerful reason emerged 
in the final months of 1655, when John Wallis published his scathingly polemical attack on the 
mathematical contents of the work, Elenchus geometriae hobbanae. Whatever Hobbes may 
have hoped for, the second edition of the original Latin text of De corpore was not in the offing: 
we may presume, that, at this stage, Andrew Crooke still had plenty of unsold copies. But 
Crooke was preparing to publish an English translation of it (by an unnamed translator): 
Hobbes was given the opportunity to go through the manuscript of this translation carefully, 
and to provide completely new versions of some sections of the text. The translation, Elements 
of Philosophy, the First Section, Concerning Body, was published in June 1656; here too, the 
author was still making changes at the last minute, with a new leaf substituted for one cut out 
of the printed sheets. Hobbes took this opportunity to issue a separate polemical reply to 
Wallis (and to Wallis’s colleague, now also a public critic of Hobbes, Seth Ward), entitled Six 
Lessons to the Professors of Mathematicks: this work, separately paginated and with its own 
titlepage, was bound with the main text, Concerning Body, and was also mentioned on the 
titlepage of that text,” “The Printing and Editing of Hobbes’s ‘De Corpore:’ A Review of Karl 
Schuhmann’s Edition,” Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 59, no. 1 (2004), 332. 
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health failed (as it very well could have551), much of the contemporary 
scholarship on the science of Hobbes’s political theory would, today, have a 
different complexion and bent. 
Before De corpore Hobbes had only supplied simple summaries of his 
scientific agenda and, similarly, simple explanations of method. In The 
Elements of Law he explicitly refused to offer a more comprehensive account of 
syllogistic ratiocination, implying that the stuff of such an account would be 
too “dry” for his readers. “All this that hath been said of names or propositions, 
though necessary, is but dry discourse.” The Elements of Law was “not” the 
“place” “for the whole art of logic.”552 It was in De corpore that Hobbes finally 
delivered a large dose of this dry stuff. The text delivers a first-of-its-kind, in-
depth examination of science and method, and even names methodological 
concepts that are named nowhere else in the work Hobbes produced between 
1634553 and 1655. It is due to the paucity of clear, filled-out explanations 
delineating the method of Hobbes’s political theory that scholars have 
 
551 Hobbes experienced many serious bouts of illness throughout his life, including in the 1640s, 
when, faced with a real prospect of death, he invited a priest to pray with him, administer 
communion, and hear his confession. As A.P. Martinich relates, “In August and part of 
September 1647, Hobbes was seriously ill. At times he was delirious and unable to recognize 
anyone. But he was lucid when Mersenne came to visit and tried to get him to convert to 
Roman Catholicism. Hobbes declined to abandon the church into which he had been born and 
told Mersenne that he had considered the differences between Protestant and Roman Catholic 
churches very carefully and was comfortable with his belief in the Church of England…A few 
days later, John Cosin, a protégé of William Laud and future bishop of Durham, visited in order 
to pray with him. He asked Hobbes whether he wanted to receive communion. Hobbes was 
grateful for the offer. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘if you will do it according to the rites of the Church of 
England.’ For the care of his soul, so to speak, Hobbes also confessed to John Pierson,” Hobbes: 
A Biography, 208. 
 
552 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, 16-17 [5.11]. 
 
553 The date is associated with Hobbes’s completion of a treatment of refraction, given the title 
“Mr Hobbes Analogy.” The tract is discussed in some length in chapter 2.  
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understandably used De corpore to answer questions about its method. 
Scholars treat the explanations he gives in the text as authoritative and 
incorporate them into their interpretations of his political texts, De cive554  
 
554 As Malcolm notes, “The classic text for this line of interpretation [promoted by, e.g., Maurice 
Goldsmith, that Hobbes’s natural philosophy and civil science share a common method] is the 
passage in the Preface to the second edition of De cive, where Hobbes argues that ‘every thing is 
best understood by its constitutive causes,’ and compares the analysis of the body political to 
taking apart a watch,” Aspects of Hobbes, 148. Or, as Goldsmith, using the methodological 
prescripts set down in De corpore as a lodestar, himself posits, “On Hobbes’s own terms, a 
political science or philosophy has to be similar to natural science. Hobbes’s natural science 
and his political science both begin with the imaginary annihilation, by analysis, of the 
phenomena to be explained. A conceptual apparatus is then elaborated by definition and 
deduction. In political science, human nature, the state of nature, natural right, the laws of 
nature, the construction of society, and the powers of the sovereign must all be elaborated. 
Finally the conceptual tools must be used to explain the phenomena. Natural science is used to 
give explanations of the observed phenomena of nature. If Hobbes’s political theory is 
scientific, it too must explain the observed phenomena – the experiences of men in society,” 
Hobbes’s Science of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 229. Alan Carter 
makes the point more clearly, specifically with reference to the preface to the second edition of 
De cive, writing that “the method” Hobbes “chose purported to be scientific in so far as it 
mirrored the approach taken by the School of Padua – namely, the resolutive/compositive 
method…This consisted in a two-part procedure: if one wishes to understand how something 
works, first of all, take it to pieces (the way of resolution), have a good look at its parts, and 
then put them back together again (the way of composition), taking note of how the various 
parts fit with one another…As Hobbes thought the motion of human beings in society was, in 
its fundamentals, little different from mechanical motion – everything, in his view, moves 
because of attraction and repulsion – then society could be understood in an analogous way. 
Thus, the first step in understanding society is to break it up, in some way or other, into its 
component parts. And this is precisely what Hobbes’s state of nature consists of – namely, 
isolated human individuals. The second step is to bring those individuals back together in such 
a way that they form a stable political order.” Carter argues “That Hobbes believed himself to be 
following such a method seems to be abundantly clear from the Preface to his earlier political 
treatise, De Cive,” “The Method in Hobbes’s Madness,” Hobbes Studies 12 (1999), 73. Later in the 
article, Carter adds, “There is no good reason, then, for doubting that Hobbes does advocate a 
form of the resolutive/compositive method for understanding both ‘political bodies’ and 
‘natural bodies.’ In other words, there is no good reason for simply dismissing the account he 
provides of his method in De Cive,” ibid, 87. The interpretive tack Carter follows, which uses 
the preface to the second edition (discussed at some length below) to project the methods of 
analysis and synthesis (as later understood by Hobbes) back onto the text of the first edition of 
De cive, is familiar and common. For a more detailed and reliable description of the Paduan 
approach, see J. Prins’ “Hobbes and the School of Padua: Two Incompatible Approaches of 
Science;” Stewart Duncan’s “Hobbes: Metaphysics and Method;” and Helen Hattab’s “Hobbes’s 
and Zabarella’s Methods: A Missing Link,” 462-467. Likewise, John Danford incorporates the 
methods into his interpretation De cive, as when he writes, “The greatest example of the 
application of this method, of course, is in Hobbes's own early work De Cive, which was written 
prior to, and independently of, the sections of his philosophical system which in principle 
should have preceded it. Forthright and unidealistic observation of the political world, 
according to Hobbes, quickly teaches one that the central fact of politics is competition and the 
struggle of each individual to further his own interest. This much had been claimed many times 
before, from the time of the earliest political thinking. But what Hobbes adds, or believes he 
adds, is a method whereby that opinion is transformed into knowledge. Societies are simply 
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and Leviathan555 in particular. 
This chapter raises objections to the common presumption that the 
methods outlined in De corpore offer practicable guidelines that can be used as 
bases for interpretations of Hobbes’s political works. It presents Hobbes 
scholars with a pair of reasons to doubt the presumption.  
(1) Hobbes’s methodological remarks in De corpore, in particular those 
regarding how the methods he delineates apply to the study of moral 
and political theory, are abbreviated and even vague, lacking in both 
depth and detail. In other words, Hobbes’s explicit discussion of the 
application of scientific method to moral and political theory is 
unspecific to an extent that makes it impossible to know precisely if or 
how the methods would have been used in the development of his work 
on natural right and civil duties.  
(2) Hobbes’s vision of science and scientific method evolved in different 
directions over the relevant period, from before 1640 to 1655. It is 
implausible that Hobbes designed his political theory, beginning with 
The Elements of Law in 1640, with reference to methodological prescripts 
he did not explicitly endorse until 1655. In fact, Hobbes openly eschewed 
these prescripts, and explicitly denied their relevance in the production 
of scientific knowledge in his commentary on Thomas White’s De 
 
aggregations of individual atomic men, each motivated by his own passions. To understand 
politics, then, one must begin by resolving the commonwealth into its parts, and these, further, 
into their elements,” “The Problem of Language in Hobbes’s Political Science,” 126. 
 
555 See, e.g., the introduction to chapter 4. 
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mundo, finished not long after the first edition of De cive was published 
(1642). 
Examination of points (1) and (2) leave unanswered the question of what 
the method of Hobbes’s political theory was. The conclusion offers the 
conservative assessment that, although, as chapter 4 shows, Hobbes’s political 
works are not without methodological dimensions, it may not be possible to 
develop a full appreciation of how and to what extent methodology is deployed 
in the works. Two factors, in particular, complicate, and may ultimately 
frustrate the development of a fully satisfying, complete methodological 
interpretation of Hobbes’s political works. First, Hobbes’s practice of serial 
composition produces a variety of difficulties with respect to the task of Hobbes 
interpretation.556 On the methodology question, the practice inclined Hobbes 
to project new philosophical commitments characteristic of later works back 
onto earlier versions of texts. That these retrojections comprise the bulk of 
what is known about the method of Hobbes’s moral and political theory will 
frustrate the task of diagnosing the method of his political works. Second, 
Hobbes’s commitment to the empirical study of politics complicates the task, 
 
556 Deborah Baumgold offers three principles that should inform interpretive praxis: “textual 
plausibility,” “textual specificity,” and “textual archeology.” Of “textual plausibility,” she writes, 
“Interpreters need to be careful, in the first instance, that claims about and characterizations of 
Hobbes's political theory are plausible in terms of the facts of composition and chronology. For 
example, a strong claim that Hobbes’s ‘political theory is fundamentally religious’ is 
implausible, given the sparing treatment of religion in the Elements.” Second is “textual 
specificity,” which she characterizes as “an antidote to the radical sceptic’s worry about the 
instability – the ‘openness’ – of the textual embodiment of Hobbes’s political theory…Specificity 
pertains to claims about Hobbes’s intentions as well as descriptions of his theory. McKenzie 
cautions us that the practice of serial composition, especially when it results in layered, 
complex works, makes general statements about intentionality inherently suspect.” Last is 
“textual archaeology:” that “the study of the process of composition” must be “a necessary 




as, it is reasonable to conclude, Hobbes’s empirical interests and concerns 
extended beyond, and did not obey the rigid strictures of a particular 
methodological regime. Put simply, not unlike many modern political 
scientists, it is possible, and likely, that Hobbes saw and aspired to explain 
more than narrow methodological prescripts, whatever their nature, could 
accommodate.  
I. The methods of moral and civil philosophy 
 
Hobbes produced three different versions of his political theory between 
1640 and 1651. However, neither The Elements of Law, either edition of De cive, 
nor Leviathan elaborates, in detail, how scientific method applies557 specifically 
to the study of natural right and civil duties (i.e., Hobbes’s political theory). 
This all changed in De corpore. In the text Hobbes, finally, took up the task of 
specifying in more substantive detail how scientific method applies to the study 
of moral and civil philosophy. De corpore specifies that it is possible to render 
insights about natural right and civil duties using either of the two methods 
delineated in the book’s sixth chapter, “On Method.”  
First is the method of synthesis. It is possible to get at the “Causes and 
the Necessity of constituting Common-wealths”558 synthetically. Synthesis 
involves beginning with “very first principles of philosophy” and building up, 
 
557 Although the third, Leviathan, contains a clearer statement of Hobbes’s methodological 
views c. 1651, all, but especially the first two, contain milquetoast, unspecific methodological 
statements. For The Elements, see: xvii [Epistle Dedicatory], 17 [5.11-5.12], 18-21 [6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 
6.8], 34 [9.18], 50-51 [13.3-13.4], 139-140 [27.13]. For De cive, see: 4-6 [Epistle Dedicatory 3-4, 8-10], 
10 [Preface to the Readers 9], 13 [Preface to the Readers 18], 13 [2.1], 74 [5.12], 123 [10.11], 139 
[12.12], 147 [13.9], 162 [14.16], 215 [17.12], 232 [17.28], 237-238 [18.4]. In Leviathan, discussions of 
science and philosophy are principally located in chapters 5, 9, and 46.  
 




layer by layer,559 from universal principles560 to a workable account of 
“Knowledge of what is Naturall Right, and what are Civill Duties.”561 However, 
 
559 Tom Sorell argues that “It is often claimed that the unified science expounded in the trilogy 
is a continuous deduction. The principles of morals and politics, which are placed last in the 
order of demonstration, physics from those of mechanics, and the truths of mechanics from 
those of geometry. But Hobbes himself never puts it this way. It is true that he regarded natural 
philosophy as the ‘first part’ of philosophy and geometry as the ‘first part of natural philosophy.’ 
It is true, too, that he prescribed an order for passing from the first to the last part of natural 
philosophy: mechanics was to be studied after geometry, and after mechanics the two ‘parts’ of 
physics: first the doctrine of sense, next the doctrine of sensible qualities and changes.” Sorell 
adds, “Hobbes does not say that the truths of mechanics are to be deduced from those of 
geometry, only that they are to be deduced after those of geometry. He does not say that 
physics is to be demonstrated from, only after mechanics,” thus, “In a similar way someone 
might now hold that linear algebra has to be understood before certain parts of economic 
theory can be understood: such a person would not be committed to holding that parts of 
economic theory are deducible from linear algebra,” Hobbes, 5-6. 
 
560 Richard Talaska notes, with others, that, for Hobbes, the structure and form of (what he 
understood to be) Aristotle’s philosophy was considered paradigmatic. Talaska explains, “As 
regards the form or structure of Aristotelian philosophy, Hobbes views Aristotelian science as a 
single edifice with its foundations in metaphysics. He views Aristotelian science as a system 
which gives and defines its most basic concepts at the start in metaphysics and then proceeds 
to use them throughout all the other sciences which depended on metaphysics in such a way 
that without metaphysics, the other sciences could not be understood. In this understanding, 
the other sciences have no integrity apart from metaphysics. The doctrine of metaphysics is the 
starting point both as regards investigation and as regards nature or reality.” However, “This 
Hobbesian interpretation of the structure of traditional philosophy has not been seriously 
questioned. It has, in fact, been suggested that Hobbes models the structure of his own 
philosophy of that of Aristotelianism, and that only the content is new, thus implying that 
Hobbes’s interpretation of the traditional ordering of sciences is traditional.” This 
characterization, Talaska argues, has resulted in elision: it “has led to a lack of appreciation of 
the specifically modern character of Hobbes’s own systematic ordering of philosophy,” 
“Aristotelian ‘Order’ and ‘Form’ According to Hobbes,” Rivista di Storia della Filosophia 43, no. 1 
(1988), 8-9. In sum, Talaska argues, Hobbes’s “system must be understood partly as a function 
of what he thought he was rejecting. Hobbes substituted a strict materialism for what he 
thought was gross, nonscientific spiritualism,” ibid, 10. Nevertheless, the portrait of Hobbes’s 
characterization of Aristotelianism is correct, finding support in Hobbes’s description of the 
“system” of Aristotle’s philosophy in the commentary on Thomas White’s De mundo: “When 
Aristotle was about to deal with the nature of the heavens and of the elements; with coming- 
and ceasing-to-be; and with the rest of the things in nature, he first published certain books, 
which he called Lectures on physics, and in which he argued about matter, form, place, time, 
motion, and the other questions pertaining to body in general, i.e. to all bodies whatsoever. 
Unless one knew this beforehand one could not approach the book On the Heavens or the rest 
of his books on physics…Realizing, then, that all the most common things must be investigated 
before anything less common is examined…he considered that the knowledge of being must be 
the first to be gained; from this, he thought, one should then come to the special kinds of 
being, such as heaven, earth, animal, etc. So he wrote several books in which he took being as 
his subject; this knowledge he called sophia, wisdom, for this science embraces all sciences, just 
as his subject, being includes all subjects. The same knowledge he called Philosophia prima 
because, if anyone wishes to philosophize correctly, he must commence with this. Here, 
therefore, [Aristotle] defined the notions or those names which are the commonest of all [kinds 
of] being and of the essences such as substance, accidens, quantity, number, unity, time, place 
and motion; and he deals with many others that he had written about earlier…Those books on 
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Hobbes notes that there is a methodological shortcut. There exists an easier 
way to generate the same insights that does not involve the intellectually 
burdensome task of developing an account of natural right and civil duties 
from first, universal principles.  
The selfsame insights can be generated using the method of analysis. 
Analysis is synthesis flipped on its head, or rather, reversed.562 Rather than 
beginning with first principles, analysis begins with effects, sense experience, 
 
Philosophia prima, i.e. on the elements of philosophy, came to be called the Metaphysics,” 
Thomas Hobbes: Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, 111-112 [9.16]. Thus, it may be proposed 
that, in the same way that Francis Bacon claimed to have improved on the Aristotelian 
Organon, with Novum Organon, Hobbes may have come to understand his project in a similar 
light, having meant to replace Aristotle’s “books on Philosophia prima, i.e. on the elements of 
philosophy,” with his own Elementa Philosophiae. 
 
561 Hobbes, Concerning Body, 54 [6.7]. 
 
562 In noting that “it is manifest by what has been said, that the Method of Philosophy to such 
as seek Science simply, without propounding to themselves the Solution of any Particular 
question, is partly Analyticall, and partly Syntheticall; namely, that which proceeds from sense 
to the invention of Principles, Analyticall; and the rest Synthetically,” Hobbes both reproduced 
the rudiments of commonplace understandings of regressus. Nevertheless, the outlines of 
regressus are visible in Hobbes’s description of the process by which the method of analysis is 
applied within the context of the study of moral and civil philosophy. R.W. Serjeantson 
explains, “Medieval discussions of method focused upon scientific proof by means of the so-
called demonstrative regress, or regressus. This involved finding a cause from its effect by 
induction and then demonstrating that effect back from its cause in order to obtain causal – 
and hence scientific – knowledge of a phenomenon. Accounts of methodus by Renaissance 
philosophers retained this preoccupation with causal demonstration while increasingly 
bringing philological discoveries to bear upon it. The basic context for accounts of 
demonstration in sixteenth century academic natural philosophy remained, however, 
Aristotelian logic, and specifically the account of scientific demonstration in Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics, II.13. This text, commentaries upon it, and redactions of it in textbooks and 
lecture courses encouraged the widespread view among early modern Aristotelians that a proof 
qualified as ‘scientific’ only if it was derived from premises that were universal. This was to be 
achieved by means of a syllogism, the middle term of which expressed the operative cause. The 
purpose of this form of scientific demonstration was to acquire certain knowledge of 
phenomena through ‘absolute demonstration’ (demonstratio potissima). This characteristically 
consisted of four stages: (1) observation, which provided ‘accidental’ knowledge of an effect; (2) 
induction, which allowed demonstration of the cause from the effect (demonstratio quia); (3) 
consideratio (or negotiatio or meditatio), by means of which the mind came to grasp the 
necessary association of the proximate cause with the effect; and (4) demonstration of the 
effect from the cause (demonstration propter quid), which finally provided certain knowledge 
(scientia) of the phenomenon,” “Proof and Persuasion,” in The Cambridge History of Science: 
Volume 3: Early Modern Science, eds. Katharine Park and Lorraine Datson (Cambridge: 




and works backwards from sense experience to fundamental principles. By 
reasoning from the information fed to us by the senses, Hobbes writes that it is 
possible to know the generative causes of the commonwealth. He writes that 
“but even they” unphilosophical folk563 who “have not learned the first part of 
Philosophy, namely Geometry and Physiques, may notwithstanding attain the 
Principles of Civill Philosophy, by the Analyticall Method.”564 Hobbes points out 
that “Knowledge of what is Naturall Right, and what are Civill Duties” as well as 
an understanding of the underpinning “Causes and Necessity of constituting 
 
563 Sorell expounds, “Hobbes’s remarks suggest that civil philosophy is a part of science, and yet 
teachable and learnable in isolation from the rest of science. There is a good idea here…The 
good idea is that while there can be something better than mere intuition or opinion about 
moral and political matters, while there can be such a thing as knowledge of science concerning 
the good and the just, it is not esoteric knowledge or science. It can be acquired by anyone with 
ordinary intellectual capacities, and it presupposes no special training. Plato had held that a 
genuine science of the good and of the just was possible, but that it was not accessible to 
everyone; Aristotle had held that practical wisdom could be acquired by most people but that 
there was not real (i.e. exact and systematic) science of the good and the just; Hobbes contrives 
to have it both ways. He holds that there can be a science of the good and the just, and that it 
can be made available to practically everyone, rulers and ruled alike,” Hobbes, 7. The 
practicability of Hobbes’s “good idea” is considered later, in the text of the chapter. 
 




Common-wealths” “may be known…by any mans experience,565 that will but 
examine his owne Mind566.”567 
Notice that Hobbes’s claims about the use of analysis push beyond the 
banal, tautological observation that first-hand experience of civil duties 
furnishes knowledge of those duties. Rather, what he points out is that because 
we have an intimate knowledge of the motions of the mind, the things that 
move us, it is possible to excavate information about the genesis and purpose of 
political order.568 This information is imprinted in us and is accessible to him 
who “will but examine his owne Mind.”  
 
565 For an analysis of the role of universal experience in Hobbes’s political theory, see chapter 3. 
 
566 The turn of phrase calls to mind the introduction of Leviathan, in which Hobbes makes a 
similar appeal and remark, indicating, “But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, 
and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into 
himself, and considereth that he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, feare, &c, and 
upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all 
other men, upon the like occasion,” Leviathan, 18. Mary Poovey, following Quentin Skinner, 
argues that, in the passage, Hobbes deploys a well-tried Aristotelian rhetorical technique, 
explaining, “As Quentin Skinner has argued, phrases that alluded to common experience were 
staples of classic rhetoric; Aristotle had pointed out in book 3 of The Art of Rhetoric that ‘it 
conferres also to perswasion very much to use these ordinary forms of speaking, All men know; 
‘Tis confessed by all; No man will deny and the like.’ What is noteworthy about Hobbes’s 
adaption of this device, however, is that whereas Aristotle could simply assume that ‘all men’ 
would know, confess to, or agree on certain things, Hobbes had to create a position that would 
confer commonality and that would do so by appealing to the self. Hobbes conferred 
commonality on his readers by identifying himself as the representative of ‘all men;’ he 
appealed to self-interest by identifying the interests of the commonwealth with the interests of 
every (identical) reader,” A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of 
Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 106-107. See chapter 2 for an 
opposing view, which contradicts the central premise that this “commonality” was a 
contrivance, something Hobbes labored to “create,” unlike Aristotle, who “could simply assume 
that ‘all men’ would know.” 
 
567 Hobbes, Concerning Body, 54 [6.7]. 
 
568 Thus, in this way, there is a continuity between the first edition of De cive, in which the 
concept of universal experience became a core feature of Hobbes’s political theory and his 




At a glance, Hobbes’s description of analysis, like the characterization of 
synthesis, has coherence. Both appear to offer a reasonably clear nuts-and-bolts 
overview of how each is applied to generate the principles that fill Hobbes’s 
moral and civil philosophy. However, closer scrutiny of the remarks reveals that 
neither offers a clear roadmap, detailing how the methods work at the relevant 




Recall the earlier description of how synthetic method is used to 
generate moral and political knowledge. Hobbes explains that “by the 
Syntheticall Method and from the very first Principles of Philosophy,” it is 
possible “by proceeding in the same way”569 to “come to the Causes and 
Necessity of constituting Common-wealths, and to get the Knowledge of what 
is Naturall Right, and what are Civill Duties.”570 The description echoes others. 
For example, in De corpore’s first chapter Hobbes notes that there exist two 
“principall parts” of philosophy, corresponding to the two different kinds of 
 
569 It may be reasonably presumed that what Hobbes has in mind is the method of synthesis, 
which, in this context, may entail, as Talaska puts it, “the means of generating connectedness, 
that is, of producing series of demonstrations. Science is a series of many connected 
propositions. The many propositions of a whole science are connected into series only by 
means of many demonstrative syllogisms. The connections of many demonstrations into a 
connected whole is brought about by method. ‘The whole method, therefore, of demonstration, 
is synthetical, consisting in that order of speech which begins from primary or most universal 
propositions, which are manifest of themselves, and proceeds by a perpetual composition of 
propositions into syllogisms, till at last the learner understand the truth of the conclusion 
sought after,’” “Analytic and Synthetic Method According to Hobbes,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 26, no. 2 (1988), 209-210. Nevertheless, as elaborated below, it is unclear, based on 
the formulation, what the nature of the connection between the different sections of the 
Elementa Philosophiae series was or was intended to be. 
 




bodies571 philosophers assay: “Naturall and Civill.”572 While Hobbes points out 
that each body can be discriminated from the other in terms of “Generation & 
Properties,”573 knowledge of the “Properties of a Commonwealth” demands 
some understanding of the “Affections and Manners of men,”574 and thus, 
natural bodies. Therefore, Hobbes indicates a proper, complete philosophical 
inquiry into civil bodies will begin with first philosophy and “Bodies Naturall,” 
proceed to the “Dispositions and Manners of men,” and finish with a 
demonstration of “the Civill Duties of Subjects.”575 Or as he puts it elsewhere,  
he that Teaches or Demonstrates any thing, proceed in the same 
Method by which he found it out; namely, that in the first place those 
things be demonstrated which immediately succeed to Universal 
Definitions (in which is contained that part of Philosophy which is 
called Philosophia Prima.) Next, those things which may be 
demonstrated by Simple Motion (in which Geometry consists.) After 
Geometry, such things as may be taught or shewed by manifest Action, 
that is, by Thrusting from, or Pulling towards. And after these, the 
Motion or Mutation of the invisible parts of Things, and the Doctrine of 
Sense & Imagination & of the internal Passions, especially those of Men, 
in which are comprehended the Grounds of Civil Duties, or Civil 
Philosophy; which takes up the last place.576 
 
 
571 The typology dates, at least, to The Elements of Law, which comprises three parts, the first 
“Concerning men as persons natural,” the second “Concerning men as a body politic,” and the 
third “Of the nature and kinds of laws,” xv-xvi. It is repeated in the manuscript “Logica…Ex 
T.H.,” which notes Philosophiae partes principles 2 (pro duobus corporum generibus summis) 
naturalis and civilis (“The 2 principal parts of philosophy (as the two principal kinds of body) 
natural and civil”), 463-464 [1.4]. 
 












Hobbes’s description of the application of the method of synthesis 
conforms to popular depictions of the relation between his texts on first 
philosophy, geometry and physics (the subject of De corpore); human nature 
(the subject of De homine); and natural right and civil duties (the subject of De 
cive). It is widely acknowledged that, as Hobbes himself indicates, it was his 
intent to develop a series of philosophical works that bore some degree of 
internal connection, as De corpore, De homine, and De cive all ostensibly do.577 
Yet, the remarks highlighted above, like others peppered throughout the 
Hobbesian oeuvre, are unclear about the nature of the connection. Hobbes 
relies on opaque turns of phrase and vague statements to gesture at a 
connection. “[F]rom the very first principles of Philosophy,” Hobbes writes, it is 
possible “by proceeding in the same way” to eventually “come to the Causes and 
Necessity of constituting Common-wealths.” Note how Hobbes’s 
methodological remarks give the outlines of a general ambition, however, offer 
little to nothing as to how, precisely, the method of synthesis was 
implemented, such that (as Hobbes would later put it) the “whole argument 
 
577 Martinich contends that the view articulated by proponents of the idea of autonomous civil 
philosophy, like Sorell, who argue that De cive “cannot depend on either of the first two” 
sections of the Elementa Philosophiae, “confus[e] the order of exposition with the order of 
deduction. De cive begins with the conception of human beings in the state of nature, and 
according to Hobbes’s official method, with definitions that include a definition of ‘man’ or 
‘human being.’ And ‘man’ is the topic of the second part of his science, De homine. If the 
conclusions that he draws about ‘man’ in De homine were inconsistent with his definition of 
‘man’ in De cive, the parts of his philosophy would not be logically independent, but 
inconsistent with each other…The reason that Hobbes could have given for how he was able to 
present De cive first, and could have presented De homine first, is that each part of his science 
begins with definitions and he can define the basic terms of each part of science in a way that is 
identical with the theorems of the logically prior sciences,” Hobbes, 172-173. The view puts 
Martinich in the camp of William Sacksteder and Noel Malcolm, whose answers to the “unity of 




might have the permanence of a strong chain.”578 As any blacksmith might 
point out, there are different kinds of chains, and different means of forging 
and connecting the links that comprise them. 
In the absence of concrete direction, scholars have eagerly filled in the 
gaps in Hobbes’s methodological remarks. For example, consider A.E. Taylor, 
an avatar for a group of scholars who presuppose Hobbes’s commitment to a 
program of strict deductivism. Taylor assumed Hobbes to have aspired to 
create a system, on the supposed model of axiomatic-deductive geometry, that 
was fully deductive, with each segment of philosophical inquiry connecting 
directly to the next, all segments having been derived from a few foundational 
axioms. Taylor contends that Hobbes envisaged “[a] true system of Philosophy,” 
a unity “in which the principles of morals and politics should be rigorously 
deduced from the fundamental axioms of science…”579 It was against this 
deductive ambition to create a unified science that Taylor, and the trail of 
deductivist interpreters that followed, evaluated Hobbes’s philosophical work, 
finding that Hobbes failed to realize his ambition of creating a “true system of 
Philosophy” or a theory of politics that originates in the “the fundamental 
axioms of science,” most notably, motion. 
In the century since Taylor authored his slim book on Hobbes, many 
have similarly asserted some knowledge of how the different elements of his 
philosophy do or do not connect. Donald Hanson, like William Sacksteder, 
 
578 Hobbes, “The Autobiography of Thomas Hobbes,” 26. 
 




takes aim of the premise of “deductivism,”580 something Taylor and like-minded 
interpreters take for granted. Both Hanson and Sacksteder claim, in different 
ways, that Hobbes never intended to fashion a continuous deduction.  
Hanson accuses deductivists of having committed two cardinal sins of 
interpretation: atextualism and anachronism. Plain and simple, he writes, the 
view is not supported by what Hobbes wrote or thought. Hanson contends that 
“when Hobbes says that he thinks he has demonstrated the elements of civil 
science…he did not mean that he had deduced them in any modern sense of 
'deduce', much less that his system as a whole either is or tries to be a 
continuous deduction.”581 Rather, Hanson argues that Hobbes “never made a 
claim of this latter sort, and it would surely have been inconsistent with his 
 
580 Similarly, Sorell notes, “It is a measure of Hobbes’s considerable success in projecting 
himself as a practitioner of the deductive philosophy he so admired, that this work is often seen 
(mistakenly, in my view) as a continuous derivation of politics and morals from psychology, of 
psychology from physics, and of physics from mechanics and geometry. That there is no book 
or sequence of books by Hobbes in which anything like a derivation takes him from the 
beginning of natural philosophy to the end of civil philosophy; that there is no book or 
sequence of books in which connections between these branches of sciences are presented as 
connections between Hobbes’s science, are facts that are regularly ignored. To the extent that 
Hobbes’s writings contain an overarching system, it is a system of science full-stop, not a 
system of his science. The ‘elements’ of the system are openly drawn from a lot of different 
scientists, including Euclid, Galileo, Kepler, and Harvey. On the other hand, to the extent that 
any elements of the systematized science are Hobbesian – its optics, perhaps or the doctrine in 
De cive – they do not form a system. It is true that Hobbes is a systematic philosopher: one sees 
how the parts of most of his books hang together, and one knows from Aubrey’s report of his 
working practices that he gave a lot of thought to organizing and digesting his material; the 
actual system, however, is a little elusive. Yet books continue to dwell on the system and its 
architecture. The system can be studied in context, as it has famously been studied by Watkins, 
but it more often attracts the interest of ahistorical analysts,” “Hobbes Overcontextualised?,” 
The Seventeenth Century vol. 16 no. 1 (2001), 143-4. The claim condenses the one made in Sorell’s 
“Hobbes’s Scheme of the Sciences,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 45-61. 
 
581 Donald W. Hanson, “The Meaning of ‘Demonstration’ in Hobbes’s Science,” History of 
Political Thought 11, no. 4 (1990), 588. 
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repeated skeptical emphasis on the non-demonstrable character582 of the 
several parts of natural philosophy.”583   
Similarly, Sacksteder finds deductivism to be “[t]he most virulent of the 
textbook orthodoxies,” and swipes at the idea that “Hobbes's philosophic 
scheme is ‘deductive’ in such a way that each posterior science may be deduced 
from that which precedes, and all of them, from some one ‘primary’ science.”584 
Such a scheme, Sacksteder opposes, is philosophically and logically 
unworkable: it is neither possible to derive the full content of a science from a 
single set of axiomatic principles nor is it possible to deduce all of the principles 
of a posterior science from a prior one. 
 
582 Marcus Adams may disagree with the formulation, perhaps pointing to De homine 10.5 as 
evidence. In the passage Hobbes claims “And since one cannot proceed in reasoning about 
natural things that are brought about by motion from the effects to the causes without a 
knowledge of those things that follow from that kind of motion; and since one cannot proceed 
to the consequences of motions without a knowledge of quantity, which is geometry; nothing 
can be demonstrated by physics without something also being demonstrate a priori. Therefore 
physics (I mean true physics), that depends on geometry, is usually numbered among the 
mixed mathematics. For those sciences are usually called mathematical that are learned not 
from use and experience, but from teachers and rules. Therefore those mathematics are pure 
which (like geometry and arithmetic) revolve around quantities in the abstract so that work in 
the subject requires no knowledge of fact; those mathematics are mixed, in truth, which in 
their reasoning also consider any quality of the subject, as is the case with astronomy, music, 
physics, and the parts of physics that can vary on account of the variety of species and the parts 
of the universe,” On Man, in Man and Citizen, trans. Charles T. Wood, T.S.K. Scott-Craig, and 
Bernard Gert ed. Bernard Gert (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 43 [10.5]. Of 
the passage, Adams argues, “The connection between geometry and maker’s knowledge 
influences how we should understand Hobbes’s claims about ‘true physics’ in…De homine 10.5. 
To reason from the effects to causes in natural philosophy, one must know already what the 
causes may be. If we understand a priori to be ‘from the causes’ for Hobbes, then we are able to 
demonstrate ‘from the causes’ when prior to a natural-philosophical investigation we already 
possess geometrical causal principles,” “Hobbes on Natural Philosophy as ‘True Physics’ and 
Mixed Mathematics,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 56 (2016), 46. 
 
583 Hanson, “The Meaning of ‘Demonstration’ in Hobbes’s Science,” 588. 
 




Sacksteder, like the deductivists, fills in the gaps left open by Hobbes’s 
methodological remarks.585 However, he claims that the deductivists got it 
wrong, having badly mis-conceptualized the relation between the parts of 
Hobbes’s philosophy. Rather than bolting together to create a single solid 
“geometric” deduction, all derived from “fundamental axioms of science,” 
Sacksteder asserts that a posterior science merely “depends”586 on the science 
antecedent to it.587 In concrete application, what this means is that, borrowing 
Sacksteder’s paradigmatic example, Hobbes’s science of human nature depends 
on physics in the sense that Hobbes’s physics fill out the key presuppositions 
upon which his science of human nature is reliant.588 Though Sacksteder 
 
585 This is not to suggest that the implications Sacksteder draws from the general principles are 
not, themselves, interpretively plausible. Nevertheless, there exists a paucity of textual material, 
from both De corpore and De homine, to which to tie his observations; see, for example, ibid, 
40-42. 
 
586 As Sacksteder holds, “I note some systematic implications from the order he [Hobbes] 
protests often for the tripartite division of his philosophy. Even in violating it, Hobbes insists 
that proper understanding or scientific exposition ought properly move from prior to posterior 
inquiries. That is, the sequence, De Corpore, Moral and Human Philosophy and Civil 
Philosophy is an order of dependence. He also announces that all of philosophy or strict science 
is completed in principle by the trio of headings named. They are all there can be,” ibid, 38. 
Although Sacksteder does not indicate either way, the impressions that guide the interpretation 
appear to have been drawn from De corpore 6.6, where Hobbes explains, “After Physiques we 
must come to Morall Philosophy, in which we are to consider the Motions of the Mind, 
Appetite, Aversion, Love, Benevolence, Hope, Fear, Anger, Emulation, Envy, &c. what Causes they 
have, and of what they be Causes. And the reason why these are to be considered after 
Physiques, is, that they have their Causes in Sense and Imagination, which are the subject of 
Physicall Contemplation,” Concerning Body, 53 [6.6]. Sorell, as already noted, comes to a similar 
conclusion, writing, “Hobbes does not say that the truths of mechanics are to be deduced from 
those of geometry, only that they are to be deduced after those of geometry. He does not say 
that physics is to be demonstrated from, only after mechanics,” thus, “In a similar way someone 
might now hold that linear algebra has to be understood before certain parts of economic 
theory can be understood: such a person would not be committed to holding that parts of 
economic theory are deducible from linear algebra,” Hobbes, 5-6. 
 
587 Sacksteder, “Hobbes’s Science of Human Nature,” 38. 
 
588 Although in agreement in broad lines, Sacksteder rejects Talaska’s use of the language of 
“deduction” in how he characterizes the nature of the relation between the different parts of 
Hobbes’s philosophy. The comparison helps to clarify Sacksteder’s own position. Sacksteder 
writes, “Talaska draws near the end of his paper: ‘The sciences exist in a specific order of 
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acknowledges there will be principles that are wholly unique to a particular 
science, he points out that “all its other principles or effective definitions, can 
be taken over only as givens understood” or “borrowed” “from [a] prior 
science.”589  That is, the two sciences, physics and the science of human nature, 
are at once overlapping and separate and distinct. On the one hand, the one – 
physics – erects conceptual scaffolding that supports the other, the science of 
human nature. On the other hand, the content of the science of human nature 
is plainly non-reducible to the content of physics. Thus, Sacksteder explains, 
“Prior sciences set conditions necessary but never sufficient for posterior 
ones.”590 
Sacksteder’s conclusions are echoed in the work of Noel Malcolm. 
Malcolm imagines the different parts of Hobbes’s science as levels that are at 
once connected and distinct. The view chimes well with Sacksteder’s on the 
necessary philosophical relation that obtains between Hobbes’s anterior and 
posterior sciences. Malcolm writes that were we to “attempt[t] to follow 
Hobbes’s ‘method’ through, ascending from one level of knowledge to the next, 
we would find that each new level required the introduction of concepts that 
 
deductive dependency.’ I think this flatly wrong. Even the nearly sound gloss on it, ‘the less 
general science cannot be understood without the prior development of the more general 
science,’ overlooks Hobbes’s claim that moral and civil philosophy can be expounded without 
prior sciences. The villain here is the word deductive. Hobbes is very sparing in his use of it and 
its correlatives, and always, I believe, he uses them comparing a minute local argument – one 
locally proof-like only and not traced to all its principles or supported by analytic method. 
Subsequent sciences are never ‘deducible’ from prior sciences, nor is it correct to say Hobbes’s 
intention is to expound a completely ‘deductive’ or ‘geometrical’ system as a whole, a mistake 
often encouraged by misinterpreting Spinoza or Descartes,” “Hobbes and Talaska on the Order 
of the Sciences,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 26, no. 4 (1988), 645. 
 
589 Sacksteder, “Hobbes’s Science of Human Nature,” 39. 
 




were simply not contained in the subject-matter of the previous level.”591 
Malcolm’s point is that the content of one level of knowledge cannot be 
derived, soup to nuts, from the level previous (prior) to592 (or higher than) it. 
While some ideas, concepts, definitions, may carry over from the one to the 
other, not all will. 
The work of Sacksteder and, especially, Malcolm, set the stage for a new, 
more recent crop of interpreters, including Zvi Biener593 and Marcus Adams,594 
who argue that Hobbes used mixed mathematics, more specifically the idea of 
subalternate sciences, as a model for his philosophy. Such an idea of mixed 
mathematics (mathematica media or scientiae mediae595) originates with 
 
591 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 147. Glen Newey is skeptical of the view, for reasons that are 
entirely textualist in nature: “It is not clear that Hobbes believed in any such distinction of 
levels, let alone that he held that the relevant concepts of one level were irreducible to those at 
another,” Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Hobbes and Leviathan (London: Routledge, 2008), 
72. 
 
592 Malcolm traces the view out, arguing “Physics will give us the concepts of ‘motion towards’ 
or ‘motion away from;’ but only psychology will provide the concepts of ‘desire’ or ‘fear,’” 
Aspects of Hobbes, 147. 
 
593 Biener notes “Malcolm’s view is consonant with the mixed-mathematical view. In fact, I take 
the mixed-mathematical view defended in this paper to provide a concrete model by which to 
articulate the introduction of new concepts at different levels of Hobbes’s system,” “Hobbes on 
the Order of Sciences: A Partial Defense of the Mathematicization Thesis,” The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 54, no. 3 (2016), 319 n. 15. 
 
594 Adams clarifies the nature of the relation between his article and Biener’s in his article’s 
acknowledgements, writing, “Zvi Biener and I have independently been working on 
understanding Hobbesian natural philosophy, and more generally Hobbes’s system, in terms of 
mixed mathematics,” “Hobbes on Natural Philosophy as ‘True Physics’ and Mixed 
Mathematics,” 50. Unlike Biener’s, Adams’s essay does not cite Malcolm. 
 
595 Although there exists evidence to suggest that Hobbes attempted to push the two together, 
in so doing, he was contravening old disciplinary boundaries, as natural-philosophical inquiry 
and mixed mathematics were conventionally held apart. Katharine Park and Lorraine Datson 
note, “The scientiae mediae (or mathematica media, “mixed mathematics”) differed from 
natural philosophy in that they dealt with matter considered solely from the standpoint of 
quantity, without respect to causes. In addition to the pure mathematical disciplines of 
arithmetic and geometry, mathematics included astronomy and astrology (the two terms were 
often used interchangeably), optics, harmonics, and mechanics. These disciplines were in turn 
distinct from the ‘mechanical arts,’ which would have included practical applications of 
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Aristotle, for whom different kinds of science were distinct in terms of scope 
and undergirding principles.596 He believed that “a true science (episteme) 
should be founded on its own proper principles unique to that science.”597 
However, this idea of science did not hold universally. Aristotle posited that 
there are some areas of study that “d[raw] on the results of pure mathematics 
(arithmetic and geometry) to apply to something other than pure quantity” like 
“celestial motions [as in astronomy] and sounds [as in music].”598 To the 21st 
 
mathematical knowledge in fields such as architecture, navigation, clockmaking, and 
engineering,” Park, Katherine and Lorraine Datson, “Introduction: The Age of the New,” in The 
Cambridge History of Science: Volume 3: Early Modern Science, eds. Katharine Park and Lorraine 
Datson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4. 
 
596 cf. Hobbes’s own remarks, related in footnote 560 above, on Aristotle’s philosophy in his 
commentary on Thomas White’s De mundo. 
 
597 Dear, “The Meaning of Experience,” 120. In the sentences that follow, Dear adds, “Subject 
matters were thus distributed into distinct sciences according to the content of their principles, 
so that the principles of a science would always be of the same genus as its subject matter. The 
requirement thus served to ensure the possibility of a formal deductive link between premises 
and conclusions. However, disciplines such as astronomy and music apparently violated this 
rule: They drew on the results of pure mathematics (arithmetic and geometry) to apply them to 
something other than pure quantity, in this case celestial motions and sounds. Consequently, 
Aristotle made a special accommodation for them by classifying them as subordinate to higher 
disciplines.” 
 
598 Ibid. It is a matter of fact that, as one would expect, Hobbes was familiar with mixed 
mathematics; the familiarity is highlighted in The Elements of Law, which maps out the relation 
between pure mathematics and mixed-mathematical subjects, all in service to the program of 
colonialism: “For those men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the 
comparison of magnitudes, numbers, times, and motions, and their proportions to one another, 
have thereby been the authors of all those excellences, wherein we differ from such savage 
people are now the inhabitants of divers places in America…For from these studies of these 
men hath proceeded, whatsoever cometh to us for ornament by navigation; and whatsoever we 
have beneficial to human society by the division, distinction, and portraying of the face of the 
earth; whatsoever also we have by the account of times, and foresight of the course of heaven; 
whatsoever by measuring distances, planes, and solids of all sorts; and whatsoever either 
elegant or defensible in building: all which supposed away, what do we differ from wildest of 
the Indians?,” 50 [13.3]. Karl Schuhmann posits, not unreasonably, that Hobbes “may be 
supposed to have known Dee’s famous ‘Mathematical Preface’ prefixed to Billingsley’s English 
edition of Euclid…This Preface contains, to begin with, a detailed classification of the sciences 
that could call to mind Hobbes’ own classification in chapter 9 of the Leviathan. Dee also gives 
ample praise to geometry – of a sort not uncommon in Renaissance time – lauding its 
usefulness in optics, architecture, fortification, cartography and navigation. This Renaissance 
theme of geometry as an art, rather than a pure theoretical science, is omnipresent also in 
Hobbes, as is also Dee’s somewhat Pythagorean view of the excellence of mathematics above all 
other sciences. In addition to Dee’s published work, Hobbes might have read also an 
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century reader the idea of mixed mathematics is a familiar one, as we take for 
granted the premise that, e.g., mathematics can be used to explain a vast range 
of natural and other phenomena, from black holes to musical harmonies. 
Adams contends that Hobbes carried over the Aristotelian idea that “for 
sciences such as optics the ‘that’ [i.e., the material being explicated] will come 
from one science while the ‘why’ [i.e., an understanding its causes] will come 
from a science which is ‘above’ it.”599 However, it is Biener who relies on the 
idea to explain the relation between all of the elements of Hobbes’s philosophy. 
Biener argues that  
the various fissures between physics and physiology, or physiology and 
psychology, do not invalidate Hobbes’s project as broadly geometrical. 
Such fissures were part and parcel of mixed-geometry and were caused 
by the addition of conditions at each transition from a subalternating to 
a subalternated science.600 
 
Yet, as with Sacksteder’s account, textual evidence showing that this was 
Hobbes’s intent is not suitably robust to support the sweeping conclusion.601 It 
 
unpublished and now lost manuscript, in which Dee had given a peculiar explanation of the 
appearance of the Nova Cassiopeiae of 1572. As a matter of fact, Hobbes in the Anti-White 
offered the same rather uncommon cause of its appearance (this star could have moved on a 
straight path towards the earth, thus becoming visible, and afterwards have withdrawn along 
the same line, thus vanishing again),” “Hobbes and Renaissance Philosophy,” in Hobbes Oggi, 
eds. A. Napoli and G. Canziani (Milano: Franco Angeli Editore, 1990), 337-338.  
 
599 Adams, “Hobbes on Natural Philosophy as ‘True Physics’ and Mixed Mathematics,” 44. 
 
600 Biener, “Hobbes on the Order of Sciences: A Partial Defense of the Mathematization Thesis,” 
325. 
 
601 One of the best textual cases to have been mounted to support the subalternate point is 
found in Talaska’s “Analytic and Synthetic Method According to Hobbes,” which, among 
others, suggests the view finds strongest support in “the Latin Leviathan, Chapter 9, and in the 
first Dialogue of the Exminatio, and even in the chapter on method in De corpore,” 236. 
Hobbes’s remarks in the Latin Leviathan are no less ambiguous than the ones found in De 
corpore, especially 6.6 and 6.17. Biener (“Hobbes on the Order of Sciences: A Partial Defense of 
the Mathematization Thesis,” 231) attends, specifically, to the latter (6.17), which prescribes, “he 
that Teaches or Demonstrates any thing, proceed in the same Method by which he found it out; 
namely, that in the first place those things be demonstrated which immediately succeed to 
Universal Definitions (in which is contained that part of Philosophy which is called Philosophia 
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is nevertheless possible that Sacksteder and the new crop of interpreters may 
be correct in their characterization of some of the (un-articulated) practical 
details of Hobbes’s work. However, it is unclear whether any correctly captures 
the meaning of synthesis, and how Hobbes would have, if at all, envisaged 
applying the method to produce a theory of politics from first principles.  
At the same time, Sacksteder’s interpretation, like the others, tacks in 
plausible directions. However, what, in part, makes his and the other accounts 
interpretively plausible is the vagueness of the material being interpreted. 
Hobbes’s methodological remarks, because of their opaqueness, operate like an 
ink-blot test. They are broad enough as to accommodate a variety of 
interpretations, which, like an ink-blot test, often may say more about the 
interpreter than the object undergoing interpretation. Taylor, Sacksteder, and 
the new interpreters do add specificity to Hobbes’s general remarks about his 
use of synthetic method and the relation between the different parts of his 
philosophy.602 Yet, the sophistication and novelty of their theorizations cannot 
make up for a fundamental lack in Hobbes’s descriptions of how the “the very 
 
Prima.) Next, those things which may be demonstrated by Simple Motion (in which Geometry 
consists.) After Geometry, such things as may be taught or shewed by manifest Action, that is, 
by Thrusting from, or Pulling towards. And after these, the Motion or Mutation of the invisible 
parts of Things, and the Doctrine of Sense & Imagination & of the internal Passions, especially 
those of Men, in which are comprehended the Grounds of Civil Duties, or Civil Philosophy; 
which takes up the last place. And that this Method ought to be kept in all sorts of Philosophy, 
is evident from hence, that such things as I have said are to be taught last cannot be 
demonstrated, till such as are propounded to be first treated of, be fully understood. Of which 
Method, no other Example can be given, but that Treatise of the Elements of Philosophy, which 
I shall begin in the next Chapter, and continue to the end of the worke,” Concerning Body, 63-
64 [6.17]. In addition, Talska’s use of a specific proof from the Examinatio demonstrates nothing 
as to the general relation between the different sections of Hobbes’s Elementa Philosophiae. 
 
602 See, especially, Sacksteder, “Hobbes’s Science of Human Nature,” 42-53; and Adams, 




first Principles of Philosophy” were envisaged as “proceeding” to “the Causes 
and Necessity of constituting Commonwealths…the Knowledge of what is 
Naturall Right, and what are Civill Duties.”603 
What are offered are historical (Adams, Biener), philosophical 
(Sacksteder, Malcolm), or potentially anachronistic604 (Taylor) solutions to a 
problem that cannot be fully resolved through contextualization, philosophical 
reconstruction, or, and especially, a misattribution of intent. That each 
simultaneously relies upon, and thinks it necessary to reach beyond the strict 
content of Hobbes’s methodological pronouncements admits the limited 
analytical and interpretive value of the statements.   
b. Analysis 
 
As remarked earlier, Hobbes did not believe the method of synthesis to 
be the sole means by which to secure the rudiments of moral and civil 
philosophy. As already explained, he notes there is another, simpler way: the 
method of analysis. Recall Hobbes’s claim that the underpinning “Causes and 
Necessity of constituting Common-wealths” “may be known…by any mans 
experience, that will but examine his owne Mind.”605 In De corpore, Hobbes 
does offer an example intended to show how analysis works in practice. 
 
603 Hobbes, Concerning Body, 54 [6.7]. 
 
604 Sacksteder points out that “Hobbes is very sparing in his use of it [the language of 
deduction] and its correlatives, and always, I believe, he uses them concerning a minute local 
argument – one locally proof-like only and not traced to all its principles or supported by the 
analytic method,” “Hobbes and Talaska and the Order of Science,” 645. The general point 
requires no reformulation. However, Sacksteder runs the risk of understating the frequency 
with which the language of deduction appears in Hobbes’s works. 
 




However, the example he gives of how analytic derivation would work within 
the context of a study of natural right and civil duties is less instructive than he 
surely hoped it would be.  
To discover the generative causes of the commonwealth using the 
method of analysis one would begin with a simple question: “Whether such an 
Action be Just or Uniust.” Having posed the question, Hobbes indicates that one 
should next dissect the question and explicate its key terms. For example, 
“Uniust” can be “resolved into Fact against the law,” and from there, the “notion 
of Law” resolved “into the Command of him or them that have Coercive Power.” 
Next, Hobbes explicates “Coercive Power.” He writes that “Power” is “derived 
from the Wills of Men” who erect political authority to “live in Peace.” Having 
secured this proposition, he continues with the chain of inferences, noting that 
in the absence of “some Power” the “Appetites of Men and the Passions of their 
Minds” will overwhelm them, and unless “restrained by some Power,” fuel 
omnium bellum contra omnēs: a war of all against all. Thus we arrive at the 
cause and necessity of the commonwealth: the “Appetites” and “Passions” “of 
Men” are such that, in the absence of a common, coercive power, they will be 
driven into a perpetual state of war. Having arrived at this principle, Hobbes 
claims that one may then build up again “by Compounding, to the 
determination of the Justice or Injustice of any propounded Action.”606 








…but even they also that have not learned the first part of Philosophy, 
namely Geometry and Physiques, may notwithstanding attain the 
Principles of Civill Philosophy, by the Analyticall Method. For if a 
Question be propounded, as Whether such an Action be Just or Uniust; if 
that Uniust be resolved into Fact against Law, and that notion of Law 
into the Command of him or them that have Coercive Power; and that 
Power be derived from the Wills of Men that constitute such Power to 
the end they may live in Peace, they may at last come to this, that the 
Appetites of Men and the Passions of their Minds are such, that unlesse 
they be restrained by some Power, they will alwayes be making warre 
upon one another; which may be known to be so by any mans 
experience, that will but examine his owne Mind. And therefore from 
hence he may proceed by Compounding, to the determination of the 
Justice or Injustice of any propounded Action. 
 
Some modern interpreters have uncritically reproduced the claims about 
the analytic derivation of civil science featured in the quotation.607 However, 
they are wrong to do so. Hobbes’s illustration, and his remarks, fail to offer a 
 
607 For a classic, if typical, example see Richard Peters’s Hobbes (London: Penguin, 1656), 75-76. 
However, Sorell and S.A. Lloyd are best known for strong advocacy of the position. Sorell is 
famous for having asserted the “autonomy” of Hobbes’s civil philosophy, largely on the basis of 
the passage, combined with a version of the preface to the second edition of De cive that had 
been imperfectly translated; the imperfections seeped into and helped to structure and spoil 
some elements of Sorell’s interpretive treatment, Hobbes, 17-24. For a discussion of the 
translation problem see Malcolm’s Aspect of Hobbes, 149. Lloyd holds to a similar line, writing, 
“That Hobbes is serious about the resolutive component of his method, and correspondingly 
that it is an error to dismiss this component as a fancy way of saying that we start from 
fundamental human nature and derive a necessary form of political organization from that, can 
be quite clearly seen by examining the chart of the sciences Hobbes presents in Chapter 9 of 
Leviathan. According to the chart, civil philosophy, that is, the science of politics, is a distinct 
branch of philosophy not connected to the study of bodies, including men, and their natural 
properties. Civil philosophy is not a branch of, nor is it deducible from, the philosophy of 
human nature. Rather, the political rights and duties of subjects and sovereigns are 
implications of the institution of states, and this must reflect the essential properties of 
commonwealths…Political philosophy proceeds form an analysis of the essential properties of 
commonwealths, and an analysis of the ways in which existing practice does or does not respect 
these properties, to the disposition of socially formed individual persons, to superior social 
practices that can, taking into account known human dispositions, preserve the integrity and 
stability of commonwealths,” Ideals as Interests: The Power of Mind Over Matter, 237. As noted 
in footnote 571, it was a commonplace, from the beginning, for Hobbes to distinguish between 
the study of natural human bodies and political ones. In the earliest formulation of his political 
theory, The Elements of Law, the distinction does not operate in the way that Lloyd suggests, 
hiving off “the science of politics” as “a distinct branch of philosophy not connected to the study 
of bodies, including men, and their natural properties.” Hobbes separated the two only after 
having taken up the project of composing De cive, and only then in response to demands 




consistent picture of how the method was, or should be applied. The remarks 
fail to supply consistent sets of methodological guidelines that can be reliably 
used by interpreters in their interpretations of Hobbesian texts. 
Consider Hobbes’s illustration of analytic method. He begins by 
isolating the key terms that comprise the question “Whether such an Action be 
Just or Uniust.”608 The terms are then specified, and the terms that result from 
the specification themselves specified. For example, we can isolate and extract 
the term “Uniust,” which resolves into “Fact against the law,” and then extract 
“law,” which Hobbes defines as “the Command of him or them that have 
Coercive Power.”609 However, it is at this point that the logic of the method he 
is illustrating shifts from simple definition to generative explanation. That is, 
rather than define power, his next move is to lay out the generative process by 
which coercive power is created and ratified. He notes that such power is 
“derived from the Wills of Men” for the purpose of “liv[ing] in Peace.”610 The 
logic of derivation then shifts yet again, with Hobbes simply stipulating that 
the “Appetites of Men and the Passions of their Minds are such…that they will 
alwayes be making warre upon one another.”611 Put differently, he sneaks in and 
takes for granted the premise that human appetites are such that, in the 
absence of some terrestrial power capable of restraining them, their ceaseless, 
 










erratic operation will engender a state in which people “will alwayes be making 
warre upon one another.” How does one know this? To answer, Hobbes invokes 
universal experience, noting that it is “known to be so by any mans 
experience.”612 In other words, he answers the question with a tautology: the 
premise is true because it is true. 
In its outlines, the example traces the principal lineaments of Hobbes’s 
political theory, a theory that uses a state of nature in which there “will alwayes 
be [men] making warre upon one another” to justify a transfer of natural right 
by individuals to set up a coercive power capable of checking the deleterious 
impulses that drive them. However, the mix of logics – and the shoddy logic – 
at work in the example only further muddles our understanding of analytic 
method, and how (or whether) it was used by Hobbes. In other words, the 
example Hobbes gives is poorly conceived and worked out. It fails to illustrate, 
with sufficient detail, how the method was applied. Second, the example fails to 
fully delineate the process by which Hobbes came up with the inferences he 
elaborates, for example, that “Appetites of Men and the Passions of their Minds 
are such…that they will alwayes be making warre upon one another.” To 
address the question, Hobbes, as he did in De cive, pivots to universal 
experience to substantiate the empirical premise, rather than give a substantive 






That Hobbes’s description of the method of analysis is unworkable finds 
support in recent work critiquing Tom Sorell,613 who, as others have done, 
makes the method a centrepiece of his interpretation of Hobbes’s civil science. 
Sorell has labored to show that Hobbes’s civil science is “autonomous” and 
capable of standing on its own. Civil science is “autonomous” insofar Hobbes’s 
“remarks” about analysis “suggest that civil philosophy is part of science, and 
yet teachable and learnable in isolation from the rest of science.”614 In other 
words, Sorell attests, with Hobbes, that it “can be acquired by anyone with 
ordinary intellectual capacities, and it presupposes no special training.”615 
Therefore, Sorell holds that “Civil philosophy can be acquired with no 
preliminaries,” while allowing that “approaching” civil philosophy “by way of 
prior sciences,” i.e., synthetically, does “make it more intelligible.”616  
Alexandra Chadwick takes the opposite view, arguing that civil 
philosophy, whatever Hobbes’s discussion of analysis may suggest, cannot be 
acquired without preliminaries. Chadwick shows that there are hidden 
premises at work in Hobbes’s discussion of analysis. For example, she explains 
that “In order to accept Hobbes’s particular definitions one will already have to 
have discarded…other” contrary or incompatible “premises about the nature of 
the commonwealth and political power, and about the nature of human 
 
613 See: Alexandra Chadwick’s “The Nature of Man and the Nature of Politics” (paper presented 
at the 2019 European Hobbes Society Mini-Workshop on the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, 
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). 
 








beings.”617 Chadwick points out that Hobbes’s conceit that “even they also that 
have not learnd the first part of Philosophy…may…attain the Principles of Civill 
Philosophy, by the Analyticall Method”618 is just that: a conceit. Rather, what 
Chadwick demonstrates is that “accepting Hobbes[‘s] particular definitions” 
turns on one’s having already accepted his “materialist psychology…since it 
rules out incompatible explanations of human nature.”619  
The genealogy of De cive presented in the third chapter fills out 
Chadwick’s findings. The discord Chadwick highlights, between Hobbes’s 
appraisal of analysis and how it operates (or fails to operate) in practice, is a by-
product of Hobbes’s implementation of the Elementa Philosophiae plan, which, 
combined with other factors, encouraged Hobbes to divide up an apparently 
cohesive work (The Elements of Law), and present part of it as a standalone 
volume (De cive). Although he used different forms of experience to shore up 
the work and buttress its foundations, the solution he posed to address the 
quandary fell short of the actual need. What Chadwick points out is that 
Hobbes’s account of political power and the commonwealth were so indebted 
to the substantive treatment of human nature presented in The Elements of Law 
as to make the two inextricable. As noted previously, the missing empirical 
material became a shadow scaffolding, helping to support the exposition of De 
cive. Put differently, the solution of using different forms of experience as a 
 
617 Chadwick, “The Nature of Man and the Nature of Politics,” 14. 
 
618 Hobbes, Concerning Body, 54 [6.7]. 
 
619 Chadwick, “The Nature of Man and the Nature of Politics,” 14. 
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tourniquet, to preserve the body and material of De cive, after having been 
severed from The Elements of Law, failed.  
In sum, Hobbes’s discussion of analysis is incomplete and, by virtue of 
its short length, sweeps much under the rug. In addition, as shown, the 
discussion is uneven in its logic and, like his discussion of synthesis, fails to 
supply methodological precepts clear enough as to be made a reliable basis for 
an interpretation of his political theory, in no small part because Hobbes put 
himself in a position, with the implementation of the Elementa Philosophiae 
plan and the out-of-order publication of De cive, that necessitated an 
imperfectly executed shift in political-theoretical practice. It is for these reasons 
that there exists a super-abundance of theories about how Hobbes did (or did 
not) use the methods in the derivation of his political theory. And it is for this 
same reason that Hobbes’s methodological remarks should be read with a 
heightened sense of caution, understanding that they lack in consistency and 
specificity.  
Yet, there exists another reason to question Hobbes’s use of the 
methods, as delineated in De corpore, in the development of his political 
theory: his vision of science and scientific method shifted between 1640, when 
he finished The Elements of Law, and 1655, when he published De corpore. Even 
more critical is that Hobbes, in or around 1643, understood “analysis” and 
“synthesis” in terms quite different from, and even inconsistent with the 
understanding elaborated in De corpore. As both his commentary on Thomas 
White’s De mundo (c. 1643) and his preface (1644) to Marin Mersenne’s 
Ballistica attest, he did not originally associate analysis and synthesis with the 
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production of science. In fact, Hobbes drew a clear, bold distinction in both 
works between analytic-synthetic logics and the organon of science: syllogistic 
reason. 
II. Science and the methods of synthesis and analysis before 1655 
 
In Renaissance and early modern contexts, the terms analysis (or, in 
Latinized form, resolutio, resolution) and synthesis (or its Latinized equivalent, 
compositio, composition) were used variably.620 Borrowing from the argot on 
Laclauian discourses analysis, the terms were empty or “floating” signifiers: 
“signs that different discourses struggle to invest with meaning,” over whose 
meaning there exists an “ongoing struggle between different discourses to 
 
620 Neal Gilbert describes a complicated semiotic process of resignification, recombination, and 
remaking, all within the context of “the usual Humanist emphasis on recovery of the 
[mathematical] sources – in this case exclusively Greek – of the discipline…” Gilbert writes, 
“Such a recovery presupposed a knowledge of the Greek language as well as of mathematics, 
and this linguistic sophistication was the contribution of Humanism. In addition, mathematics 
in the educational programs of the day received an impetus from the Humanist reevaluation of 
the arts curriculum, which tended to emphasize mathematics at the expense of logic. For 
methodology this emergence of the Greek sources of mathematics created a need to distinguish 
clearly between mathematical and nonmathematical senses of ‘analysis.’ Because analysis was 
one of the traditional four Platonic methods of dialectic, and the root of Aristotle’s Analytics as 
well, the Greek commentators…brought the geometrical version into their discussions of these 
topics. The geometrical sense of ‘analysis’ had been incorporated into traditional methodology 
at least as early as the second century, and it continued to appear, although not without 
transformation, in the methodology of later commentators, Peripatetic and Platonic, until 
Byzantine times. Both Arab and Latin commentators and philosophers took over this tradition, 
the Latins using the terms resolutio and compositio for the two methods. But these medieval 
Latin versions were so distinct from their mathematical origin, and so bound up with 
metaphysical and even theological ideas, that they can scarcely be regarded as keeping alive the 
spirit of Greek geometry. It was not until the detailed description given by Pappus was 
published, in the Latin translation made by Federigo Commandino, that we can again speak of 
the influence of Greek geometry upon general philosophical methodology…The geometrical 
sense of the terms ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ began to gain currency, replacing the medieval 
resolutio and compositio used by Commandino to translate them. In fact, the very replacement 
of these Latin words by the Greek in subsequent philosophical and scientific usage is 
unquestionably due to the fact that the Greek words were now associated very precisely with 
their geometrical usage, and thus were considered superior to the medieval Latin terms, with 
their more extensive yet vaguer connotations,” Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York: 




fix…”621 Consider the word “body.” It is a “sign” that “does not acquire detailed 
meaning until it is inserted in a particular discourse.”622 So too with analysis (or 
resolution) and synthesis (or composition). In different discursive contexts, the 
terms carried different meanings, were fixed with different valences, and had 
different (often overlapping) etymologies.  
Lisa Jardine explains that, in the Renaissance, authors who filled out the 
methods of analysis and synthesis (occasionally associated with the second 
century physician Galen),623 “collat[ed]” material from a variety of passages in 
Galen’s works with Averroës’s writings, producing “interpretation[s]” that 
“varie[d]” 
 
621 Marianna Jorgensen and Louise J. Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method 




623 Given the somewhat idiosyncratic content of Galen’s view and his use of the terms, both 
distinct from their use in geometrical contexts (see Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method, 
16), the association requires explanation. N. Jardine traces the points of connection, how 
Galen’s ideas were picked up and transformed. Jardine writes, “Another factor which 
contributed to the sixteenth century obsession with demonstratio propter quid and quia is yet 
more complex. At the beginning of the Ars Parva (Microtegni) Galen lists three ways of 
teaching medicine: the analytic, which proceeds towards some intended goal; the synthetic, 
which proceeds conversely, starting with what is discovered by analysis; and the Platonic 
method of division, which he uses as his own method of presentation in the rest of the book. 
This cryptic passage puzzled Galen’s commentators. In ‘Ali ibn Ridwan’s exposition on the Ars 
Parva, which became available in Latin around 1300, Galen’s analytic and synthetic teaching 
methods are identified with Aristotle’s demonstratio quia [“demonstration that”] and proper 
quid [“because of which, what”], and the analytic method is further identified with the method 
of analysis practiced by geometers. Pietro d’Abano, in his immensely influential Conciliator 
differentiarum philosophorum (written about 1310), compounded this confusion by conflating 
these methods, on the authority of Averroës, with the two methods of presentation which 
Aristotle mentions in the introduction to the Physics, the one observed motions of the stars 
was taken by several fifteenth century from the universal to the particular. Abano uses the term 
regressus to describe the relation between two procedures, the one of which retraces the steps 
of the other. In this context regressus means ‘reversal’ or ‘turning back,’ as in the axiom of 
Aristotelian physics, in punctu regressus mediat quies (‘at the point of reversal of motion there 
is rest’). This kind of confusion continues to be prevalent amongst Galen commentators well 
into the seventeenth century,” “Galileo’s Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress,” Studies 




widely according to their particular selection of sources. Some authors 
related Galen’s methods of analysis and synthesis to the corresponding 
methods of geometrical demonstration; others equated them with 
syllogistic arguments from effect to cause and cause to effect; and yet 
others with methods of presentation, the one proceeding from the 
complex and particular to the simple and general and the other 
proceeding conversely.624 
 
Some authors, notably the sixteenth century Italian methodologist Jacopo 
Zabarella, reasoned about the methods625 with reference to all three contexts, 
often with explicit reference to Aristotle,626 Averroës,627 Euclid,628 and Galen.629 
 
624 Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), 40. 
 
625 It bears noting that, as Jan Prins and Helen Hattab point out, Zabarella draws a distinction 
between “ordo doctrinae” and “via doctrinae,” the “order of doctrine” and the “way of doctrine, 
that is, method in the strict sense of the word,” Prins, “Hobbes and the School of Padua: Two 
Incompatible Approaches of Science,” 32. Prins explains, “The distinction he makes between 
ordo and via and between the different ways of ordering material, is closely related to the 
metaphysical foundations of his methodology. Science is nothing but an ordered collection of 
statements. The order however is not arbitrary. Only if the statements are ordered from the 
known to the unknown and if the unknown is a logical consequence of the known such a 
collection bears the character of science,” ibid, 33. Or as Hattab puts it more tangibly, for 
Zabarella, “method and order does not cause us to infer one thing from another, but rather 
arranges (disponere) the things to be treated, as when the order of teaching demands that we 
first discuss the heavens and the elements. In other words, it arranges the parts of a discipline. 
Order takes precedence because one must divide a discipline into parts before one can 
articulate the method that will lead us from the known to the unknown that is sought within 
each part. For example, one must first treat of living things in general, then each individual 
species of living thing; and finally seek methods to treat what is common to animals, to 
understand the nature of an animal (if such is hidden) and its accidents,” “Hobbes’s and 
Zabarella’s Methods: A Missing Link,” 464-465. In addition, Hattab notes that “Zabarella 
follows Averröes, claiming that the procedure for ordering the sciences and all disciplines is 
found not in the essence of the objects sought, but in the manner of knowing things that is best 
or easiest for us. When a science is ordered in one way rather than some other, it is so ordered 
because it shall be learned more easily and effectively this way, not because of a natural order 
that exists outside the mind,” ibid, 465. In the pages referenced in the footnotes below, 
Zabarella is principally concerned with working out the proper approach to order (ordo), rather 
than method properly speaking. 
 
626 For examples, see: Jacopo Zabarella, On Methods vol. I, ed. and trans. John P. McCaskey 
(London: Harvard University Press, 2013), 17, 27-28, 31, 35, 37, 39, 41, 55, 57, 63, 73, 75, 77, 79, 91, 
93, 95, 97, 99, 101, 103. 
 
627 For examples, see: ibid, 27, 49, 55, 65, 73, 87. 
 
628 For examples, see: ibid, 77, 79, 87, 89, 91. 
 




Zabarella used the terms to, at once, refer to geometrical demonstration,630 the 
practice of syllogistic reasoning from cause to effect and effect to cause,631 and 
reasoning from universals to composites and composites back to universals.632 
Hobbes’s peers, Marin Mersenne in particular, associated the language 
of analysis and synthesis with geometric demonstration, and specifically the 
work of Pappus (a fourth century geometer whose work was translated into 
Latin in 1588).633 Given Hobbes’s proximity to Mersenne, and others in the 
Mersenne circle (like René Descartes) who understood the terms in roughly the 
 
630 For examples, see: 31, 79, 87, 89, 91. 
 
631 An example is found here: ibid, 51. As Prins notes, “the syllogism” was, for Zabarella, 
“considered the prototype of a scientific collection of statements, and science as a chain of 
syllogisms or as a collection of premisses and conclusions,” “Hobbes and the School of Padua: 
Two Incompatible Approaches of Science,” 33. Hanson summarizes Zabarellan regressus this 
way: “regressus is a three part procedure. First one formulates a resolutive syllogism from effect 
to cause, but by itself this produces only an unclear cognition (cognition confuse), which has to 
be transformed into a ‘distinct’ one by ‘mental consideration.’ It is this which enables the 
turning around which is demonstratio propter quid,” “The Meaning of ‘Demonstration’ in 
Hobbes’s Science,” 606. Also see Stewart Duncan’s excellent primer of the method in “Hobbes: 
Metaphysics and Method,” 85-92. For a discussion of how the Aristotelian method became 
integrated into the prototype method of regressus, see footnote 623. 
 
632 For examples, see: Zabarella, On Methods, 27, 28, 31, 73, 75, 77, 81. 
 
633 “In 1588,” writes Daniele Cozzoli, “Guidobaldo Del Monte published Fergio Commandino’s 
Latin translation of Pappus’ Mathematical collection. After Commandino’s translation, 
mathematicians started working towards reconstructing ancient analysis. Marin Mersenne in 
La verité des sciences (1625) described the recovery of ancient analysis as one of the most 
important enterprises of his time. Commandino, who was properly following Francesco 
Barozzi’s translation of Proclus’ Commontary to the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, translated 
analysis and synthesis as resolutio and compositio respectively. His translation led him to 
identify Aristotle’s demonstratio quia and demonstratio propter quid with Pappus’ analysis and 
synthesis. It must be stressed that the two mathematical ways of proving did not imply any 
commitment towards Aristotle’s notion of logical consequence,” “Beyond Mixed Mathematics: 
How a Translation Changed the Story of Descartes’s Philosophy of Mathematics,” in Beyond 
Borders: Fresh Perspectives in History of Science, eds. Josep Simon and Néstor Herran, with 
Tayra Lanuza-Navarro, Pedro Ruiz-Castell and Ximo Guillem-Llobat (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2008), 47. As Cozzoli points out, the confusion and conflation features in 
Hobbes’s own methodological prescripts: “This is at least true, for all the scholars who accepted 
Aristotle’s notion of logical consequence in terms of a causal relations such as Hobbes, who in 
De Corpore (1655), identified the geometrical mode of reasoning of analysis and synthesis with 
Aristotle’s two kinds of proof,” as did Peirre Gassendi, ibid. For a more fulsome presentation of 
Pappus’s view, see Hanson, “The Meaning of ‘Demonstration in Hobbes’s Science,” 602-603.  
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same geometrical way, the expectation is that Hobbes would have held a 
similar, strict geometric-scientific understanding of analysis and synthesis.  
a. 1640-1642: The Method of Synthesis in The Elements of Law and De cive 
 
Testing the expectation is a difficult interpretative matter. Neither 
method is named in The Elements of Law – or in De cive. At the same time, it 
would be foolish to doubt that Hobbes, as a practitioner of geometricized 
science, was familiar with either method, or that he aimed, especially, to 
replicate the method of synthesis (demonstration) in some aspects of his work. 
In his early work, Hobbes theorized in patterns that were reminiscent of the 
geometric method of synthesis, writing in The Elements of Law that there is “no 
way, but first to put such principles down for a foundation…and afterward build 
thereon the truth of cases in the law of nature…by degrees, till the whole be 
inexpungable,”634 and in De cive that the production of “truth” entails “correct 
reasoning from true principles.”635 Both descriptions of the organon of science 
or philosophy approximate the description of synthesis Mersenne adduces in 
his objections to René Descartes’s Meditations on First Principles (1641). 
Mersenne held that philosophy should take the form of a demonstration, 
offering to Descartes that “it would be worthwhile if you set out the entire 
argument in geometrical fashion, starting from a number of definitions, 
postulates, and axioms.”636  
 
634 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, viii [Epistle Dedicatory]. 
 
635 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 33 [2.1].  
 
636 Mersenne, Marin, “Second Set of Objections,” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes vol. 
II, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 91-92. 
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Before proceeding to evidence of analysis in Hobbes’s early political 
works, it bears noting that the presence of language in The Elements and De 
cive that approximates or appears to endorse the methodological ideal of 
synthesis (as related by Mersenne) should not be taken as support for the view 
that there exists a continuity between the seeming application of synthesis in 
The Elements and De cive and how it is applied to the study of politics in De 
corpore. Recall that De corpore specifies, narrowly, that a synthetic derivation 
of “civil philosophy” entails starting from “the very first Principles of Philosophy 
[“namely Geometry and Physiques”637]” and “proceeding in the same way” to, 
eventually, “the Causes and Necessity of constituting Common-wealths.”638 
Although The Elements and De cive may bespeak a broad, general aspiration to 
practice (geometricized) synthesis, in neither work is found evidence to suggest 
that Hobbes, from the beginning, aspired to practice synthesis in the narrower 
sense specified in De corpore. A chronology of the development of the Elementa 
Philosophiae plan (as given in chapter 3) militates against the conclusion that 
The Elements was conceived as part of a larger philosophical series. Similarly, it 
is likely that, by the time De cive was completed, Hobbes had, at most, a rough 
sketch of his “Geometry” and “Physiques.”639 
b. 1642: The Method of Analysis in De cive 
 
There exists only ambiguous evidence, in De cive, of how Hobbes might 
have used the method of analysis during this early period. Identification of the 
 







method in De cive is easiest when considered through the lens of a debate 
between Descartes and Mersenne about the use of analysis as a means of 
philosophical demonstration. In his objections to Descartes’s Meditations, 
Mersenne (gently) criticized Descartes’s use of the method of analysis. At the 
heart of Mersenne’s objection was a strong view of what form philosophy 
should take. Mersenne held that philosophy should be synthetic and 
demonstrative (proceeding from exactingly specified axioms and postulates), 
rather than analytic, i.e., an interrogative inquiry and process of discovery, 
which reasons backward from sense to first principles.  
Descartes disagreed with the assessment. His Meditations are, in part, 
memorable for having been written in an analytic “mood.” In the work, 
Descartes punctiliously separates out and interrogates experience, 
painstakingly walking his reader through the process of inquiry that led him to 
the first principles of philosophy. Descartes posits that analysis, just as much as 
synthesis, is a “method of demonstration.” “Analysis,” he writes,  
shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was 
discovered methodically and as it were a priori, so that if the reader is 
willing to follow it and give attention to all points, he will make the 
thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had discovered 
it for himself. But this method contains nothing to compel belief in an 
argumentative or inattentive reader; for if he fails to attend even to the 
smallest point, he will not see the necessity of the conclusions…Now it is 
analysis which is the best and truest method of instruction, and it was 
this method alone which I employed in my Meditations.640 
 
 
640 René Descartes, “Author’s Replies to the Second Set of Objections,” in The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes vol. II, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch 




Inquiries into metaphysics, Descartes held, are best executed by means of 
analysis. Using the language of “a priori” in a way that is neither “modern” and 
“post-Leibnizian” nor “Thomist,” the Meditations begins with “what is 
epistemically prior, i.e. from what is prior in the ‘order of discovery’ followed by 
the mediator.”641  
In a passage in De cive that is reminiscent of the illustration of analysis 
supplied in De corpore, Hobbes uses something like analysis as an expository 
tool. The epistle dedicatory of De cive guides readers through a short, 
backward-moving inquiry from “what is epistemically prior” (or what is already 
known or known to us) to the certain postulates that anchor the political 
philosophy of De cive. Hobbes explains to his readers that 
when I turned my thoughts to the inquiry about natural justice I was 
alerted by the very name of justice (by which is meant a constant will to 
give every man his right) to ask first how it is that anyone can ever spoke 
of something as his own rather than another’s; and when it was clear that 
it did not originate in nature but in human agreement (for human beings 
have distributed what nature had placed in common), I was led from there 
to another question, namely, for those whose benefit and under what 
necessity, when all things belonged to all men, they preferred that each 
man should have things that belonged to himself alone. And I saw that 
war and every kind of calamity must necessarily follow from community in 
things, as men came into violent conflict over their use; a thing all seek by 
nature to avoid. Thus I obtained two absolutely certain postulates of 
human nature, one, the postulate of human greed…the other, the 
postulate of natural reason, by which each man strives to avoid violent 
death as the supreme evil in nature. From these starting points I believe I 
have demonstrated by the most evident [logical conclusion]642 in this little 
 
641 John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 110 n. 2. 
 
642 Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne’s translation reads, “From these starting points I 
believe I have demonstrated by the most evident inference…,” On the Citizen, 6 [Epistle 
Dedicatory 10]. However, the Latin points in another direction. Hobbes uses the adjective-noun 
pair, euidentisima connexione, Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive. In the context, a 
better translation of connexione (i.e., the third declension noun conexio) is “logical conclusion,” 
Traupman, John, The New College Latin & English Dictionary (New York: Amsco School 
Publications, 1994), 109. 
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work that necessity of agreements and of keeping faith, and thence the 
Elements of moral virtue and civil duties.643 
 
In the passage, Hobbes claims to have derived the “certain postulates” that are 
the “starting point” for his “demonstration” by means of a process of inquiry 
that launches from what is already known: the meaning of “justice.” That is, the 
remarks walk the reader through the steps in the interrogative process by 
which the “absolutely certainly postulates” Hobbes delineates were discovered. 
Situated against Descartes’s reply to Mersenne’s objection, it is possible 
to see lines of analytic reasoning in Hobbes’s remarks. However, the lines are 
faint. Question marks hang over the passage. First, it is not clear that the 
remarks relate the actual process by which Hobbes derived the premises he 
identifies. The Elements of Law, from which much of the content of De cive was 
cribbed or adapted, features no similar admission or analysis-style explanation. 
Rather than an honest accounting of his process of discovery, the remarks 
appear calibrated to establish the postulates Hobbes sets out as evident and 
certain. That is, the remarks operate as a justificatory device to buttress the 
empirical postulates of natural cupidity and fear of violent death (i.e., self-
preservation). Thus, the remarks have an expository function, unique to De 
cive, as they were used, in Sorell’s words, to establish the “autonomy” of the 
work. Second, like the illustration of analysis featured in De corpore, the 
remarks cannot be systematized into a cohesive method, for many of the same 
reasons that the illustration of analysis from De corpore cannot be. Last, it is 
 




simply impossible, on the basis of this passage alone, to make a reliable 
interpretive judgment as to Hobbes’s method, or whether the passage is 
illustrative of his understanding of analysis. 
c. 1643-1644: Synthesis and analysis in the commentary on De mundo and 
Hobbes’s preface to Ballistica 
 
Written on the heels of De cive (1642), the commentary on Thomas 
White’s De mundo (c. 1643)644 is the first surviving piece of Hobbesian writing 
that mentions analysis and synthesis. What the commentary articulates is a 
conception and understanding of analysis and synthesis that is wholly unlike 
Mersenne’s. The commentary characterizes the logics as both unremarkable 
and unscientific, painting analysis and synthesis as unscientific causal 
recollection, as of the sort that all animals, human and beast alike, engage in 
regularly (if to different “degree[s]” and in different “speed[s]”).645  
Specifically, Hobbes describes the first logic, synthesis, as composition, a 
“‘collecting-together.’”646 To illustrate the concept, he gives the example of 
someone “visualiz[ing] a building647 according to an order [of events] from the 
 
644 See chapter 3, footnote 390 for a discussion of the date of Hobbes’s commentary on De 
mundo. 
 
645 Hobbes, Thomas Hobbes: Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, 369 [30.10]. 
 
646 Ibid. In fact, Harold Jones’s hand can be seen in the translation. In the Latin, Hobbes uses 
the standard methodological terminology, compositio, Critique du De Mundo de Thomas White, 
353 [30.10]. However, I have retained Jones’s translation of the term, as it fits with Hobbes’s 
description of the process of compositio. 
 
647 It appears the building example was a commonplace, perhaps taken over from Galen. Gilbert 
indicates, “Galen decides that medicine belongs to the productive arts, and he compares it to 
the building of houses or architecture (Galen’s father was an architect). Just as by analysis and 
dialysis (a term which Galen uses utmost as a synonym for analysis) we understand the finished 
house, so by anatomy we understand the body of a man, which is the subject matter of the 
healing art,” Renaissance Concept of Method, 17. The metaphor is reproduced in Zabarella’s De 
methodis. He writes, “Just as, if the art of building is to be conveyed, the first beginning-
principle of the art to be learned will be the prior knowledge of the end, that is, the definition 
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material to the form of the house they propose bringing into being.”648 Our 
imagination “moves from the material to its transportation and from there to 
the foundations, thence to the walls and from there to the roof.”649 Accordingly, 
Hobbes makes synthesis a causal imaginative act whereby a person collects 
together, or recalls, the parts out of which an observed whole (e.g., a house) 
was or was likely made. One imagines the sequence whereby the discrete 
components Hobbes names – material, foundations, walls, a roof –were or 
might have been combined to create “the form of” a “house.” 
Whereas Hobbes sees synthesis as a “collecting-together,” he views 
analysis as resolution, an “unloosing.” “An instance of ‘unloosing’ [or 
resolution] among men,” he writes, “is when the thought advances from the 
form of a house to that of a site where it is to be built” and from there to “the 
material that has been brought together in that place; then of the actual 
transportation; and then of the place it is got from.”650 Thus, analysis, unlike 
synthesis, entails a causal imaginative act whereby a person breaks down an 
 
of the house to be built. From this, passage is made to the foundation, walls, roof, and from 
these finally to stones, tiles, mortar, and wood; these [last] are the first and simplest elements 
of the art. In them the art as taught ends, and from them the art as practiced afterward begins,” 
On Methods, 31. The metaphor also features in the work of the medieval physician Ugo Benzi, 
who, while expounding Galen’s De compositione, calls up the example “of the builder who, with 
the object of building a house, by doctrina resolutiva breaks the house down into its parts, roof, 
walls, foundations, even the smallest parts, and then that of the physician whose goal is to 
cause and maintain health,” Lawn, Brian, The Rise & Decline of the Scholastic ‘Quæstio 
Disputata:’ With Special Emphasis on its Use in the Teaching of Medicine & Science (Leiden: 
Brill, 1993), 79. In the analysis, Benzi associates the methods with Aristotelian methods. It is 
impossible to know whether Hobbes relied upon the metaphor because it was a commonplace 
(plausibly Galenic in origin), or rather meant to wield it as a cudgel. 
 








observed whole (like a house) into discrete, causal parts, imagining backward, 
causal bit by causal bit, the sequence by which the whole was or might have 
been created.  
The characterization of the logics given in Hobbes’s commentary on De 
mundo denies analysis and synthesis the opportunity to be used within the 
context of the production of certain, scientific knowledge.651 Rather, Hobbes 
uses synthesis and analysis to describe the quotidian forms of recollection upon 
which humans (and animals) rely when conjecturing about causes. He reasons 
that neither form of causal recollection, nor any kind of causal thinking652 
could produce certain, non-prudential (scientific) knowledge, something he 
equates with syllogistic reasoning,653 not speculative-causal recollection or 
other forms of causal analysis.  
Not long after Hobbes completed the commentary on De mundo the 
claim about synthesis and analysis was repeated in his preface to Marin 
Mersenne’s Ballistica of 1644, a Galilean-inspired essay on ballistics in 
Mersenne’s sprawling Cogitata Physico-Mathematica. Hobbes’s prefatory 
 
651 Robin Bunce draws the same conclusion, however, with respect to Hobbes’s remarks in his 
preface to Mersenne’s Ballistica, Thomas Hobbes (New York: Continuum, 2009), 29. Although 
not something to which Bunce draws attention, comparison reveals the remarks to have been 
cribbed or otherwise adapted from Hobbes commentary on De mundo. 
 
652 Ibid, 371 [30.13]. Hobbes does, somewhat inexplicably, use the language of scientia causarum 
in the relevant passage, without pausing to explicate the phrase, Critique du De Mundo de 
Thomas White, 353 [30.10]. Jones translates phrase to mean “science of causes,” Thomas Hobbes: 
Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, 369 [30.10]. It is plausible, given the context and the 
discussion that follows that, here, Hobbes is, not unreasonably, using scientia to mean, more 
generically, “knowledge.” Cf. Sapientia vera nihil aliud est quam in omni materia veritatis 
scientia (“True wisdom is nothing other [or more] than the knowledge of truth in every matter 
[or, per Tuck and Silverthorne, “subject”]), Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive 
[Epistle Dedicatory].  
 




remarks echo the earlier point made in the commentary. He writes that 
synthetic and analytic causal conjecture, progressing from “imagined causes to 
imagined effects” (synthesis) or “effects to causes” (analysis), is 
“but…remembrance”654 – i.e., not science.  
d. 1645: Synthesis and analysis in “Logica ex T.H.”  
 
By 1645655 Hobbes’s methodological outlook and conception of science 
changed radically. His thinking vis-à-vis the possibility of causal science had 
shifted,656 as an early draft copy of De corpore, dated to the mid-1640s, records. 
The sentences that open the draft register the change. Philosophy now entails 
acquiring knowledge of the properties of bodies from either (i) conceiving of 
the process by which a body is generated (i.e., reasoning from cause to effect) 
or (ii) reasoning backward from a body’s properties to the process by which it 
might have been generated (i.e., reasoning from effect to cause).657 
 
654 Si processu fiat ab imaginatione cause ad imaginationem, effectus versus finem, qui semper est 
effectus vltimus, dicitur…compositio; si ab effectu ad causam & ita deinceps versus 
priora…resolutio: est autem vtraque reminiscentia (“If [we] advance from an imagined cause to 
an imagined effect, turned in the direction of an end, which is always the final effect, it is 
called…composition; if [we proceed] from effect to cause & thus follow [in succession] towards 
the former cause…[it is called] resolution: both however is remembrance [or, “but both is 
remembrance”],” “Præfatio Vtilis in Ballisticam ad Lectorem,” in Cognitata Physico-
Mathematica, composed by Marin Mersenne (Paris, 1644). Bunce, in the first of two paragraphs 
summarizing Hobbes’s shifting stance on the relationship between the methods of analysis and 
synthesis and science, offers the following translation of the same passage: “If we proceed from 
imagined causes to imaged effects towards a goal which is always the final effect, this is 
called...composition; if [we work] from effects to causes and thus in a regular order towards the 
previous causes this is...resolution. Each however is but memory,” Thomas Hobbes, 28. 
 
655 As Malcolm notes, the change is first registered “in the notes on Hobbes’s philosophy made 
by Sir Charles Cavendish in 1645, and in the undated manuscript at Chatsworth, the ‘Logica ex 
T.H.,’ which closely resembles Cavendish’s notes and represents a draft of the early chapters of 
De corpore,” Aspects of Hobbes, 154. 
 
656 Malcolm also clocks the shift, noting, “After a few years in Paris in the 1640s…Hobbes began 
to include the knowledge of causes in his definitions of science,” ibid. 
 
657 Philosophia est corporum proprietatum ex conceptis eorum generationibus, et rursus 
generationum, quae esse possunt, ex cognitis proprietatibus, per rectam ratiocinationem 
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Despite the pivot to a causal-generative conception of science, the 
language of neither analysis nor synthesis, resolution nor composition, make an 
appearance in the draft. However, both methods, as delineated in Hobbes’s 
commentary on De mundo and the preface to Ballistica, appear in the substance 
of the text, in Hobbes’s new conception of philosophy specifically. The first 
prong of the definition, marked (i), corresponds to synthesis, reasoning from 
cause to effect, specifying the process by which some thing (like a house) 
comes into being. The second prong of the definition, marked (ii), corresponds 
to synthesis, reasoning from effect back to cause, imagining the causal 
sequence that might have produced observed effects. 
e. 1646: Synthesis and analysis in the second edition of De cive 
 
The new vision of science and accompanying changes in Hobbes’s 
methodological commitments appear in the 1646 preface he prepared for the 
second edition of De cive, published in 1647. Just as in the draft copy of De 
corpore, there is no mention of analysis or synthesis in the preface to the 
second edition of De cive. Yet, within Hobbes’s description of method can be 
seen the new conception of science as well as the example of analysis and 
synthesis given in Hobbes’s commentary on De mundo. In the commentary, 
Hobbes offered the example of a person whose mind “range[s] from a building 
 
acquisita cognito (“Philosophy is the knowledge of the properties of bodies having been 
acquired through right [or “correct”] reason from a conception of their generations, and turned 
back, of possible generations acquired from properties known [by experience]”), “Logica. Cap. 1 
Ex T.H.,” 463 [1.2]. Malcolm offers the following translation of the same lines: “‘Philosophy…is 
the knowledge of the properties of bodies, acquired by correct reasoning from the notions of 
their generations; and conversely the knowledge of possible generations, acquired by correct 




through all the means [of constructing it] to the place where the building-
material can be got, and then back again to the [form of a] building”658 as an 
example of analysis and synthesis. In the preface to De cive, Hobbes discusses 
the ex hypothesi deconstruction and re-composition of a commonwealth in a 
way that is reminiscent of the building example. In particular, and as with the 
building example, there is an emphasis on the final form of the commonwealth 
and the matter from which it is made. He writes, 
As far as my Method is concerned, I decided that the conventional 
structure of rhetorical discourse, though clear, would not suffice by 
itself. Rather I should begin with the matter of which a commonwealth 
is made and go on to how it comes into being and the form it takes, and 
to the first origin of justice. For a thing is best known from its 
constituents. As in an automatic Clock or other fairly complex device, 
one cannot get to know the function of each part and wheel unless one 
takes it apart, and examines separately the material, shape and motion 
of the parts, so in investigating the right of a commonwealth and the 
duties of its citizens, there is a need, not indeed to take the 
commonwealth apart, but to view it as taken apart, i.e. to understand 
correctly what human nature is like, and in what features it is suitable 
and in what unsuitable to construct a commonwealth, and how men 
who want to grow together must be connected.659 
 
The preface reflects how Hobbes’s views on science and method evolved 
after first publishing De cive in 1642. In the first edition of De cive Hobbes 
specified philosophy as the practice of deriving, by logic, consequences “by 
reasoning…from our starting point in experience,”660 i.e., from “true 
principles.”661 Right reason, Hobbes indicated then, begins “from the most 
 
658 Hobbes, Thomas Hobbes: Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, 371 [30.10]. 
 
659 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 10 [Preface to the Readers 9]. 
 
660 Ibid, 215 [17.12]. 
 




evident principles” and entails “weav[ing] a seamless discourse of necessary 
consequences.”662 It did not begin with causal analysis, much less an 
examination of material and formal causes. It was not calibrated to the goal of 
mapping generative-causal processes. In other words, in 1642 Hobbes remained 
very much attached to the project of syllogistic science, a science of necessary 
truths, where “Truth is the same as [a] true” categorical “proposition.”663 By 1646 
his orientation had changed. He was now a proponent of a “Science of Causes” 
(as he would later put it).664 
The preface to the second edition registers the change. It gives his work 
a new frame, one that better comports with the philosophical posture he had 
fallen into by 1646. Method now entailed an unloosing and a collecting-
together. It involved the unloosing of the commonwealth into the material that 
makes it and, in turn, the recombination or collecting-together of those 
material elements into a sequence, specifying how a commonwealth might665 
come into being.  
Hobbes took the opportunity afforded by publishing a new edition of De 
cive to put a new spin on his political theory, using terms more congruent with 
his new, emergent methodological commitments. It was not the first or the last 
 
662 Ibid, 162 [14.16]. 
 
663 Ibid, 237 [18.4]. 
 
664 Hobbes, Concerning Body, 49 [6.1].  
 
665 It is clear, in the Latin of the second edition, that Hobbes proposed a hypothetical analysis of 
the process by which commonwealths might be made: non quidem ut dissolvatur civitatis, sed 
tame ut tanquam dissolute consideretur, Elementa Philosophica de Cive [Preface to the Readers]. 
“…not indeed to take the commonwealth apart, but to view it as taken apart,” On the Citizen, 10 




time Hobbes did this. For him, it was a common practice, which went hand-in-
hand with his use of serial composition, a method of writing texts carried over 
from scribal publication. Hobbes relied upon serial composition when 
developing the different versions of his political theory as well as other 
philosophical works. The method entailed a “process of producing multiple, 
progressively expanded versions of a text made possible by the adaptation of 
works for different audiences and the rapid production of new(ish) volumes.”666  
Throughout the process of developing and expanding his texts, Hobbes 
tinkered with individual arguments and made more macro-level adjustments to 
the organization of his works. In the process, Hobbes also adapted old texts to 
new ends, imbuing them with revolving raisons d’être. As this chapter shows, 
re-interpretation of earlier works went hand in hand with Hobbes’s use of serial 
composition. The fluidity and nature of his compositional process enabled him 
to reimagine earlier materials in terms of newly adopted epistemological 
positions and corresponding methodological commitments. And he did this 
without worry about misleading readers, for the texts he wrote and his 
understanding of them was always changing. Put differently, adopting serial 
composition as a compositional modus operandi furnished Hobbes with notions 
about what a text is that are discordant with the modern view. His texts were 









a. Methodological interpretations of Hobbes and serial composition 
 
Hobbes’s reliance on serial composition introduces perils for 
interpreters hoping to use descriptions of his project found in later works, like 
De corpore, as methodological cyphers. Hobbes used the discussion of the 
method of moral and civil philosophy, as in the second edition of De cive and in 
De corpore, not to clarify the root method of his political theory, but to re-
describe and re-frame earlier work in terms more amenable to emergent 
viewpoints about the nature of scientific knowledge and how to obtain it. Thus, 
challenges abound for interpreters, like Tom Sorell, who make the 
methodological prescripts articulated in De corpore a centerpiece of their 
interpretations. Sorell must not only contend with the muddled and internally 
inconsistent methodological guidelines articulated in De corpore, but with the 
question of whether Hobbes was actively practicing the method of analysis in 
the construction any one of the versions of his political theory.  
As the previous chapter shows, the language and the methods of analysis 
and synthesis would have been available to Hobbes as he wrote The Elements of 
Law (1640) and, as Mersenne’s dispute with Descartes shows, were available as 
he re-engineered The Elements into De cive (1642). Nonetheless, it remains an 
open question as to what role either method played in Hobbes’s early works. 
What is more certain is that, by 1643, he, unlike members of the Mersenne 
circle, chose to associate the methods with causal knowledge. Thereafter, 
Hobbes introduced the methods into his own work, but only after having 
turned to a generative-causal conception of science. They made their first 
 
 257 
appearance in Hobbesian prose, but in substance only, in an early draft of De 
corpore and again in the preface to the second edition of De cive (1646). After, 
they reappeared by name in De corpore (1655), 667 but without a coherent 
description of how either is applied to the study of moral and civil philosophy. 
This chronology, and examples showing how Hobbes constructed and then 
creatively reconstructed progressive iterations of his political texts, should give 
interpreters like Sorell pause. At a minimum, both should encourage 
interpretive restraint, a recognition that making the statements from De 
corpore, or even the first or second editions of De cive, a basis for 
interpretations of Hobbes’s political theory is a fraught and doubt-laden 
enterprise.  
In general, Hobbes’s interpreters have devoted too much time to the 
study of the methodological bearings purportedly guiding his work, with the 
implicit hope that their study might reveal hidden philosophical dimensions in 
or the inner structure of Hobbes’s political theory. It is true that Hobbes may 
have, throughout, composed his works in a quasi-geometrical style. In The 
Elements of Law this simply entailed a commitment to the expository principles 
of linear and transparent reasoning and the specification of key terms.668 
 
667 Also see Hobbes’s seemingly non-standard application and use of the terms in Leviathan’s 
forty-seventh chapter; the explicit reference to the methods in chapter 47 is unique, as they 
appear nowhere else in Leviathan. In the relevant passage, Hobbes portrays analysis and 
synthesis as nearly synonymous with historical analysis, as tools by which to render an 
historical account of the “Construction of the Pontificall Power,” Leviathan, 1114.  
 
668 As Baumgold points outs, “The bulk of the work – four-fifths of the chapters, to be precise – 
is fleshed out on a skeleton of defined terms, which appear highlighted in black gothic script in 
the manuscript. This method of exposition corresponds to the geometrical method – of 
proceeding by way of axiomatic definitions…,” “The Composition of the ‘Elements of Law,’” 27. 
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However, his understanding of what the commitment entailed changed with 
time, as his understanding of the nature of geometry669 and science changed. 
As shown, Hobbes, time and again, reframed his political theory to 
better reflect the scientific method de jour. This happened again in 1656, a year 
after De corpore’s publication. By then, and while in the process of working up 
a second, revised edition of De corpore,670 he realized that, in the same way that 
geometers have a perfect, maker’s understanding of the “lines and figures” they 
create, so too do we have maker’s knowledge of a commonwealth, something, 
he reasoned, we make ourselves. “Geometry therefore is demonstrable for the 
lines and figures from which we reason are drawn and described by ourselves.” 
Analogously, he wrote, “civil philosophy is demonstrable because we make the 
commonwealth ourselves.”671 It is not possible to know what brought about the 
669 See footnote 673 below. 
670 In a review of Karl Schuhmann’s edition of De corpore, Noel Malcolm recounts that “Within 
months of the publication of De corpore, Hobbes seems to have been contemplating a second 
edition, in which further alterations would also have been made. Reasons for making such 
changes included the evolution of his own thinking, and the suggestions and criticisms he 
received from his friends; but the most powerful reason emerged in the final months of 1655, 
when John Wallis published his scathingly polemical attack on the mathematical contents of 
the work, Elenchus geometriae hobbanae. Whatever Hobbes may have hoped for, the second 
edition of the original Latin text of De corpore was not in the offing: we may presume, that, at 
this stage, Andrew Crooke still had plenty of unsold copies. But Crooke was preparing to 
publish an English translation of it (by an unnamed translator): Hobbes was given the 
opportunity to go through the manuscript of this translation carefully, and to provide 
completely new versions of some sections of the text. The translation, Elements of Philosophy, 
the First Section, Concerning Body, was published in June 1656; here too, the author was still 
making changes at the last minute, with a new leaf substituted for one cut out of the printed 
sheets. Hobbes took this opportunity to issue a separate polemical reply to Wallis (and to 
Wallis’s colleague, now also a public critic of Hobbes, Seth Ward), entitled Six Lessons to the 
Professors of Mathematicks: this work, separately paginated and with its own titlepage, was 
bound with the main text, Concerning Body, and was also mentioned on the titlepage of that 
text,” “The Printing and Editing of Hobbes’s ‘De Corpore:’ A Review of Karl Schuhmann’s 
Edition,” 332. The excerpt from Malcolm’s review is also found in footnote 550.  
671 Hobbes, Thomas, “Six Lessons to the Professors of Mathematics, One of Geometry, the Other 
of Astronomy, in the Chairs Set up by the Noble and Learned Sir Henry Savile, in the University 
of Oxford,” in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury vol. VII, ed. Sir William 
Molesworth (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1845), 184. 
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realization; perhaps it was the collapse and then the intentional remaking of 
England’s political institutions. However, what is knowable is that this idea 
about civil philosophy and maker’s knowledge, put in this way, had not 
occurred to Hobbes before 1656.672 It especially had not occurred to him while 
writing The Elements of Law or De cive, since it presumes an understanding of 
geometry and science that definitively postdates both. 673 As a result, such an 
 
672 See footnote 673 below. 
 
673 Indeed, on numerous occasions, Hobbes reasoned in patterns and presented formulations of 
his ideas that appear to have anticipated the view, as when, for example, he notes in De cive a 
direct parallel between the construction of mathematical and political precepts: “it may be 
proposed that two and three are five, and one may recall the order of the number words, and it 
has been determined by the common consent of speakers of the same language (as by a kind of 
agreement necessary for human society) that Five is the name for as many units as are 
contained in Two and Three taken together; if one then assents that it is therefore true that 2 
and 3 together are the same as 5, that assent will be called knowledge. To know that truth is 
simply to recognize that it was made by ourselves. For those who made the decision and the 
rule of language that the number ** is called Two, *** Three, and ***** Five, are also responsible 
for the fact that the proposition, Two and three taken together make Five is true. Likewise, if we 
remember what it is that is called Theft and wrong, we shall know, from the words themselves 
whether it is true that Theft is a wrong, or not,” On the Citizen, 237 [18.4]. However, Hobbes’s 
later insights vis-à-vis makers knowledge seem not to have sprung from observations about 
naming and the wholesale construction of mathematical and political concepts. Instead, the 
germ of the turn to makers knowledge in Hobbes’s work appears to have been a pivot to a 
generative understanding of geometry, consonant with Gilles Personne de Roberval’s. 
Although, pace Malcolm, the lines of influence are impossible to disentangle, Malcolm is 
correct in the remark that the new understanding was “characteristi[c]” of a turn toward 
understanding “geometrical figures” as “products of the motion of a point,” Aspects of Hobbes, 
154. Hobbes’s pivot to causal science, and incorporation of physics (as conceptualized in the 
“Latin Optical Manuscript”) into the body of philosophy, was concomitant to the shift in 
mathematical understanding. In the “Latin Optical Manuscript,” likely composed in the early 
1640s (see chapter 2 for a discussion of the tract), Hobbes specifies that “hypotheses” 
(hypotheses) about possible effects, whether perfectly correct or not, “are in no small way 
serviceable to human use, as much as if they [the causes about which we hypothesize] may be 
known and demonstrated” (ita ut non minus humano usui inserviant, quam si essent cognitae et 
demonstratae), “Thomas Hobbes: Tractatus Opticus,” 147. The turn, and incorporation of 
“physics” into Hobbes’s conception of science, can be seen in Leviathan, in which he maintains 
the scientific knowledge produces that “by which, out of that we can presently do, we know 
how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time: Because when we see how 
any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come 
into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects,” Leviathan, 72.  David Gauthier 
attempts to locate the incipient elements of the position vis-à-vis makers knowledge and civil 
science in Leviathan. However, the account is unpersuasive as to show that Hobbes had made 
the connection between geometry and civil philosophy by 1651. The most compelling piece of 
textual evidence Gauthier cites is from chapter 21 of Leviathan, wherein, he notes, “Hobbes tells 
us,” “true liberties…are ‘the things which, though commanded by the sovereign, he [the subject] 
may nevertheless without injustice refuse to do so.’ And to determine these, ‘we are to consider 
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insight, like the methodological insights elaborated in De cive, may be, and 
likely are untrustworthy guides for understanding the layers of Hobbes’s 
political theory. 
b. Empirical Hobbes
The real truth is this: Hobbes practiced political theory in a way that was 
neither as neat, systematic, or methodologically unified as later impressions of 
his work suggest. Instead, Hobbes’s political texts are a tangle of old and new 
material. As Hobbes adapted The Elements of Law into different texts, he tacked 
on and slotted in material that addressed emergent empirical insights and 
concerns.  
It is not a single method or scientific intent that unifies Hobbes’s 
political theory. What “unifies” or connects Hobbes’s works of political theory 
is an orientation – a way of being in and responding to the world. From the 
beginning, he aspired to bring the world into his work, and relied on a 
changing set of tools to do this. As Hobbes’s world changed, so did the political 
theory he was writing. Hobbes was in the habit of using political texts to treat, 
capture, and explain emergent aspects of his world. Similarly, changes in his 
world, life, and empirical project also created obstacles that necessitated 
changes to his texts. This “drift”674 resulted in complicated expositions, texts 
what rights we pass away, when we make the commonwealth,’” “Hobbes on Demonstration and 
Construction,” 519. Tellingly, the point vis-à-vis makers knowledge, although staked out in Six 
Lessons and subsequently in De homine, makes no appearance in De corpore. 
674 Alison McQueen offers an alternative, if plausibly complementary account of this drift (or 
some elements of it) in an extraordinarily valuable article on Hobbes’s use of convergent 
argumentation, “Hobbes’s Strategy of Convergence,” Hobbes Studies 33, no. 2 (2020): 135-152. 
The subject also receives attention in McQueen’s “‘A Rhapsody of Heresies,’” 189-190.  
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that address a range of subjects, using a range of means, with each text 
supplying a snapshot of who and where Hobbes was, what he thought or on 
which features of his world he was focused at that particular moment.  
I offer that the fissures and breaks between or plausibly within Hobbes’s 
works are a byproduct of this drift. In the same way that methodological unity 
fails to obtain across his works of political theory (or, potentially, within single 
works of political theory), Hobbes’s other philosophical works (especially De 
corpore, De homine, and De cive) fail to add up to a single whole for the simple, 
proven, reason that he frequently changed his mind, often in response to 
changes in his world and in his own life. However, this is no shortcoming. Nor 
does this mean that Hobbes’s political theory and broader philosophy fails. 
Instead, it is this “drift,” and the empirical character of Hobbes’s texts, that 
make them interesting and deserving of continued rumination.  
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